











Title of Dissertation: ESSAYS ON DECISION MAKING OVER 
RISK   
  
 Ibraheem Abdel-Rahman Catovic, Doctor of 
Philosophy, 2021 
  




I make several contributions to the literature on decision making over risk-bearing 
products. Summarily, my research highlights the importance of non-distributional 
factors in the decision-making process for products bearing risk. I demonstrate that 
the majoritarian consumer behavior of the multi-billion-dollar Mega Millions lottery 
game is not rationalizable by existing preference-based models. Non-preference-
based explanations are also unable to account for the observed behavior. I identify 
factors likely influencing choice behavior and incorporate them into a new model, 
which can account for the majoritarian choice behavior. In a separate project, I 
explore the relationship between risk preferences and preferences over winning 
number selection in games of chance. I provide novel experimental and empirical 
evidence of an interdependence of these preferences. Specifically, I find that at 
relatively reasonable odds, self-selection of winning numbers is most preferred. 
However, when odds worsen, allocation of selection to a random mechanism 
  
becomes most preferred. In a third project, I explore consumer preferences over Prize 
Linked Savings (PLS) products, which have the principal guarantee of standard 
savings products coupled with the positive return skewness of games of chance. I 
provide experimental evidence that designing PLS products with gaming features, 
like those found in games of chance, increases the appeal of PLS and the creation of 
savings. Furthermore, PLS products so designed may serve as better substitutes for 
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Chapter 1: A Mega Millions Anomaly
Abstract
The interstate lottery game Mega Millions introduced a new product in Oc-
tober 2017 called Just the Jackpot. Sales of this product have been anemic. The
Standard option accounts for over 90% of sales even though it is never the ex-
pected value maximizer for consumers among ticket options at any jackpot level.
Several popular decision theoretic models predict Just the Jackpot should have
strong appeal, while interest in the Standard option should be low. I show that
consumers' choice of product is not due to inattentiveness, liquidity constraints or
lags in the adjustment of consumption to new product introduction. I argue that
the data trends are due to dierences in ex post outcome feedback on foregone
choices depending on which option is selected, as well as minimal winner regret,
something not accounted for in most models. I propose a Feedback Weighted
Regret Minimax model that incorporates a feedback parameter as well as a novel
winner-loser regret feature that captures the data trends signicantly better. It
is puzzling that lottery managers chose to introduce Just the Jackpot, as exist-
ing decision models predict negligible increases in Mega Millions participation on
the extensive margin. I show that inducing players to switch from another Mega
Millions option to Just the Jackpot maximizes neither lottery revenue nor lottery
prots. Finally, I argue that the seemingly irrational inverse relationship between
jackpot size and the Just the Jackpot sales percentage can be explained by changes
in player demographics, as a larger share of players at bigger jackpots are likely
unaware of the existence of the Just the Jackpot option.
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Introduction
This paper provides novel empirical evidence of the inability of the most popular models
of decision making under risk to capture actual lottery player behavior. An analysis
of the ticket options and sales for Mega Millions, the second-largest lottery game in
the United States, shows that the actual extant choice pattern in the data is not gen-
erally rationalizable by any of these models, using commonly utilized functional forms
employed in the literature over a wide range of parameter values. This is particularly
intriguing, as the annual sales of Mega Millions tickets is in the range of a few billion
dollars and therefore captures the choice behavior of millions of people, and there are
only three Mega Million ticket options available. The data patterns are also not due
to player unawareness of some of the available ticket options, nor a lag in lottery con-
sumption adjustment, nor liquidity constraints binding on the more expensive ticket
options. The paper argues that this apparent anomaly is due to the insuciency of
the (state space) payo distribution for modeling the decision making process for this
game. The paper proposes that the major driver of the choice behavior is a dierence
in the generation of ex post feedback on foregone choices, depending on which ticket
option is purchased. Another factor likely impacting choice behavior is minimal winner
regret. A model is proposed accounting for both of these phenomena, and this model
is able to more closely align with the revealed preferences in the sales data.
The central motivation for the paper is the introduction of a third Mega Millions
ticket option in October 2017, called Just the Jackpot. Just the Jackpot gives the
consumer the best value of any ticket option for winning the jackpot. Sales of this
product started quite low at about 2% of Mega Millions sales, and then proceeded to fall
below 0.5% by the end of 2017 and remain below that percentage through the writing of
this paper. The sales data is anomalous for a few reasons. First, lottery sales data from
many games over decades demonstrates that jackpot size is the primary driver of sales
for jackpot games, with revenues and prots often growing exponentially as jackpots get
excessively large. Given that Just the Jackpot gives the best value of any ticket option at
winning the jackpot, it is surprising its sales are so low, especially at high jackpot levels.
Second, over 90% of the sales are of the Standard option, even though the Standard
option is not the expected value maximizer at any jackpot level. Third, evaluation of the
choice framework through a decision theory lens suggests that Just the Jackpot should
be a highly desirable product, and the Standard option the least desirable option, across
wide parameter ranges for commonly used parameterizations over a variety of models
and jackpot levels. Essentially, mainstream decision theory would likely have endorsed
the creation of this product from a consumer welfare perspective, yet it has been nothing
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short of a disaster. To its credit, mainstream decision theory models suggests that
introducing Just the Jackpot does not bring in many new players, and that the demand
for Just the Jackpot would be almost entirely due to existing players opting for a
more preferred ticket type. Interestingly, this paper shows that such behavior is not
revenue or prot maximizing from Mega Million's perspective, and therefore questions
the decision to create such a product in the rst place. This study shows that there
is indeed still more to be learned about the factors individuals take into consideration
when making choices over risk, and provides some policy implications relating to lottery
product design.
Rationalizing lottery consumption within a unied model consistent with other com-
mon behavior over risk dates back to the birth of decision theory. Attempting to
incorporate participation in unfair lotteries within an Expected Utility (EU) frame-
work proved to be a tricky proposition. An initial attempt at reconciling simultaneous
(risk loving) lottery participation and (risk averse) insurance purchasing within an EU
framework involved a utility function with multiple inection points (Friedman and
Savage, 1948). While this approach technically could explain the lottery-insurance
paradox at some wealth levels, it opened up bigger cans of worms, including the pre-
dicted depopulation of the middle class due to risk loving behavior (for a comprehen-
sive critique of the Friedman-Savage approach, see Hirshleifer, 1966). An alternative
approach was to remove lottery and gambling participation from evaluation by the
utility of wealth function, by classifying such activities as pleasure-oriented gambling,
discernible from wealth-oriented gambling by its repetitive, small stake nature (Hirsh-
leifer, 1966). Pleasure-oriented gambling qualies as a consumption good and therefore
not subject to consideration under EU, whereas wealth-oriented gambling would be.
There are various rationales consistent with the pleasure-oriented classication, includ-
ing: the (short-lived) right to dream or fantasize about potential winnings (Clotfelter
and Cook, 1990); contributing to socially-desirable causes that are funded by proceeds
from such activities (Clotfelter and Cook, 1990); an escape from the routine, mundane
and predictable nature of modern industrial life (Bloch, 1951); a mechanism for releas-
ing tensions and registering non-disruptive protests against an inequitable capitalistic
system (Devereux, 1949; Frey, 1984); a way to establish social cohesion and maintain
friendships (Guillen et al., 2012). In spite of these reasons, it is unlikely that individuals
partake in games of chance solely or even mostly for non-pecuniary purposes. About
half of California lottery players polled stated that they played the lottery for the money
more so than the fun, the share of which moved inversely with income (Los Angeles
Times, 1986). More recent evidence further validates this, as a poll of over 1,000 US
adults estimated that `21% of Americans, and 38% of those with incomes below $25,000,
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think that winning the lottery represents the most practical way for them to accumulate
several hundred thousand dollars' (Consumer Federation of America, 2006). There is
even evidence that lottery players place value on the means of lottery risk resolution, for
instance, with preferences over self-selection of winning numbers for lottery entries (see
Simon 2008 for a comprehensive discussion of number selection behavior in lotteries).
As the evidence against EU as a sucient framework to model decision behavior
over risk began to pile up, a number of models emerged as modications or wholesale
alternatives to EU. These models sought to maintain much of the normative appeal
of EU while allowing behavior that was becoming increasingly viewed as common and
even rational. Some of the more widely utilized and referenced models include: prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979); anticipated utility (Quiggin, 1982); cumulative
prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992); disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991);
regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell 1982); salience theory (Bordalo et al.
2012). These models are able to handle the lottery-insurance paradox fully within their
frameworks, in spite of diering axiomatic foundations and psychological motivations.
These models maintain the suciency of the (state space) payo distribution for de-
cision making, with no need to attribute lottery or gambling play to consumption in
any way, and without explicitly modeling any of the non-pecuniary motives mentioned
above. However, these models are unable to explain the Mega Millions choice patterns
present in the sales data, as this paper demonstrates.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces Mega Millions and
the sales data. Section 3 reviews the decision theoretic models and their predictions re-
garding the Mega Millions ticketing options. Section 4 addresses non-decision theoretic
explanations of the lack of interest in Just the Jackpot, namely player unawareness
of its existence, slow adjustment of sales, and liquidity constraints due to its relative
costliness. Section 5 proposes behavioral mechanisms that could be impacting Mega
Millions choice behavior. Section 6 incorporates these mechanisms into a model that
is able to explain Mega Millions choice behavior. Section 7 analyzes a few interesting
counterfactuals with implications on lottery design. Section 8 concludes.
Mega Millions Data
Mega Millions is one of the two major interstate lottery games in the United States,
the other being Powerball. To put the size of the US lottery industry into perspective,
aggregate lottery revenue across states and games in scal year 2018 was $85.6 billion
(NASPL, 2020). This is larger than the combined gambling revenues of $41.7 billion
of commercial casinos (AGA, 2019) and $33.7 billion of Indian tribal gaming (NIGC,
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2019), a total of $75.4 billion. Aggregate lottery spending in the United States outpaces
that of sports tickets, books, video games, movie box oce tickets, and music - combined
(CNNMoney, 2015). Powerball and Mega Millions are the two largest selling lottery
games in the United States. In scal year 2018, Powerball recorded $5.2 billion in sales,
while Mega Millions recorded $3.2 billion, combining for about 10% of aggregate lottery
sales in the United States.
A Mega Millions entry requires the player to select ve numbers between 1 and
70 without replacement and a sixth ball from 1 to 25. Players may choose their own
numbers or opt for a random assignment of numbers. Drawings for each game are held
twice a week, during which a large drum spits out ve numbers from the larger range
and a second drum spits out the sixth number from the smaller range. If a player's
ticket has partial number matches with the numbers drawn, that ticket is eligible for
certain prize amounts based on the number of balls matched. If a ticket matches all six
balls (order independent), that ticket is eligible to collect the jackpot amount, albeit
in installments over 30 years. Jackpot winners also have the option to cash out the
jackpot in a single immediate payment, for an amount that is less than the advertised
jackpot. If multiple tickets match all six balls within a drawing, the jackpot is split
among the winners. All other lower prize amounts are given as advertised in a single
payment, regardless of the number of winners at that prize tier.1 If there is no ticket
that matches all six numbers in a drawing, the jackpot rolls over into the next drawing
and increases by an amount determined by the projected and actual sales for that
drawing. The current iteration of Mega Millions features prizes ranging from $2 to the
jackpot, which starts at $40 million. The odds of winning $2 are 1 in 37, the odds of
winning the jackpot are 1 in 302,575,350, and the overall odds of winning any prize are
1 in 24 (for the full prize-odds matrix, see the Appendix).2
There are three ticket types oered by the Mega Millions lottery game. It will be
convenient to categorize Mega Millions prizes in two groups: all the prizes besides the
jackpot are grouped into the lower tier (L), and the jackpot (J) is its own category. This
is a natural classication as only the jackpot can roll over and is the only parimutuel
prize.. The rst is the Standard ticket, which increased from a price of $1 to $2 during
1The exception is California, which determines payouts for non-jackpot prizes on a parimutuel basis.
2Mega Millions started as the Big Game in September 1996, selling tickets in six states: Georgia,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan and Virginia. In May 2002, the Big Game turned into
Mega Millions. In January 2010, a cross-selling agreement was made between the Mega Millions
consortium and the Multi State Lottery Association (MUSL, which runs Powerball). Up to that point,
a state could not sell both Mega Millions and Powerball products. This agreement allowed states
to oer both. Over the years more and more states began oering Mega Millions. Currently, Mega
Millions is available for purchase in 45 states, Washington DC and the US Virgin Islands. The most
recent addition to the Mega Millions family was the state of Mississippi, which began selling Mega
Millions tickets in January 2020 (for even more Mega Millions history see Mega Millions, 2020).
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the latest Mega Millions prize-odds changes in October 2017. This ticket amounts to a
single entry into both the lower tier and the jackpot. The second is the Megaplier, which
increased from a price of $2 to $3 during the October 2017 changes. The Megaplier ticket
yields a single entry into the lower tier and the jackpot, just like the Standard. However,
prospective lower tier prize amounts are at least doubled with a Megaplier ticket. During
the drawing, a Megaplier value is displayed by a random number generator, in addition
to the winning numbers selected from the drums. This Megaplier multiplier takes a
value of 2, 3, 4 or 5 with probabilities of 1/3, 2/5, 1/5 and 1/15, respectively, amounting
to a multiplier expected value of 3. So, if a ticket qualies for a lower tier prize amount
and the purchaser paid the extra dollar for the Megaplier option, the holder would be
entitled to that prize amount multiplied by the Megaplier value. If the Megaplier option
was not added, the holder would be entitled only to the prize amount. The Megaplier
impacts all prize amounts except the jackpot. The third option is the Just the Jackpot
ticket, which is a new option introduced during the October 2017 changes. It has no
similar counterpart in Powerball, unlike the Megaplier. Just the Jackpot costs $3 and
entitles the purchaser to two entries into the jackpot drawing only, the two entries are
not eligible for any lower tier prizes. Figure 1 displays the probability tree diagram for
each of the ticket types.
It is worthwhile to briey consider the choice framework of the current version of
the Mega Millions game. A Standard ticket costs $2, while the Megaplier and Just
the Jackpot each cost $3. The expected value of the lower tier for a Standard ticket is
$0.25, whereas it is $0.75 for the Megaplier lower tier due to the expected Megaplier
multiplier of 3. The expected value of the minimum jackpot of $40 million, assuming
no prize sharing, is $0.13, and a jackpot of $75 million yields about the same expected
value of $0.25 as the lower tier prizes for a Standard ticket. From an expected valued
maximization perspective of a single ticket with a single jackpot winner, the Standard
ticket is best for jackpots below $378 million, and Just the Jackpot for jackpots in excess
of that, with Megaplier never being the best option under any feasible jackpot. However,
modeling the decision behavior based on the actual ticket costs introduces a cost eect
between the Standard ticket and the other two options. For example, consider a half-
Standard ticket, which is a Standard ticket with all of the win probabilities cut in half,
and let the cost of this be $1. If this payo distribution is valued much more by a player
than a dollar, then the decision problem pitting the three ticket options with their costs
against each other would be under-valuing the Standard ticket option, and vice versa.
Modifying the decision problem by adding this half-Standard ticket to the Standard
ticket would yield one and a half Standard tickets at a cost of $3. Comparing this with
the other two options more appropriately captures the decision framework. Players are
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not limited to a single ticket purchase and can buy as many tickets as they want, and
this cost neutral transformation better captures this reality. The choice problem is not
so much which ticket option would a player prefer, but rather which payo distribution
a player would prefer at a given cost. The cost neutral approach will be the baseline
approach for the model evaluations. Now, ranking tickets by expected value under the
assumption of a single jackpot winner yields the Megaplier with the maximum expected
value for jackpots below $223,870,250 and Just the Jackpot for jackpots above that:
the cost neutral Standard option never maximizes the expected value at any feasible
jackpot level.

































In 2018, the Mega Millions jackpot reached an enormous $1.6 billion, making it
the largest lottery payout in US history to a single individual (Mega Millions, 2019).
Figure 2 presents the Mega Millions sales data for this historic round, spanning from
July 27 to October 23. A Mega Millions jackpot draw is a specic Tuesday or Friday
on which the winning numbers are drawn, whereas a round consists of the set of draws
beginning with the minimum jackpot up until the next jackpot reset. A key takeaway is
the exponential climb in draw sales as the jackpot gets abnormally high. The sales data
for the whole two years, including the historic round, is in Table A2 in the Appendix.
The Total column represents the total Mega Millions sales for that draw of the three
ticket types in DC and the 14 states that oer Just the Jackpot: total nationwide
sales are approximately three times those amounts. The Standard, Megaplier and Just
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the Jackpot columns represent the percentage of sales in dollars (not tickets) of each
ticket type. The percentage reported of the number of tickets would further elevate the
Standard percentages over the other two options, as it costs one dollar less. There are
a few things to note right o the bat. First, sales do not monotonically increase with
jackpot at lower jackpot levels. This is due to the weekend eect: there is a drawing
on Tuesday night and one on Friday night, the sales for Friday drawings will typically
outdo those for the following Tuesday, even with the increase in jackpot. Second, as the
jackpot rolls over and sales respond to the increased expected jackpots, the dierence in
successive jackpots increases. In this case, the dierence start at $5 million and maxes
out at $600 million.
Figure 2: Mega Millions Sales for $1.6 Billion Jackpot












07/25/2018 08/24/2018 09/23/2018 10/23/2018
Draw Date
Figure 3 presents the sales percentages of each ticket type during the historic round,
which are representative of the overall trends over the two years. The Standard ticket is
selected in over 90% of transactions across all jackpot levels, the percentage increasing
with jackpot size, in spite of it not being an expected value maximizer at any jackpot
level under the cost neutral approach. The Megaplier seems to hold some niche ap-
peal, with a range of 5% to 8% of sales, decreasing with jackpot size. This negative
relationship between the Megaplier sales percentage and jackpot size is as expected:
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from an expected value viewpoint, Megaplier holds its biggest relative appeal at the
minimum jackpot level. As the jackpot increases, the share of expected value going to
the jackpot increases, implying a reduction in the relative appeal of Megaplier. The
Just the Jackpot sales numbers are particularly intriguing. Once again, the sales and
percentages reported are only for those states that oer Just the Jackpot. The percent-
age of sales never goes above a measly 0.3% for any of the draws. Even more bizarre
is the at or perhaps even slightly negative relationship between the Just the Jackpot
sales percentage and the jackpot amount. A positive relationship is expected, since
Just the Jackpot holds minimal relative appeal at the minimum jackpot amount, and
increases in relative appeal with each successive rollover. The diminutive sales of Just
the Jackpot tickets are perhaps surprising, given the clear impact jackpot size is having
on aggregate sales in Figure 2, let alone all the evidence highlighting the impact of
jackpot sizes on sales and protability.3 This product is nothing short of a op, to the
point where the state of Wisconsin discontinued Just the Jackpot on October 30, 2018,
citing a lack of interest in the product, per an email exchange the author of this paper
had with a Wisconsin lottery ocial. The next section introduces a number of the more
popular decision models and demonstrates their collective inability to explain the sales
data.
3The positive impact of jackpot size on lottery sales is well-established in the lottery literature
(DeBoer, 1990; Cook and Clotfelter, 1993; Forrest, Simmons and Chesters, 2002). There is even
evidence of the positive impact of jackpot size on lottery sales and a negative impact of expected
value, but the high correlation between expected value and jackpot size may be aecting the estimates
(Cook and Clotfelter, 1993). Lottery sales decreases in New York in the 1980s were attributed to
increased participation resulting in fewer rollovers and smaller jackpots, with a recommendation to
reduce the odds of winning to generate larger jackpots (DeBoer, 1990). Many of the innovations
to jackpot lottery games over the years have come about with the intent of increasing jackpot sizes:
increased ticket costs, larger minimum starting jackpots, larger target player pools, and decreased odds
of winning the jackpot. The development of interstate lotteries was due to the belief that larger player
pools with decreased jackpot odds would allow jackpots to grow in size, with a disproportional eect
on revenue and protability. Mega Millions ran with this notion by introducing its Just the Jackpot
ticket option, made available in 14 states and Washington, DC since the most recent Mega Millions
iteration in October 2017.
9
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Megaplier Just the Jackpot
Standard
Decision Theory Model Predictions
This section evaluates the Mega Millions choice problem in a number of decision models.
These models require one or more functional specications to concretely predict choice
behavior over risk. For example, Expected Utility requires the specication of a utility
function over wealth. Additionally, estimation of these models generally proceed by
assuming a certain family of functions. For instance, the power function xα is often
used as the functional family for utility over wealth in a number of models. The
majority revealed preference in the data is for the Standard option across jackpot
levels. A minority of players prefer the Megaplier, and Just the Jackpot participation is
eectively negligible. For a model to be realistically considered to rationalize the data,
it should be able to demonstrate the primary trends in the data using the common
functional forms assumed in the literature across a suciently wide range of parameter
values. Specically, the parameter ranges should be consistent with those estimated
in the experimental model estimation literature. Additionally, at least some of those
parameter values should predict a preference for the Standard option over the range
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of jackpots observed in the data, modeling the behavior of a frequent Mega Millions
player who buys at all jackpot levels. Perhaps there should be more parameter-jackpot
combinations consistent with Standard preferences than either of the two other Mega
Millions options. However, simply using the percentage of parameter combinations
predicting each preference as an indicator of population preferences implicitly assumes
uniformity of the population across parameter values. This assumption is extremely
tenuous and is a weakness of the proposed approach. It turns out that none of the
models tested are able to demonstrate even a single parameter combination that can
predict Standard selection across the range of feasible Mega Millions jackpots, so that
the distribution of the population over parameter values eectively becomes a moot
point. Additionally, there should be a good number of parameter-jackpot combinations
that predict not participating in Mega Millions at all, since most people do not play
Mega Millions. Even restricting the population to existing lottery players suggests that
participation predictions should not be too high, particularly at low jackpot levels, as
Mega Millions accounted for less than 5% of US lottery sales in 2018. Such a restriction
is reasonable, since some people may have moral or religious objections to lottery play
and therefore the choice problem becomes trivial.
An important assumption is that the choice framework utilized in model evaluation
is selecting one of the three ticket distributions, or a fourth outside option of not buying
any and therefore having the cost of the ticket with probability 1. In reality, players
may opt to play another lottery game or do anything else with those unspent funds,
but the analysis forthcoming essentially subsumes this within the option of not playing
and thereby having those funds. This assumption essentially just sets a threshold for
Mega Millions play. For example, consider $3 that can be spent on Mega Millions or
in some other way. It is possible that there is an outside option with a cost of $3
with a higher utility than simply having those $3. This would just raise the required
utility to play Mega Millions. So, in situations where modeling a utility of $3 implies
just barely choosing a Mega Millions option, raising that threshold could result in the
model predicting no participation. It turns out that across models, situations in which
Standard is preferred sit disproportionately close to the participation threshold relative
to the two other ticket types, so that increasing the threshold would result in even
worse predictions of Standard preferences. Also, model implications are determined
purely using distributional and state space payo information: non-monetary concerns
like entertainment utility or preferences over how lotteries are resolved are excluded
from the analysis. Even if such considerations exist, assuming these non-monetary




In order for Expected Utility to explain participation in unfair lotteries, convex utility is
required, at least over certain ranges of wealth, as in Friedman and Savage (1948). Jack-
pot games like Mega Millions sometimes oer positive expected returns when jackpots
get excessively large. Under the assumption of a single jackpot winner, the requisite
break-even jackpot amounts are about $530 million for the $2 Standard purchase, $685
million for the Megaplier purchase, and $453 million for the Just the Jackpot purchase
(two jackpot only entries). Expected value calculation and the decision modeling that
follows use the advertised jackpot amount, not the cash value (one-time payout) of the
jackpot. This latter amount becomes more relevant for the revenue estimations that
happen in Section 7. The minimum starting jackpot is $40 million, jackpot amounts
above $400 million are relatively uncommon. Factoring in the likelihood of multiple
jackpot winners based on the number of tickets sold further increases these break-even
thresholds. Therefore, the general case for Mega Millions participation would require a
convex utility function to meet the individual rationality constraint.
One thing to consider before making functional and parametric assumptions is
whether any of these ticket options dominate any other. No option FOSD any other:
while the Megaplier FOSD the Standard option at the lower tiers, the higher probability
of winning the jackpot in the cost neutral Standard option negates FOSD over the whole
distribution; both the Standard and Megaplier FOSD over Just the Jackpot is nullied
by the higher probability of winning the jackpot with a Just the Jackpot entry. There
is some conditional dominance in the second order: both the Standard and Megaplier
options SOSD Just the Jackpot at jackpot levels below approximately $224 million,
above which the added value of the better jackpot odds under Just the Jackpot negates
SOSD; there is no cost neutral SOSD between the Standard and Megaplier ticket at any
jackpot level. The SOSD results imply that at jackpot levels below $224 million, which
the majority of latent jackpots meet, a risk averse EU maximizer will not buy Just the
Jackpot, irrespective of parametric considerations. While this result is consistent with
the lack of take up of Just the Jackpot in the data, risk averse EU maximizers would
not buy any of the options at jackpot levels below $224 million, as the expected return
for each is negative. So dominance results under EU cannot rationalize the data.
The next step is to consider functional forms of utility with the appropriate para-
metric value ranges. As Mega Millions tickets usually oer negative expected returns,
convex utility is required for individual rationality to hold. As was mentioned earlier,
Mega Millions can be simplied into a game with a probability of getting a lower tier
prize (L) and a smaller probability of getting the jackpot (J), which rolls over into the
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next jackpot if no one wins. Without loss of generality, Mega Millions can be reduced
to a lower tier and jackpot two branch lottery, and the expected utility of each ticket
can be represented as:




pmu(m ∗ L)) + pJu(J)
3. Just the Jackpot: 2pJu(J)
Here the u(0) is normalized to 0, and the subscript m refers to the four possible
Megaplier values. Regarding the Megaplier, a convex u(.) and a mean Megaplier
value of 3 imply that (
5∑
m=2
pmu(m ∗ L)) > 3u(L). These conditions reduce to:
0.5pJu(J) > 1.5pLu(L) (1)
0.5pJu(J) < 1.5pLu(L) (2)
1.5pLu(L) + 1.5pJu(J) > u(3) (3)
where (1) is the preference condition for Standard over Megaplier, (2) is the preference
condition for Standard over Just the Jackpot, and (3) is the rationality constraint. It is
immediately apparent that (1) and (2) cannot simultaneously hold, meaning that under
the assumption of a convex utility function, the Standard option can never be the most
preferred option under EU, irrespective of the rationality constraint or wealth level.
Given the argued necessity of a convex utility function to capture lottery participation
at most jackpot levels, the strong conclusion is that EU is unable to account for the
preference patterns in the data.
Prospect Theory
The theory that has gained the most traction as an alternative to EU theory is Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), abbreviated to PT, and its rened version
Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), which will be addressed
in the next section. Among its advantages is its innate ability to explain the insurance-
lottery paradox via the introduction of a probability weighting function w(p), which
over-weights small probabilities and under-weights large probabilities. A preference
for participation in an unfair lottery no longer necessitates a convex utility of wealth
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function, as sucient probability over-weighting can overcome even heavily concave
utility and lead to risk loving behavior. Under PT, the three cost neutral probability-
weighted expected utility representations of the simplied Mega Millions lottery options
are:




w(pm)u(m ∗ L)) + w(pJ)u(J)
3. Just the Jackpot: w(2pJ)u(J)
The dierence in representation here in relation to EU is the incorporation of the
possibly non-linear w(p), allowing
∑
nw(pn) 6= 1. A general feature of w(.) is the
over-weighting of small probabilities and the under-weighting of large ones. The proba-
bilities of winning any Mega Millions prize are much smaller than the typical inection
point probabilities both theoretically postulated (Prelec, 1998) and experimentally es-
timated (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Wu and Gonzalez,
1996). Therefore, subadditivity is expected to hold at the Mega Millions win probabil-
ities under PT: w(xp) < xw(p), x > 1. The two preference conditions and rationality
constraint for the Standard option to be selected are:
[w(1.5pJ)− w(pJ)]u(J) > [δw(pL)− w(1.5pL)]u(L) (4)
w(1.5pL)u(L) > [w(2pJ)− w(1.5pJ)]u(J) (5)
w(1.5pL)u(L) + w(1.5pJ)u(J) > λu(3) (6)
Simplications beyond these conditions are not as readily made without further assump-
tions, unlike EU. Condition (4) is the preference condition for Standard over Megaplier,
(5) is the preference condition for Standard over Just the Jackpot, and (6) is the ratio-
nality constraint, with λ > 1 capturing the loss aversion associated with paying $3 to
play the lottery. The presence of loss aversion in the Mega Millions PT representation
depends on whether each of the three ticket evaluations include the payment of $3, or
if not playing is a separate fourth lottery that gives $3. Loss aversion does not im-
pact preference between Mega Millions tickets and only raises the threshold for Mega
Millions participation. Loss aversion serves the same role as an outside option with
a higher threshold. Therefore, loss aversion will not be included as a model parame-
ter (λ = 1), or equivalently, not playing and keeping $3 is an outside fourth option.
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Condition (4) takes advantage of the fact that (
5∑
m=2
w(pm)u(m ∗ L)) = δu(L) for some
real number δ > 1. The value of δ is determined by both the shapes of u(.) and w(.).
The Megaplier value probabilities are much closer to typical inection points than the
prize win probabilities, so that δ may be more heavily inuenced by u(.) and similar
but larger in value to a δ for the same utility function under EU. This is because the
Megaplier values of 4 and 5, which are above the mean of 3, have probabilities that
fall in the generally understood over-weighting portion of w(.), whereas the Megaplier
probability values of 2 and 3 are close to the usual inection point range. A consequence
of the subadditivity is that while both the LHS of (4) and the RHS of (5) represent
a change in probability of 0.5pJ , the LHS of (4) is larger than the RHS of (5). This
allows a wider range of permissible behavior relative to the EU constraints.
Given expected population variation of preferences, a parametric modeling of PT
should demonstrate a preference for the Standard option over a substantial range of
parameter values and jackpot levels. The most commonly used utility function in the
parameter estimation literature of PT is the CRRA power function
u(x) = xα, x ≥ 0, α > 0 (7)
(see Abdellaoui, 2000 for a list of studies using this formulation). The PT estimations
will test two of the more referenced w(.) in the literature: pγ/[pγ+(1−p)γ ]
1
γ (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992) and the more theoretically-motivated exp(−(−lnp)γ) (Prelec, 1998).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) generate experimental data and estimate median values
of α = 0.88, γ = 0.61 for gains. All lottery options are framed as gains, so the loss side
estimates of parameter values can be ignored, as symmetry is not an implicit assumption
of PT. These estimates are consistent with diminishing sensitivity and strong probability
distortion. They can also serve as starting points for determining parameter ranges that
support a rational preference for the Standard ticket over various jackpot amounts.
At these starting points, the Standard option is highly individually rational, with
a net PT utility of about 50 at the minimum jackpot of $40 million, increasing to a
net PT utility of about 700 for a jackpot of $1 billion. This jump in net PT utility
with jackpot change highlights the fact that a minimum of 75% of the PT utility
value of the Standard option at these median parameter values is due to the jackpot
PT utility valuation, share increasing with jackpot size. While Standard is rational,
it is not preferred at these parameter values: for jackpots up to about $100 million,
Megaplier is preferred, while Just the Jackpot is preferred for all larger jackpots. Model
predictions were generated for jackpot levels of $40 million, $100 million, $200 million,
$300 million, $400 million, $500 million, $750 million and $1 billion, with lower jackpot
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levels occurring in reality with more frequency than higher ones. Using the Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) functional specications, utility power function parameter α is
allowed to run from 0.71 to 1.10. This range is chosen because it is the interquartile
range of parameter values estimated for subjects modeled under PT in the experimental
estimation of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and L'Haridon (2008). While an experimental
setting may arguably not constitute a representative sample of Mega Millions players, it
is also dicult to nd a reason why lottery player preference estimates would necessarily
fall outside of this range. Furthermore, results are robust to the extension of the range
of permissible α to [0.5, 1.5], not just here but in all the popular models tested in this
paper. Probability distortion parameter γ from both the Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
and Prelec (1998) specications run from 0.50 to 0.99. A γ of 1 reduces to EU, a γ
above 1 is distortion in the opposite direction than the literature nds evidence for.
The total number of parameter-jackpot combinations in each PT specication is
16,000: 40 utility parameter values, 50 probability distortion parameter values, and 8
jackpots. The results reported in Table 1 are of the specication most favorable to a
Standard preference, which happens to be the Prelec (1998) weighting function speci-
cation. It is generally more likely to predict lottery play given its relative steepness at
low probability levels in comparison to the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) specication:
91.4% of the 16,000 parameter-jackpot tests predict playing some version of Mega Mil-
lions, much more than the 77.2% in the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) specication.
Of these 16,000 combinations, only 104 predict a preference for the Standard option,
about 0.7%. The number of jackpot tests for which Standard is preferred and rational
is at most 2 of a possible 8 for any parameter pair, as indicated by the Max Jackpots
Standard column in Table 1. No parameter pair predicts Standard preference at the
minimum $40 million jackpot, and most of the predictions are for the rarer high jackpot
amounts. Figure 4 gives a mapping of preferences over parameter values by jackpot
amount for the Prelec PT specication. Overall, PT does very poorly in explaining
the strong preference for Standard in the data. In fact, it actually predicts a strong
preference for Just the Jackpot, contrary to the choice behavior in the data.
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Table 1: Summary of Cost Neutral Model Predictions
Model Max Jackpots Standard
Expected Utility 0
Prospect Theory 2




Table 1 shows the maximum number of jackpots that any one parameter set predicts a Standard preference for. Prospect
Theory uses the Prelec (1998) weighting function; Rank Dependent Utility is Cumulative Prospect Theory using the
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function; Disappointment Aversion with a certainty equivalent less than 4
specication; Regret Theory under pairwise aggregation and full overlap scenario; Salience Theory under a no overlap
scenario with θ = 1, 000, 000.
A major driver in the preference relationship between Mega Millions options under
PT is subadditivity. The cost neutral comparison boils down to getting bigger lower
tier prizes and the jackpot with probability p with the Megaplier, a shot at both the
lower tier and jackpot with a probability of 1.5p with the Standard, and two shots
at only the jackpot with Just the Jackpot. The eective non-linearity between these
probabilities strongly impacts preference under PT. However, the intuitive motivation of
subadditivity in the case of Mega Millions participation is not so clear cut. Subadditivity
implies that if buying multiple Mega Millions tickets in sequence, the value of the rst
ticket is larger than that of the second, the value of the second larger than that of the
third, etc. This results in every player only buying a nite number of Mega Millions
entries, because at some point the subadditivity will drive ticket valuations below the
cost of participation under the assumption of approximate linearity of u(.) over small
wealth intervals (Rabin, 2000). At some point, all existing players will drop out, and
the only way to maintain participation is to bring in new players, which does not
seem sustainable. It is also not consistent with the existence of regular players who
play such games on a frequent basis for extended periods of time. There needs to be
some resetting of subadditivity at some point. Is it with every transaction? Every
change in jackpot? Resetting after every draw seems more reasonable, as technically
the lottery changes after every draw and the previously purchased tickets are not valid
for future draws. However, that would allow a player buying multiple tickets over
consecutive drawings to value an earlier ticket at a lower jackpot over a later ticket
at a higher jackpot, violating FOSD, a violation which PT does allow, but does not
seem reasonable in this case. A Mega Millions scenario perhaps most consistent with
PT and subadditivity is a regular player who purchases a single ticket for every draw.
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Subadditivity coupled with the signicant value added of a possibility of winning prizes,
however small, ensure that only a single entry is purchased per draw. Subadditivity
resetting with every draw allows this pattern to continue indenitely. The Standard
ticket is the cheapest option that gives entry into the Mega Millions, and the added
perks of the Megaplier and Just the Jackpot do not oset the additional dollar cost.
While this story may have descriptive appeal, it should be able to be validated within a
parametric modeling of PT. Parametric estimations of PT utility comparisons for single
purchases using both the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Prelec (1998) weighting
functions result respectively in a paltry 2 and 22 parameter pairs predicting Standard
preference, even worse than the cost neutral framework. The single purchase framework
is discussed more thoroughly in Section 5 below.
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Rank Dependent Utility
One criticism of PT is its allowance of FOSD violations. Quiggin (1982) introduced
Anticipated Utility (AU) theory, which uses the cumulative probability distribution to
determine the probability weights and eliminates FOSD violations. Outcomes are or-
dered by size, and weights are determined by the marginal impact of the probability.
The implication is that w(p) can change depending on where in the distribution it falls,
with higher distortions occurring when it falls closer to 0 or 1. Using the marginal prob-
ability contribution ensures that
∑
w(p) = 1. Kahneman and Tversky modied PT into
Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT, 1992) by incorporating Quiggin's idea of marginal
probability contributions. Models that use the cumulative probability distributions to
determine weights have been termed Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) models. While
CPT incorporates more structure than AU (loss aversion, separate weighting over gains
and losses, reference point, etc.), in the case of Mega Millions, the only dierence is
how the weights are determined via the cumulative distribution. For example, consider
a lottery with three outcomes x1 < x2 < x3 with probabilities p1, p2 and p3. Under AU,
the weightsπ1, π2 and π3 are w(p1), w(p1+ p2)−w(p1), 1−w(p1+ p2). Under CPT, the
weights are 1 − w(p3 + p2), w(p3 + p2) − w(p3), w(p3). The preference and rationality
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constraints are the same as in (4), (5) and (6) from PT, except the weights are now the
marginal weights derived from the cumulative probability distribution. Once again, the
parametrization will employ the power function in (7) and the two weighting functions
used in the PT modeling over the same ranges.
The two weighting functions and two rank dependent models yield four specica-
tions. Once again, Table 1 only reports the specication most favorable to a Stan-
dard preference, which happens to be CPT using the Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
weighting function. Under this specication, 12,215 parameter pairs are consistent with
playing Mega Millions, of which 422 predict a preference for the Standard ticket, about
2.6%. The number of jackpot tests for which Standard is preferred and rational is 3 of
a possible 8 for any parameter pair, one more than under PT modeling. Figure 5 gives
a mapping of preferences over parameter values by jackpot amount for the Tversky
Kahneman CPT specication. The preference for Standard is better distributed across
jackpot levels here, although only 11 parameter pairs support a Standard preference
at the most common jackpot amount of $40 million. The estimations were carried
out applying the relevant probability distortion to the Megaplier probabilities. Forcing
linear weighting over Megaplier probabilities does not substantially change the results
of the predictions. The results of all four RDU specications end up quite similar to
those of PT: low preferences for Standard, high preferences for Just the Jackpot, and
seemingly high rates of Mega Millions play. All of these run contrary to the choice
behavior observed in the sales data.



























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha




























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha





























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha




























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha




























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha




























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha




























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha




























0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10
Utility Parameter Alpha
Standard Megaplier Just the Jackpot None Literature
$1 Billion Jackpot
Disappointment Aversion
Disappointment Aversion (DA) is an axiomatic model that swaps in an alternative to
the independence axiom, with the intent of accommodating the Allais paradox while
minimally straying from EU (Gul, 1991). Given a lottery p, there must exist a certainty
equivalent for it. All outcomes larger than the certainty equivalent are considered ela-
tion outcomes, all outcomes below the certainty equivalent are considered disappoint-
ment outcomes (DA is a reference dependent model of sorts). Let a be the summed
elation probabilities, q and r the normalized elation and disappointment sub-lotteries,
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u(x) ∗ q(x)] + [(1− γ(a))
∑
x∈r
u(x) ∗ r(x)] γ(a) = a
1+(1−a)β (8)
with β ∈ (−1,∞). A negative β indicates an over-weighting of the elation outcomes
and therefore elation loving, whereas a positive β indicates an over-weighting of the
disappointment outcomes, hence disappointment averse, and β = 0 reduces to EU. The
Allais paradox is consistent with disappointment averse preferences.
There has not been much work done on tting individual decisions over risk using
DA modeling. Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt (2007) propose an elicitation method for
estimating DA parametrization using a power function as in (7) for utility. Estimation
results from their experiment implementing the elicitation procedure are a median value
for the power function parameter of α = 0.89 for gains, and median DA parameter β
ranging from about 0 to 3.5, depending on the probability of winning. They strongly
reject the notion of a constant β for an individual, and that as the probability of
winning increases, the higher β reects the increased desire to avoid disappointment.
When the probabilities of winning are low, the feeling of disappointment ex post will not
be as intense compared to when the probability is higher, since the expectation is for a
disappointing outcome (Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt, 2007). This result falls outside of
the scope of the DA model as proposed by Gul (1991). The lowest win probability tested
in Abdellaoui and Bleichrodt (2007) was 0.1, which gave a median β slightly below 0,
indicative of elation loving. As the win probabilities for Mega Millions are exponentially
smaller than 0.1, projecting the inverse relationship between win probability and elation
loving onto the Mega Millions data should predict β estimates well in the elation loving
range. Parameter values that are more likely to predict purchasing Mega Millions
products will be lower values for β and higher α values for the power utility function.
A necessary prerequisite for DA modeling is determining certainty equivalents of
the lotteries in question. As these may vary signicantly for players of Mega Millions,
DA modeling for Mega Millions executed here allows certainty equivalents to fall into
two possible ranges that should cover the actual certainty equivalents for most players:
certainty equivalents less than 4, and certainty equivalents between 4 and 10. This
requires two separate estimations. Letting α to once again move between 0.71 and
1.10 in increments of 0.01 and β range from -0.9 to 4.0 in increments of tenths, with
the same 8 jackpot levels, there are 16,000 possible parameter-jackpot combinations
under each specication. There is a grand total of 0 parameter-jackpot combinations in
which the Standard option is both rational and most preferred under either certainty
equivalent specication. Results in Table 1 are for the certainty equivalent less than
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four specication, selected since the cost of tickets in the cost neutral framework is $3.
No mapping of parameters is given here since no tested parameter combination predicts
Standard preference at any feasible jackpot level. The only DA parameter values that
allow a rational preference for the Standard option are β < −.95, corresponding to
absurd elation loving. Such extreme elation loving equates to a minimum of 30%
weight going to elation outcomes under DA utility evaluation of the Standard option
for certainty equivalents below 4 which have an actual probability of about 2% of
occurring. In the case of certainty equivalents between 4 and 10, the weight is about
9% for outcomes with an objective probability of approximately 0.5%. These weights
are somewhat incredulous, especially if they are to hold across decision problems. The
conclusion must be that DA is not an appropriate model to account for the preferences
for the Standard option displayed in the Mega Millions data.
Regret Theory
The models analyzed so far are structured so that lottery evaluation is independent
of the set of lotteries available: evaluation of a lottery is wholly within-lottery. The
remaining models require lottery evaluation to be contingent on the opportunity set,
allowing for both within and between-lottery factors in lottery evaluation. Regret The-
ory (RT) was independently and simultaneously developed by Bell (1982) and Loomes
and Sugden (1982). The environment for RT is in the mold of Savage (1954), in which
the decision framework is choosing among acts that result in consequences depending
on the state of the world that occurs. This native environment diers from those of
the models discussed so far, which are choices between probability distributions over
outcomes. The premise is that utility consists of an objective part, separate from the
choice setting, as well as a part that depends on the other choices available. Specically,
an individual can make a choice or take a certain course of action between two avail-
able, and then some state of the world resolves, and the outcome associated with that
action in that state of the world ensues. An individual could perhaps feel some elation
or rejoice if that outcome is better than the outcome in the same state of the world
under the other course of action, and perhaps some regret if the outcome observed is
worse than what would have occurred under the other course of action. RT attempts
to capture the anticipation of such feelings in the decision making process. Theories
that allow for set-dependent lottery evaluation may have a better shot at explaining the
Mega Millions choice behavior, due to the interdependence of the ticket types. With a
given ticket in hand, a regret-inuenced player may feel regret for playing at all if it is
a losing ticket. In the case of the ticket winning a lower tier prize, such a player will
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feel no regret or maximal rejoice if the ticket is a Megaplier, a combination of regret
and rejoice if it is Standard, and maximal regret if it is Just the Jackpot, even more
so than not playing. If the ticket is a jackpot winner, there is no dierence in outcome
across ticket types, and rejoice is felt over not playing.
The method of action evaluation under RT is fundamentally between two actions
only. Loomes and Sugden (1982) specify that
Ai  Ak ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
pj[cij − ckj +R(cij − ckj)−R(ckj − cij)] ≥ 0 (9)
where cij is the choiceless utility that the outcome of action Ai yields in state j, and R(.)
is a strictly increasing regret-rejoice function. This condition equates to the modied
expected utility of Ai being greater than that of Ak. Dening a function Q(ξ) =
ξ +R(ξ)−R(−ξ), the evaluation condition simplies to
Ai  Ak ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
pj[Q(cij − ckj)] ≥ 0 (10)
Loomes and Sugden (1982) demonstrate that a convexQ(.) is consistent with typical EU
violations like the common consequence eect, Allais paradox and the lottery-insurance
paradox. One drawback of RT is that its extension to decisions between three or more
actions is not straightforward. A keystone of the axiomatic foundation of RT is the
relinquishing of transitivity and maintenance of the sure-thing principle. Therefore, as
RT is built to compare two actions, invoking transitivity for decisions over three or
more actions is not acceptable (Loomes and Sugden, 1982).
Bleichrodt et al. (2010) develop and perform the trade-o estimation procedure
to experimentally estimate parametric forms of RT. The power function family in (7)
was used to measure both choiceless utility c and the regret function Q(.). Mean esti-
mates of choiceless utility were eectively linear at 0.98 and 1.01 across two elicitation
problems. However, there was signicant variation at the individual level, with more
subjects classied under concave utility than convex. Mean estimates of the power
function parameter for Q(.) yielded mean estimates of 1.73 and 1.89 across two elici-
tation problems. There is some variance at the individual level, but the overwhelming
majority of subjects display a convex Q(.) under RT. The convexity estimated is con-
sistent with the functional requirements in RT for many commonly observed choice
behaviors. The relevant set of actions are purchasing any three of the Mega Millions
ticket types, or not playing at all, so four actions. As in Bleichrodt et al. (2010), both
choiceless utility c and regret function Q(.) will take a power function representation as
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in (7). The power parameter in c will run from 0.71 to 1.10 in hundredths intervals as
in previous models, and the power parameter for Q(.) will run from 0.6 to 3.0 in tenths.
The Mega Millions choice problem is not pairwise, so a RT extension is necessary, and
two dierent ones will be employed. For pairwise mean utility, a simple average of the
pairwise utilities is used to predict preference, where the option yielding the maximum
average is preferred (Loomes and Sugden, 1982). In the case of state-wise mean utility,
the input corresponds to cij −mean(c−ij), where c−ij refers to the outcomes of all ac-
tions besides Ai (Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Sugden 1993). There does not seem to be
any compelling reason to weigh certain actions and outcomes more so than others.
In order for RT to model a decision process, a matrix of state-contingent outcomes
must be fully specied (Loomes and Sugden, 1982). With independence of the available
lotteries assumed, this criterion is generally satised. However, the cost neutral fram-
ing of the decision problem may not satisfy independence. Consider the cost neutral
pairwise choice between a Standard and Megaplier purchase. For any purchase amount,
the Megaplier yields a smaller set of number combinations eligible for prizes, although
winning combinations result in a higher payo for lower tier prizes. Consider spending
$6 on either two Megapliers or three Standard entries, and assume the Megaplier value
is 3, meaning lower tier prizes are multiplied by three. The number combinations on
the rst two tickets would be the same, regardless of Megaplier or Standard status. The
third entry is what can cause a matrix uniqueness violation, as Table 2 displays. If the
third entry is Ticket 3a, Ticket 3a can only win in states of the world that Tickets 1
and 2 do not. However, if the third entry is Ticket 3b, Ticket 3b and Ticket 1 have the
same Mega Ball entry, entitling them both to the lowest possible prize if the Mega Ball
value drawn is 25. Whether Ticket 3a or 3b is the third Standard ticket changes the
set of possible outcomes pairs and breaks the outcome matrix uniqueness. One way to
tackle this is to assume the case of Ticket 3a, of no overlapping numbers. With a given













≈ 65%. Note that this probability will decrease greatly as the number
of existing tickets required to not match a new ticket increases. The other option of
considering Ticket 3b is more problematic in that there are other potential scenarios
like Ticket 3b that result in further diering outcome matrices, such as sharing two
numbers, three numbers, etc. Therefore, the polar overlap case of sharing all winning
states for lower prize levels will be tested. While technically this scenario cannot mani-
fest in reality, since matching the Mega Ball is a condition for some lower level prizes, it
serves as a limiting case to test the RT model. Allowing the jackpot winning to overlap
can only hurt the Standard option, since the jackpot is simply split among the winning
tickets, so the jackpot entries from additional Standard entries will not overlap. Both
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the no overlap and full overlap cases are tested, as depending on the parameter values
of c and Q(.), one of these boundary cases will always make the Standard option as
favorable as it can be under RT.
Table 2: Example of Outcome Matrix Dierences
Combination (#-#-#-#-#|Mega Ball) Outcome Pairs with Ticket 1, Megaplier=3
Ticket 1 1-2-3-4-5|25
Ticket 2 6-7-8-9-10|24 N/A
Ticket 3a 11-12-13-14-15|23 {(J,0);(0,J);(3L,0);(0,L);(6,0);(0,2);(0,0)}
Ticket 3b 16-17-18-19-20|25 {(J,2);(6,J);(3L,0);(0,L,);(3L,2);(6,L,);(6,2);(0,0)}
The total number of distinct parameter-jackpot combinations per specication comes
out to 8,000: 40 parameter values for c, 25 parameter values for Q(.), 8 jackpot levels.
Note that there are also four specications: 2 non-pairwise aggregation methods and
2 overlap scenarios. First, there is no parameter-jackpot combination that predicts a
preference for the Standard option under the state-wise mean utility specication with
both overlap scenarios. Under the pairwise mean utility specication, the choice of
overlap scenario is essentially inconsequential to prediction. With no overlap of win-
ning combinations, only a single parameter combination predicts Standard preference at
a jackpot of $40 million, and none for all other jackpots. Under a full overlap scenario,
8 parameter combinations predict Standard preference at a jackpot of $40 million, and
none for all other jackpots. The results of the pairwise mean specication under a full
overlap scenario are presented in Table 1, as it is the least inconsistent with the actual
choice behavior. Figure 6 gives a mapping of preferences over parameter values by
jackpot amount for this specication. One potential critique is that the native problem
of Mega Millions choice does not generate a unique outcome matrix, and therefore RT
cannot make a prediction for this game. However, the polar cases of possible outcome
matrices via overlap scenarios were both considered and result variation is negligible.
Both are suggestive of a minimal preference for the Standard and Megaplier options,
with preference behavior mostly being for Just the Jackpot or not participating at all.
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Salience Theory
The most recent of the reviewed decision models in this paper is Salience Theory (ST),
which allows the relative salience of payos within states of the world to impact the
weight placed on those states of the world (Bordalo et al., 2012). The psychological
motivation is that salient payos are over-weighted by the decision maker, and not so
salient payos are under-weighted. ST is also set-dependent like RT. To apply ST to
the Mega Millions problem, let's start with an example. Each of the ticket options
gives some chance at the jackpot for $3: Megaplier gives 1 entry, the Standard option
1.5 entries, and Just the Jackpot 2 entries. Since the native framework in ST is binary
choice, just consider the Standard option and Just the Jackpot for now as the only
two options available. The jackpot odds break down into 2 meaningful states of the
world: the shared 1.5 entries, and the extra half entry of Just the Jackpot. Since the
outcome of the 1.5 shared entries is the same, the salience in this state is the minimum
of zero. This would lead to an under-weighting of this state relative to its objective
probability. The bonus half entry of Just the Jackpot is highly salient, as the payo
dierence is a minimum of $40 million. This state would be over-weighted relative to
its objective probability. This example highlights a major diversion between ST and
PT/RDU: small probabilities only get over-weighted in ST if they are salient, whereas
PT/RDU consistently over-weights small probabilities.
The notation used in Bordalo et al. (2012) is replicated here for model exposition.
Consider a lottery Li that has outcomes x
i
s across the states s∈ S, and lottery Lj with




s ) be the salience function determining the salience of a
state. Like RT, the natural setting of ST is making binary comparisons. In the binary






| xis − x−is |
| xis | + | x−is | +θ
(11)
where θ > 0. Salience increases with the dierence in payo between the two lotteries
in a state, but decreases as the absolute average payo deviates from 0. For example,
consider LA with payos {1,6} and LB with payos {2,5}. The payo dierence between
lotteries in each state is 1, but the salience in the rst state is larger because those
payos are closer to zero. States are then ranked by decreasing salience, so the most
salient gets a rank of 1. The salience rank of state s for lottery Li is denoted k
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s. For a
δ ∈ (0, 1] and objective state probabilities of πs, the modied probability of state s is{





specied as such so that the modied probabilities sum to 1. The valuation of lottery






s). A state is over-weighted if and
only if it is more salient than average, under-weighted otherwise. Notice that salience is
determined independently of the objective state probabilities. Since the Mega Millions
decision problem is non-pairwise, an extension of ST is required for proper evaluation.
Bordalo et al. (2012) elaborate on a non-pairwise extension in their online appendix.
They propose non-pairwise salience function σ̂(xis, x
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s, a simple average. Once the composite
alternative state outcomes are calculated, lottery valuation proceeds exactly as in the
binary case. However, σ̂(.) is not necessarily symmetric, so valuations need to be
calculated for each lottery under consideration. As in RT, calculations will be impacted
depending on whether additional Standard tickets overlap in number combinations with
existing counterfactual Megapliers. Therefore, both full overlap and no overlap scenarios
will be tested.
While δ ∈ (0, 1] is the possible range for the distortion parameter, Bordalo et
al. (2012) show that δ = 0.7 is consistent with a number of observed EU violations.
Konigsheim et al. (2019) experimentally estimate the distortion parameter δ and nd
that the Bordalo et al. (2012) assumptions of δ = 0.7 and linear utility are reasonable
and consistent with the results of their estimation, where δ is estimated to live in the
range of 0.5 to 0.8 among subjects who behave according to ST. Bordalo et al. (2012)
also show that a θ ≥ 0.1 is also consistent with observable EU violations that ST can
account for; the choice of θ can impact the salience ranking within a lottery. Setting
θ = 0.1 in the Mega Millions choice problem yields some questionable salience rankings.
For instance, from the perspective of Standard evaluation under a no overlap scenario,
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the state of the world in which the Standard ticket gives $4 and the other tickets give
nothing is more salient than the state of the world in which Standard and Just the
Jackpot win the jackpot while the Megaplier wins nothing. Recall salience ranking is
independent of the probabilities of states of the world. The choice problems in Bordalo
et al. (2012) that justify θ = 0.1 had payos thousands of times smaller than jack-
pot levels. A selection of θ = 1, 000, 000 seems to yield signicantly more reasonable
salience rankings. As a robustness check, estimations are run for both overlap scenarios
using both θ = 0.1 and θ = 1, 000, 000. The results reported in Table 1 are for the no
overlap scenario with θ = 1, 000, 000. For the parametrization run here, non-linearity of
utility will be permitted, and the power function in (7) will once again be the functional
form employed. The power parameter α will run from 0.71 to 1.10 in increments of
0.01, distortion parameter δ will run from 0.5 to 0.99 in increments of 0.01, and the 8
jackpot levels used in previous estimations will also be tested. This amounts to a total
of 16,000 distinct parameter-jackpot combinations per specication. Not a single one
of these corresponds to a preference for the Standard option under any specication,
and a majority of them correspond to a preference for Just the Jackpot. Therefore, no
gure will be provided displaying the preference distribution across parameters. The
extreme salience of the additional jackpot entries for Just the Jackpot overpowers the
relative advantages of the Standard and Megaplier options under ST, rendering it inept
at matching the choice behavior in the data.
Non-Decision Theoretic Explanations
There are a few reasons to conjecture that certain aspects of the real world imple-
mentation of Mega Millions outside of the simple choice problem may be constraining
consumers, leading to consumption choices that would dier absent such constraints. It
is plausible that since Just the Jackpot is relatively new, many consumers may not be
aware of its existence, and therefore attention is limited to the Megaplier and Standard
options. It may be that newly oered lottery products take time to acquire a strong
sales base, and Just the Jackpot has not had enough time to do so. This could be an
eect of consumer inattention, or just due to slow adjustment in consumption. There
could also be some liquidity constraints at play, since both Megaplier and Just the Jack-
pot cost $3 relative to the Standard price of $2. Severely constrained consumers could
opt for the cheaper Standard option even if they prefer one of the other distributions.
This section takes a closer look at all of these possibilities.
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Limited Attention
Since Just the Jackpot has only been around since October 2017, it is plausible that
many players are simply not aware of its existence. If inattentiveness or limited at-
tention (LA) applies in this case, it could be that for some consumers, C(Megaplier,
Standard, Just the Jackpot) = Just the Jackpot, and CLA(Megaplier, Standard, Just
the Jackpot) = C(Megaplier, Standard) = Standard. This could account for the main
data patterns, since the Standard option comprises over 90% of sales, and all of the
models tested above nd Just the Jackpot to be the most appealing Mega Millions
product overall. At face value, testing for limited attention is not really feasible. The
author's correspondence with numerous lottery ocials in various states suggests that
advertising of Just the Jackpot can vary signicantly at the retailer level (like signs out-
side the retail location mentioning the new option, a retailer bringing up the product
in conversation with customers, etc.), and acquiring retail-level data is quite costly, let
alone the eective impossibility of determining Just the Jackpot advertising intensity
at each retailer, which is not part of any compiled data set the author is aware of.
Fortunately, the lottery commission of Kansas created a natural test of limited
attention by running statewide promotions for Just the Jackpot. On November 2,
2018, a complementary Just the Jackpot ticket was given to customers who purchased $6
worth of Mega Millions tickets of any type in a single transaction, resulting in $15,975 in
promotional sales, or 5,325 Just the Jackpot giveaways. Admittedly, there was $155,454
Mega Millions in non-promotional sales purchased in Kansas for that drawing. In order
to maximize the number of players who qualied for the promotion, 5,325 separate
players would spend $11 and thereby qualify for just one giveaway each, and non-
qualifying players would each spend $5. This would imply at best 22% of players during
that drawing being exposed to the promotion; 10% is a more realistic expectation. Given
that just 67 non-promotional Just the Jackpot tickets were purchased for that drawing,
if players indeed had preferences in line with the model predictions, then the thousands
of players who received the promotion would have been enough to produce a noticeable
uptick in Just the Jackpot purchases for subsequent drawings.
To formally test the limited attention hypothesis, a dierence in dierence analysis
can be implemented. The neighboring state of Nebraska displays similar sales levels and
trends to those of Kansas, and also oers Just the Jackpot. Both states have a trend
of diminishing Just the Jackpot sales with time. Ideally, every player in Kansas for
the promotional drawing would have been eligible for the giveaway for the dierence in
dierence analysis to be most convincing. However, the already paltry Just the Jackpot
sales levels and the gross number of players who did qualify for the promotion increases
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the chances of identifying an impact of the promotion. The regression estimates for the
dierence in dierence model presented below are listed in Table 3, with the dependent
variable being the percentage of sales that are Just the Jackpot. Similar conclusions
are reached using dependent variables of Just the Jackpot sales, as well as Just the
Jackpot sales as a percentage of the jackpot.
JtJ%Sales = β0 + β1Period+ β2Kansas+ β3Period ∗Kansas+ ε
The result of the dierence in dierence test is no evidence of an impact of the promotion
on Just the Jackpot sales. The downward trend in Just the Jackpot sales is in no way
stymied by the promotion. Therefore, it must be concluded that for at least habitual
Mega Millions consumers, limited attention is not culpable for the dearth of Just the
Jackpot sales. This restriction is due to the promotion being run at a low jackpot
amount of $52 million. Most of the players qualifying for this promotion would have
been regular players and not jackpot frenzy players, who generally only play when
jackpots get excessively high. Since no such promotion was run at an unusually high
jackpot level , this analysis makes no claim regarding limited attention among jackpot
frenzy players.














Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates. *** indicates signicance at better than 1%.
Slow Sales Adjustment
There is a possibility that there is a signicant lag in consumption adjustment after the
introduction of a new lottery product. More precisely, the introduction of an additional
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ticket option within an existing lottery game may require a long timeline to acquire its
stable sales range. Data consistent with this hypothesis would show an increase in sales
percentage of a new lottery product with the passage of time, controlling for appropriate
factors like jackpot size. In the case of Just the Jackpot, there should be some indication
of an increased share in the Mega Millions sales percentage as time passes. A quick
glance at Table A2 in the Appendix, which displays the time series of Mega Millions
sales for states that oer Just the Jackpot since its inception on October 31, 2017 up
through September 2019, seems to indicate the opposite. The Just the Jackpot sales
percentage starts o at 2.08% on the rst day it is available for purchases, but quickly
drops below 1% in a week's time, then settles below 0.5% about a month after that
and further declining into the 0.2% to 0.4% range and never rebounding. This is in line
with a consumption lag of no more than a month, and the adjustment runs opposite to
what the hypothesis would require.
A linear regression of the Just the Jackpot sales percentage on time further validates
this hypothesis rejection. Table 4 presents a couple of variations on this regression,
where Time is a counting variable for each passing draw date, set equal to 1 for the rst
day Just the Jackpot was available for purchase. Also, since jackpots for a specic draw
are due to a combination of the previous jackpot rolling over and the actual sales for
that draw, using jackpot as a regressor in a sales regression introduces endogeneity: a
lotto consumer likely takes into account the expected jackpot when deciding on lottery
consumption, but that lottery consumption itself is impacting the jackpot size (Cook
and Clotfelter, 1993). Therefore, two regressions are provided in Table 4: one regressing
the sales percentage on time and the log of the rollover, which is the previous draw's
jackpot amount, unless the previous jackpot was won, in which case the rollover is
zero; the other using the log of the rollover and time as instruments for the log of
the jackpot and regressing sales percentage on time and the predicted log jackpot.
Both regressions produce essentially the same highly signicant negative estimate of
-0.000018. An additional puzzling result is the signicant negative coecients on Log
Rollover and Log Jackpot, indicative of the trend highlighted above for the historic $1.6
billion Mega Millions run. As the jackpot increases, Just the Jackpot should increase
in relative appeal, as the lower tier distribution remains unchanged. The regression
results indicate the opposite, and this will be addressed in greater detail later on.
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Time is a counting variable for passing draw dates. Log Rollover is the natural log of the rollover amount, which is
equal to the previous draw's jackpot or zero, in case the previous jackpot was won. In this case, the natural log of
the rollover of zero is also set equal to zero. Log Jackpot is the natural log of the jackpot amount. (1) presents linear
regression results, whereas (2) presents two stage least squares estimates, in which Log Jackpot is instrumented for with
Log Rollover and Time. Note that jackpot and rollover have a correlation coecient of 0.97. Standard errors are in
parentheses below the estimates. *** indicates signicance at better than 1%.
Liquidity Constraints
Given that many lottery products costing a dollar or less, the Just the Jackpot price of
$3 may be too steep for some consumers. Lotteries are often considered to be a poor
man's tax, regressive in nature. Data bears out the regressivity, but only in so much
as lower income tiers spend a higher percentage of their income on lottery products,
as aggregate spending is relatively steady across income levels (Clotfelter and Cook,
1990; Kearney, 2005). Since lotteries are consumed even at the lowest income levels,
where liquidity constraints are most likely to bind, it is plausible that some constrained
consumers may opt to purchase the cheaper Standard ticket at the price of $2, even if
Just the Jackpot is the preferred option without such constraints.
There are two reasons up front why liquidity concerns are likely not the primary
determinant of the data patterns. First, regressivity varies signicantly within lotteries:
instant games are highly regressive, draw games with jackpots that rollover are much
less so, even somewhat progressive when jackpots become exceedingly large (Clotfelter
and Cook, 1987). Mega Millions is precisely a draw game with a rollover jackpot that
can get exceedingly large, much larger than the Maryland jackpots of a few million
dollars analyzed in their study, and therefore Mega Millions players are on average
wealthier than many other lottery game players. Second, from the limited attention
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test on the Kansas Mega Millions data, at least 20% of sales during typical jackpots
are due to ticket purchases of at least $6, meaning multiple tickets were purchased in
a single transaction. It is likely that a larger percentage than that abounds during
atypically high jackpot draws, in which jackpot frenzy buyers join the fray and the
lottery becomes more progressive.
The most recent changes to the Mega Millions game on October 31, 2017 involved
both a change to the payo-odds matrix and an increase in the cost of the ticket options.
Standard tickets doubled in cost from $1 to $2, and Megaplier increased 50% in cost,
from $2 to $3. Assessing the impact on Megaplier sales of this cost increase to $3 can
provide some further insight regarding liquidity constraints on Just the Jackpot, which
also costs $3 but was newly introduced on October 31, 2017. For the two years prior
to the change, median nationwide Megaplier sales by draw amounted to about $2.14
million. After the change, the median Megaplier sales remarkably remained within just
a few hundred dollars of the median for the two years before the change. This implied
an approximate one-third reduction in Megaplier entries purchased after the cost change
was instituted. So the cost change was essentially revenue-neutral for Megaplier sales.
This is not true for the Standard ticket. Median Standard ticket revenue before the
cost change was about $16.7 million, whereas after the cost change it rose to $25.4
million, over a 50% increase in median revenue, implying about a 25% reduction in
median Standard entries. Therefore, overall median Mega Millions revenue grew after
the increased cost, reduced odds and resultant increased jackpots of the October 31,
2017 restructuring.
Is this evidence of the presence of liquidity constraints for Mega Millions consump-
tion? The most recent changes implemented to Mega Millions altered the expected
return and eective price of both the Standard and Megaplier options. Eective price
of a lottery entry can be thought of as the normalized expected loss, so the cost minus
the expected value of the ticket, divided by the cost. Expected values vary as jackpots
increase and with the probability of sharing the jackpot, so here the minimum jackpot
is used in expected value determination, along with the simplifying assumption of no
jackpot sharing. Prior to the changes, the eective price of the Standard ticket was 77
cents, and for the Megaplier it was 63 cents. After the 2017 changes, eective prices
increased to 81 cents for the Standard ticket and 71 cents for the Megaplier. The Stan-
dard eective price increase was about 0.81
0.77
−1 ≈ 5%, whereas for Megaplier it was about
0.71
0.63
− 1 ≈ 13%. The Megaplier became relatively more pricey after the changes than
the Standard ticket did, and this by itself can rationalize the shifts in sales behavior
witnessed with the 2017 changes. An increase in eective price should lead to a reduc-
tion in quantity demanded, which the data conrms for both ticket types. The higher
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relative price increase on Megaplier is more consistent with a net move from Megaplier
to Standard, and not the other way around. While it is not possible to track individual
purchasing behavior to conrm this with certainty, a higher percentage reduction in
Megaplier purchases relative to Standard entries is consistent with this idea. The price
increase on the Megaplier was high enough to diminish Megaplier sales to the point of
revenue-neutrality, whereas the price increase on the Standard option was low enough
so that revenue actually increased.
Notice that this rationalization of the data does not require a liquidity constraint
story. It is conceivable that with the cost increase, constrained consumers who had
previously purchased Megaplier under the old cost regime could buy Megaplier less
frequently, switch to buying Standard tickets, or stop playing Mega Millions. While
liquidity constraints are consistent with the observed reduction in Megaplier entries
observed, the price increase channel described above can also explain it. The pricing
motive may arguably better explain the shifts in consumption than liquidity constraints,
since after the change in cost regime, the Standard cost doubled, whereas the Megaplier
only increased in cost by 50%, both increasing by the same amount of $1. It is plausible
that a dollar increase in cost will cause liquidity constraints to bind for more individuals
the smaller the original cost is, so that Standard sales would be more impacted than
Megaplier sales by binding constraints. The point estimates of price elasticity are
indicative of this as well: a 5% price increase in the Standard option led to about a
25% reduction in quantity consumed, whereas a 13% price increase of the Megaplier
resulted in only a 33% reduction in quantity consumed. More tightly binding liquidity
constraints will strongly reduce consumption when prices increase, implying a higher
price elasticity absent those constraints. The Standard price elasticity is approximately
double that of the Megaplier, suggesting that if liquidity constraints are even present,
they are likely impacting Standard consumption more than Megaplier consumption.
Furthermore, recall that the motivation for looking at Megaplier consumption shifts
with a cost increase was to see if low Just the Jackpot sales percentages were due
to liquidity constraints. Recall that a minimum purchase of Megaplier and Just the
Jackpot both costs $3. At best, liquidity constraint arguments are confounded by the
price channel predicting the same directional movements in the data. Even with the
increase in cost, Megaplier sales account for between 5.5% to 8.5% of Mega Millions
dollars sales, 20 to 30 times more than the paltry average 0.3% of Just the Jackpot,
which costs the same as the Megaplier. For liquidity constraint arguments to have
bite, there should have been a much larger reduction in Megaplier sales after the cost
increase. Therefore, it must be concluded that liquidity constraints are not the primary
driver of low Just the Jackpot sales.
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Status Quo Bias
It is possible that consumers who played Mega Millions prior to the introduction of
Just the Jackpot in October 2017 may not want to change their behavior after the
introduction. The preference-based models as they were considered above did not have
an allowance for status quo bias built in, although alternative formulations of some of
those models can account for such a bias. The Mega Millions sales data prior to the
October 2017 Just the Jackpot launch can help identify if Mega Millions players suer
from status quo bias in large numbers.
The Megaplier was a known and available option in most states by the time of the
October 2017 Mega Millions changes. However, for a number of years, players in many
states only had access to a single Mega Millions product: whatever version the Standard
ticket was at that time. If status quo bias is present among Mega Millions players, it
should be present for the introduction of both the Megaplier and Just the Jackpot
options. For the January 18, 2011 drawing, ve states that were already oering just
the Standard option for Mega Millions introduced the Megaplier: Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Washington. The aggregate Megaplier sales percentage
was 5.8%.
Of these ve states, only New Jersey and New York oer Just the Jackpot. Those
two states had a combined Megaplier sales percentage of 3.9%. Small but signicant
Megaplier sales percentages persist with time. For the November 18, 2011 drawing
ten months later, they had a combined Megaplier sales percentage of 4.2%. For the
launch of Just the Jackpot for the October 31, 2017 drawing, the combined Just the
Jackpot sales percentage was 0.8%. For the same size jackpot drawing on July 27,
2018 ten months later, Just the Jackpot sales percentages drop to 0.1%. These Just
the Jackpot percentages are more in line with the percentages observed for the time
series outside the rst few weeks after Just the Jackpot was introduced. Dierences
in sales percentages by a factor of about 40 suggests that responses to Megaplier and
Just the Jackpot introduction varied widely even in the presence of status quo bias.
One interpretation is that players do not have a status quo bias, but a small percentage
prefers the Megaplier.
However, these discrepancies in sales percentages upon Megaplier and Just the Jack-
pot introduction are not necessarily enough to rule out status quo bias among most
Mega Millions players. Perhaps if no status quo bias was present, the true Megaplier
sales percentage would have been 50%. Return to the models and predictions pre-
sented in Table 1 and consider a reduced Mega Millions game with only Standard and
Megaplier options. It turns out that running the reduced Mega Millions game in these
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models results in the Standard option replacing Just the Jackpot as the most preferred
option across jackpot levels. There still remains a minority of parameter-jackpot com-
binations predicting Megaplier preference, in the same range of a few percentage points
observed in the New Jersey and New York data. Therefore, the models are able to
account for the observed behavior in the Megaplier-Standard-only Mega Millions game.
Status quo bias is also capable of explaining the behavior, but without more compelling
reasons to favor that hypothesis over the model predictions, the inclination is to go with
the simplest explanation. There also does not seem to be a reason to think that status
quo bias should only be present for the introduction of Just the Jackpot and not the
Megaplier. Given the evidence, status quo bias is unlikely to be driving choice behavior
in the Mega Millions game.
Behavioral Mechanisms
Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory
The various models analyzed share a general consensus that with jackpots relatively
low, high concavity of utility and other model-specic parameter ranges, Megaplier or
not playing at all are the preferred options. For larger jackpots, convex or even rel-
atively linear utility and relevant model-specic parameter ranges, Just the Jackpot
is the preferred option. Data consistent with any of these models should show a low
percentage of Standard sales, with Megaplier and Just the Jackpot sales making up
the majority of sales, and a decent level of non-participation. Furthermore, the non-
decision model explanations of limited attention, slow sales adjustment and liquidity
constraints have been ruled out. One hypothesis that would essentially bypass the en-
tire conundrum is that lottery play is not rationalizable, especially given the inability
of a wide range of models with varying rationality criteria to explain the Mega Millions
data. One manifestations of this hypothesis is lottery and gambling play being classied
as consumption goods (Hirshleifer, 1966), not subject to utility of wealth evaluations.
However, sensitivity of lottery sales to expected returns across a variety of games (Kear-
ney 2005) and surveys reporting that lottery players mainly view the lottery as a means
to acquire wealth counter this hypothesis. Additionally, the attempts of many models
in the literature at explaining the so called lottery-insurance paradox is a concession
in the literature that lottery consumption is primarily a wealth concern that can be
rationalizable via preference modeling.
The remaining possibility is that Just the Jackpot is simply not appealing to Mega
Millions consumers. Decision theory suggests that the poor appeal is not justiable via
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the payo distribution or even the choice set. Perhaps the mechanics of actually playing
the Mega Millions lottery will provide some insight into the choice behavior. Once a
decision to play is made, a player must either pick a set(s) of numbers or have one(s)
randomly assigned. The player must also determine which of the three ticket options to
select. Consider spending $3 on Mega Millions. If the player goes with the Megaplier,
after the winning numbers are drawn, a player will feel no regret if the ticket is eligible
for a prize. If the ticket wins a lower tier prize, that is more than would have been won
had that ticket been a Standard or Just the Jackpot. In the case of winning the jackpot,
there is no dierence between ticket types. However, in the event of the Megaplier not
winning a prize (a 96% probability), a player may regret not opting for one of the other
ticket types. That original ticket would not have won regardless of the ticket type, but
additional counterfactual entries may have been eligible for prizes. However, that ex
post regret can only be felt in a probabilistic sense, since those additional tickets were
never generated. Now consider originally opting for Just the Jackpot, which would give
two dierent entries into only the jackpot portion. In the unlikely event of one of them
winning the jackpot, no regret would be felt, and possibly some rejoice. This is because
at any given cost, Just the Jackpot gives the most entries into the jackpot, and it may
be that opting for another ticket type would not have generated the winning ticket.
But in the nearly certain event of Just the Jackpot entries not being jackpot eligible,
a partial ticket match may stir up regret, since if the ticket had been one of the other
ticket types, it would have won a prize. This regret may be dierent from the regret
engendered by the Megaplier, since in the case the Megaplier is not eligible for a prize,
a player will not know with certainty the outcomes of the foregone Standard or Just
the Jackpot entries. However, most models do not take such a distinction into account,
including state and opportunity set-dependent models like Regret and Salience Theory.
The ex post regret would be the same if additional voided entries were given for players
who opted for the Megaplier or the Standard option, bringing the total of void and
non-voided entries equal to the number of counterfactual Just the Jackpot entries.
There is precedence in the literature that this distinction in engendered regret ex
post is contributing to the distaste for Just the Jackpot. Specically, feedback about
what denitely would have occurred produces a greater potential for regret than pal-
lid, abstract knowledge of what was statistically likely to occur (Larrick, 1993). This
description captures the regret dierence here, since a Just the Jackpot holder has feed-
back about what denitely would have occurred if the Megaplier was chosen, whereas
the Megaplier holder is missing denitive feedback for the foregone second Just the
Jackpot ticket. The implication is that Megaplier buyers would prefer not being given
the voided second Just the Jackpot ticket, and a similar extension can be made for
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Standard buyers with respect to the Just the Jackpot alternative. While Regret The-
ory and its ilk may be said to account for anticipated regret, this is not the same as ex
post regret or post-decision regret, which refers to having knowledge of the outcomes
of foregone options in at least some states of the world. A number of studies in the
psychology literature have detected eects on decision making of the presence of ex
post regret in varying settings: choice between two risky gambles (Zeelenberg at al.,
1996); consumer purchase decisions (Inman and Zeelenberg, 1998); an ultimatum game
in which the proposer knows that he/she will be informed of the minimum acceptable
oer after the proposal is made (Zeelenberg and Beatie, 1997); and most relevant to the
problem at hand, inuencing participation behavior and regret motivation in the Dutch
postcode lottery, for which the entry is the player's postal code (Zeelenberg and Pieters,
2004). The Dutch postcode lottery has ex post regret built into it, since a player will
know the outcome of the foregone option independent of participation. This is not true
for lotteries in general: by entering, one will know whether one wins or loses, as well as
the outcome of not entering (keeping the ticket cost); whereas by not entering, one will
never know the outcome had they entered.
Given the evidence for ex post regret considerations in decision making, Humphrey
(2004) attempts to add an ex post regret avor to original Regret Theory (Loomes
and Sugden, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1987). The specics of the Humphrey (2004)
modication to Regret Theory is provided in the Appendix. The main takeaway is
that even incorporating dierences in ex post feedback into Regret Theory does not
yield a model capable of matching the strong preference for Standard in the data.
The predictive power is comparable to that of the Rank Dependent Utility results
listed in Table 1; detailed results of Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory (FCRT) are
listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. These disappointing results do not necessarily
mean that feedback consideration is not impacting choice behavior per se, as Regret
Theory may also not be an appropriate base model to apply feedback considerations to.
The structural interdependence of the Mega Millions ticket options engenders feedback
variation based upon the option chosen, which at least descriptively seems to have the
potential to impact choice behavior. Indeed, the model developed in the Section 6
does include a feedback parameter which contributes to its relatively strong predictive
power.
Winner and Loser Regret
FCRT attempts to capture what is probably a major factor in the aversion to Just
the Jackpot. The albeit unlikely possibility of purchasing a Just the Jackpot ticket
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that would have been eligible for a lower tier prize, particularly the million dollar prize
level, may weigh heavily on some consumers. While FCRT is not able to rationalize
the data, the variation in the elicitation of feedback on foregone actions ex post does
seem to be a reasonable factor in the decision making process from a psychological and
behavioral perspective. Returning to the mechanics of Mega Millions, any given number
combination could be a Megaplier, Standard or Just the Jackpot entry. In the case of
that ticket being jackpot eligible, ticket type is inconsequential. If it is not eligible for
any prize, once again the type is inconsequential. However, if it is eligible for a lower
prize, Megaplier gives the best possible outcome, Just the Jackpot gives the worst, and
Standard is intermediary. In such a scenario, Standard and Just the Jackpot holders
may experience ex post regret for not having opted for a Megaplier, with Just the
Jackpot eliciting (perhaps disproportionately) more regret than the Standard option.
For example, consider the state of the world in which the ticket designated as a
Megaplier would win $5 million, in which case the Standard version of that ticket would
win $1 million, and Just the Jackpot would win nothing. For ease of exposition, assume
linear utility of wealth and a state-specic regret magnitude, dened as the dierence
of the maximum attainable outcome in that state and the outcome of the chosen ticket
type. In this state of the world, Megaplier yields no regret, Standard yields a regret
of 4 million, and Just the Jackpot yields a regret of 5 million, so that the regret of a
Standard designation is 80% of that of a Just the Jackpot designation. A linear RT
framework also yields an 80% state-specic utility ratio of Standard foregoing Megaplier
and Just the Jackpot foregoing Megaplier. A reduction of this ratio will generally result
in the Standard option becoming relatively more favorable compared to the Megaplier
without also making Just the Jackpot relatively more favorable.
There is precedence for thinking that this ratio should indeed be less than 80%, even
with linear utility assumptions. In the million dollar state described above, Megaplier
is the winner and Just the Jackpot the loser, while Standard falls in between the two.
From a regret perspective, holding a Megaplier engenders no regret, while the other
two may do so. Just the Jackpot can be said to engender loser regret, as it yields
the worst possible state-specic outcome. Standard may be classied as engendering
winner regret, as the holder walks away with $1 million but could have walked away
with $5 million. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) theoretically propose and experimentally
demonstrate that observed overbidding relative to the Risk Neutral Nash Equilibrium
in rst price auctions can be attributed to bidders anticipating loser regret. Loser regret
would be felt ex post if a bidder loses an auction, is then told the winning bid, and
realizes a higher but still rational bid could have won the auction. Their experiment also
demonstrates that bidders do not strongly anticipate winner's regret. Winner's regret
41
in a rst price auction occurs if a bidder wins an auction and is told the second highest
bid, and realizes a lower, more protable bid would have still won the auction. Mean
bid dierences between treatment groups, as well as self-reported feelings of anticipated
winner and loser regret, both suggest that only loser regret is signicantly impacting
bidding behavior in rst price auctions. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) run
a similar test of winner and loser regret in rst price auctions, but nd signicant
eects of both winner and loser regret on bidding behavior. However, they note that
winner regret becomes more prevalent in bidding behavior with successive auctions in
a repeated experimental session, suggesting that winner regret is not as anticipated as
loser regret and becomes more impactful with bidding experience.
The insights on winner and loser regret from the rst price auction experiments are
relevant to the Mega Millions choice problem. If the conclusion from Filiz-Ozbay and
Ozbay (2007) carries over to the Mega Millions setting, the implication would be that
players deciding on which ticket type to purchase would focus on the lower tier prize
disparity between Megaplier and Just the Jackpot disproportionately more than that
between Megaplier and Standard. Incorporating this into a model would improve the
overall desirability of the Standard option. In order to determine where a given action's
outcome in a certain state falls on the regret scale, the best and worst outcomes for the

























where A represents the set of available actions, xkj is the outcome of action k in state
j, and u(.) is the (choiceless) utility function, and ρ > 0 is a winner regret intensity
parameter. The power functional form is used to allow for substantial variations in
γkj depending on where xkj falls within the range of state payos. The denominator
of (13) is the maximum possible utility dierence in state j, essentially the maximum
regret. The numerator of (13) gives the action-specic regret in state j. If action k
happens to be the best action in state j, then (13) reduces to 0, irrespective of ρ. If
action k happens to be the worst action in state j, then (13) reduces to 1, irrespective
of ρ. More generally, when there are only two actions in the choice set, (13) will always
reduce to either 0 or 1. When there are only two possible outcomes in a certain state
of the world, there can be only a max and a min outcome, and hence no potential for
winner regret. Going back to the lower tier evaluation of Megaplier, Standard and Just
the Jackpot, (13) equals 0 for Megaplier evaluation, it equals 1 for Just the Jackpot
evaluation, and it equals something in between 0 and 1 for Standard evaluation. If not
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playing at all means having the ticket cost in a cost neutral framework, for instance the
minimum cost of $3 that can buy any type, not playing also will fall between 0 and 1,
albeit much closer to 1 as the lower prize tier being evaluated increases. The distinction
between winner and loser regret is more ambiguous with this denition in comparison
to the rst price auction setting. An action yielding the worst possible outcome in a
state will engender loser regret, but getting a marginally better than worst outcome can
hardly be considered as shifting to winner regret. This is exemplied by not playing
Mega Millions with a counterfactual $5 million Megaplier: the player still has the $3
ticket cost relative to nothing from Just the Jackpot, but the dierence in regret is
negligible. A more appropriate description is that the designation in (13) allows for
shades of winner and loser regret.
Demand Quota
The argument up to this point has been for the cost neutral choice framework. While
that framework is more appropriate from a purely decision modeling perspective, the
fact of the matter is that single purchases dominate Mega Millions sales. The Kansas
Lottery Commission promotion of a free Just the Jackpot entry with a $6 Mega Millions
purchase shows that only 20% of the sales in that period qualied for the promotion,
and therefore more than 80% of the transactions did not qualify. The only multi-entry
transaction that would not qualify for the promotion is a purchase of two Standard
tickets. It is dicult to come up with any defensible reasons as to why most of the
transactions would be of pairs of Standard tickets. Based on the data, it seems rea-
sonable that there is a large drop o in the number of transactions after single ticket
purchases.
It is important to identify possible reasons for the dominance of single purchases.
It actually is not so important to nail down a specic reason, but to rule out certain
ones that would constrain consumers to choose a sub-optimal option. One constraining
reason is liquidity constraints, but the argument provided earlier shows that the high
levels of Standard sales are likely not primarily due to liquidity constraints forcing
constrained players to settle for their less preferred Standard option. A non-constraining
reason is that players set some sort of demand quota, either per draw(s) or by jackpot
amount. Some players may just make one purchase for every draw, or once a week, or
once the jackpot goes over $200 million. This could be due to a force of habit, or even
to regulate potentially addictive consumption. It could also be to avoid regret of not
playing. A single entry into either the Standard or Megaplier would shield a player from
large amounts of regret in states of the world with big winnings, even with the lack of ex
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post feedback that comes by not playing. It is therefore worthwhile to consider a single
purchase framework, which diers from the cost neutral framework only in how the
Standard option is distributed. The single purchase framework puts back an additional
dollar to the Standard option in every state of the world, and takes away the additional
half Standard entry. A single purchase analysis of the decision models tested in Section
3 is provided in Table 5. The predictions are with the cost neutral framework, except
for Salience Theory, which now has a few instances of Standard preference prediction.
However, factoring in the winner regret into the decision modeling within a single
purchase framework should favorably impact the Standard standing, since relative to
the Megaplier and Just the Jackpot, it leaves an additional dollar in the consumer's
pocket in the likely event of not being prize eligible. The next section will show results
from the proposed model in both the cost neutral and single purchase frameworks.
Table 5: Summary of Single Purchase Model Predictions
Model Max Jackpots Standard
Expected Utility 0
Prospect Theory 2




Table 5 shows the maximum number of jackpots that any one parameter set predicts a Standard preference for. Prospect
Theory uses the Prelec (1998) weighting function; Rank Dependent Utility is Cumulative Prospect Theory using the
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function; Disappointment Aversion with a certainty equivalent less than 4
specication; Regret Theory under pairwise aggregation and full overlap scenario; Salience Theory under a no overlap
scenario with θ = 1, 000, 000.
Data Rationalization
Model
The previous section argued for incorporation of feedback on foregone choices ex post
and winner regret into a cost neutral or single purchase framework. A model incorpo-
rating these features would be more similar to models that incorporate between-lottery
information, like Regret Theory and Salience Theory, than within-lottery only models
like Expected Utility, Rank Dependent Utility, Disappointment Aversion, etc. Incorpo-
rating ex post feedback on foregone outcomes into a decision model requires information
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about other lotteries in the consideration set, in addition to the lottery being evaluated.
The proposed winner regret coecient requires knowing the span of outcomes over each
state for evaluation purposes. A model of the Mega Millions game that considers these
factors therefore implicitly holds that the choice evaluation process is a function of the
available choices, which will allow for subsequent counterfactual analyses of reduced
choice sets and removal of feedback and winner regret mechanisms from Mega Millions.
The process for developing a model to account for the Mega Millions choice data
is behavioral, in the sense that psychological and behavioral motives are identied
in the actual game, which then inform an appropriate model. The approach is not
preference-based and therefore will not be presented with an axiomatic foundation.
There may be no single right model given the approach, but the intent is to develop
as simple and parsimonious a model as possible. Given the argued importance of regret
in the Mega Millions game structure, some sort of regret model seems to be a good
starting point for a model capturing the Mega Millions decision making process. There
are a plethora of regret-based decision models that have developed over the past few
decades: Minimax Regret (Savage, 1951); Regret Theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982;
Bell, 1982); Reference-Dependent Regret (Krahmer and Stone, 2005); Smooth Regret
Aversion (Hayashi, 2008), to name a few. Some of these models are intended for pairwise
choice scenarios with extensions to non-pairwise choice, like Regret Theory. Others,
like Minimax Regret, fundamentally allow for non-pairwise choice settings. The Mega
Millions choice setting has four options and would more naturally t in a non-pairwise
model.
Before introducing the model, the choice framework will be laid out. The framework
is in the spirit of Savage (1954) and resembles the framework of most regret-based
models, in particular Loomes and Sugden (1982). There are a nite number N states
of the world, where each state of the world j ∈ N corresponds to a unique vector of
consequences −→xj of nite lengthM . Each state j has an associated probability pj ∈ [0, 1]
with
∑
j pj = 1. There are M actions to choose from, each action Ai ∈ A being an
N -tuple of consequences. xij refers to the consequence of choosing action Ai if state j
realizes.
A decision maker is tasked with choosing a single action from the set of available
actions. The decision maker is aware of not only the probability of every consequence in
each action, but also the vector of consequences −→xj for each possible state of the world.
A decision maker behaves according to Regret Weighted Feedback Minimax (RWFM)































where γkj is as specied in (13), δ < 1 captures the dierence in regret engendered
ex post if choosing action Ak and state j realizing does not reveal max
A
xij. If under
every action and every state there is always either no feedback or feedback, then the
decision criteria reduces to just the rst line of (14), removing the need for the feedback
parameter δ. The criteria in (14) is a probability-weighted Minimax, with an additional
winner regret weight γkj and possible scaling down of the regret term by δ if action Ak
and state j realizing does not reveal max
A
xij.
The method to proceed with evaluating (14) is to start with any of the available
actions in A, which will take the role of Ak. Then for each state of the world, the
max
A
xij must be identied, so that with a given utility function, max
A
u(xij)−u(xkj) can
be evaluated. It then must be determined if in state j action Ak is revealing of the
max
A
xij. If so, the rst case of (14) is used for evaluating Ak in state j. If not, the
individual-specic δ is applied using the second case of (14). γkj can also be calculated
by identifying the min
A
xij and applying the individual-specic ρ. pj is the probability
of state j, which is not the same as and will generally be smaller than the probability
of getting the consequence xk under Ak, as xk may realize in more than one state. The
valuation of Ak can then be established by summing over all states. Proceed in the
same manner for all Ai ∈ A, and the action that yields the minimum is the indicated
choice of action.
Since this is a newly proposed model, there is not really a precedent on what range
of values δ and ρ can practically take. The utility function will be parameterized
with the power function as in (7), and power parameter α will range from 0.71 to
1.10 in increments of hundredths as in the other model estimations above. δ will be
allowed to run from 0.1 to 1 in increments of tenths, and ρ will run from 0 to 5 in
increments of 1. To give an idea of how the extreme values of these parameters impact
evaluation, return to the Mega Millions choice problem, and assume linear utility for
ease of exposition. Consider evaluating the Standard option in the state of the world in
which the Megaplier wins $5 million and the Standard wins $1 million. Since opting for
Standard in this state of the world reveals the counterfactual Megaplier of $5 million and




= 0.8ρ. At the allowable minimum, 0.80∗(5, 000, 000−1, 000, 000) =
4, 000, 000. At the allowable maximum, 0.85 ∗ (5, 000, 000 − 1, 000, 000) = 1, 310, 720,
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resulting in a dierence in regret by a factor of more than three, so that the Standard
option will become more favorable in this state of the world as ρ increases. Now
consider evaluating Megaplier in the state of the world in which Just the Jackpot
wins the $40 million jackpot with the additional jackpot entry it gets relative to the
Megaplier. Holding a jackpot-losing Megaplier ticket does not reveal the additional
counterfactual Just the Jackpot winning entry, bringing δ into play. For a given γkj,
the extreme values of δ result in regrets of γkj ∗ 1 ∗ (40, 000, 000) = γkj ∗ 40, 000, 000
and γkj ∗ 0.1 ∗ (40, 000, 000) = γkj ∗ 4, 000, 000, a dierence by a factor of ten. So,
highly discounting non-feedback (low δ) and diminished winner regret (high ρ) has the
potential to strongly alter choice prediction.
A cost neutral analysis of the Mega Millions choice problem using RWFM will en-
sue, followed by a single purchase analysis. Since this is still a regret-based model,
predictions will be dependent on the overlap specication of additional Standard en-
tries. Once again, both extremes of full and no overlap are considered, in order to
set bounds on predictive power. The total number of parameter-jackpot combinations
considered is 19,200: 40 utility parameter values, 10 values of feedback parameter δ, six
values of winner regret parameter ρ, tested at eight jackpots. Table 6 presents the re-
sults. In the no overlap scenario, 1,956 parameter-jackpot combinations are consistent
with a Standard preference, a substantial 10.2% of the combinations in this overlap sce-
nario. Furthermore, Standard is the Mega Millions option with the largest number of
combinations predicting its selection, Just the Jackpot at 6.3% and Megaplier at 1.8%.
The estimates do not change substantially under a full overlap scenario, with 10.7% of
parameter-jackpot combinations indicative of Standard selection and 81.6% predicting
non-participation. The insensitivity to the overlap specication is an additional plus of
this model, since some sort of mixing between these two extremes is most practical.
There is one downside to the estimation results of the cost neutral RWFM, as no
parameter combination predicts Mega Millions participation of any type at the min-
imum jackpot of $40 million, although there are numerous combinations that consis-
tently predict Standard selection across the other seven tested jackpots. It should be
noted that allowing utility convexity to go just a few hundredths above 1.1 will yield
some combinations predicting Mega Millions play and specically Standard selection.
However, it may be a bit concerning that in the concavity-convexity range that ex-
perimental studies identify as holding much of the density there is no predicted Mega
Millions play. If players approach Mega Millions with a self-imposed demand quota
of a single minimum purchase per draw, week, jackpot threshold, etc., the cost neu-
tral approach is no longer appropriate. Under a single purchase approach, all options
but Standard remain the same as in the cost neutral approach, but Standard loses its
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additional entries. So a Standard ticket diers from a Megaplier in that it keeps an
additional dollar per Megaplier in exchange for reduced payouts in lower tier eligible
states. Since there are no additional Standard entries modeled, there is no longer a
need to consider variation in overlap scenarios. The estimation results of both the cost
neutral and single purchase approach can be seen side to side in Table 6. Using the
same parameter-jackpot combinations as in the cost neutral case, 4,994 of the 19,200
combinations indicate Standard selection, or 26.0%. A majority of combinations still
predict non-participation at 64.7%. The primary benet of this approach over the cost
neutral one is that now 318 of the 2,400 parameter combinations (13.3%) tested at the
$40 million jackpot indicate Standard selection, with no other Mega Millions option
favored at the $40 million jackpot. The single purchase approach predicts greater Mega
Millions participation at each jackpot level relative to the cost neutral approach.
Table 6: Cost Neutral vs Single Purchase RWFM Predictions




Table 6 shows the maximum number of jackpots that any one parameter set predicts a Standard preference for. No
overlap is the cost neutral specication for which additional Standard entries share no winning states of the world with
Megaplier. Full overlap is the cost neutral specication for which additional Standard entries share all winning states of
the world with Megaplier. Single purchase is the specication of a single $2 Standard purchase, $3 Megaplier purchase
and $3 Just the Jackpot purchase.
From Table 6 alone it is not necessarily clear as to whether the cost neutral or single
purchase approach is more appropriate to model the Mega Millions choice problem. It
is possible that cost neutral better captures the problem for some players, while single
purchase does better for others. It is even possible that players facing low jackpots
restrict themselves to single purchases given the frequency of low jackpots, but switch
to behavior more consistent with cost neutrality when jackpots become excessively
high. Whatever the explanation may be, each RWFM specication diers with and
does signicantly better than all of the models analyzed in this paper in three key ways
consistent with the sales data:
1. Standard is the Mega Millions ticket option most preferred over wide ranges of
parameter combinations.
2. Standard preference is demonstrated for a large set of parameter values across the
range of feasible jackpot values.
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3. Not playing Mega Millions at all is the preference for most parameter-jackpot
combinations.
As was noted earlier, there is eectively no precedent as to an appropriate range of
parameter values capturing feedback and winner regret considerations in the popula-
tion. A wide range of values were tested, perhaps excessively so, in order to see the
full implications of the model. Therefore, results like a higher percentage of parameter-
jackpot combinations predicting Just the Jackpot than Megaplier should be taken with
a grain of salt. This does not imply that we should expect to see a similar pattern
in the data, which we don't. This observation applies to a lesser degree to the com-
mon models tested above, since the parameter values tested in those cases are based
on precedents established in the experimental literature. But the distribution of the
population over the presumptive parameter values tested is most certainly non-uniform,
so simply imposing the predicted percentages onto the population as expected behav-
ior would be misleading. What the predictions can tell is if a product is expected to
be preferred at all, and perhaps give some notion of the intensity of preference in the
population. Literal interpretation of the magnitudes of the results in any model rests
upon unrealistically strong assumptions.
In the pursuit of parsimony, RWFM can be constrained to remove either the feedback
or winner regret parameter. The former is equivalent to setting δ = 1 in (14), whereas
the latter is equivalent to setting γkj = 1 for all k, j. Table 7 reports the parameter
percentages with a no feedback restriction, and Table 8 reports the percentages for
a no winner regret restriction. There are some trade os relative to the unrestricted
version of the model, results of which are in Table 6. Removing feedback distinctions
renders the cost neutral framework inept at capturing the strong Standard preference in
the data over the gamut of feasible jackpots, but the single purchase framework still is
quite eective, although the Megaplier is now never predicted at any parameter-jackpot
combination. Eliminating the winner regret parameter is marginally better for the cost
neutral framework than removing the feedback parameter, but only predicts a Standard
preference for a maximum of 4 of the 8 tested jackpots for any of the parameter values
considered. Once winner regret is removed, the single purchase framework becomes
about as eective in mimicking the data trends as the common models tested earlier.
A case can be made that accounting for winner regret and dropping the feedback
parameter from the model does well enough at predicting the general data patterns.
Accepting this restriction de facto sets the single purchase framework as the appropriate
modeling framework as well. Figure 7 displays the parameter distribution at each
tested jackpot for the restricted RWFM single purchase model dropping the feedback
parameter.
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Table 7: RWFM Predictions with No Feedback




Table 7 shows the maximum number of jackpots that any one parameter set predicts a Standard preference for, under
a RWFM model without a feedback dierentiation parameter. No overlap is the cost neutral specication for which
additional Standard entries share no winning states of the world with Megaplier. Full overlap is the cost neutral
specication for which additional Standard entries share all winning states of the world with Megaplier. Single purchase
is the specication of a single $2 Standard purchase, $3 Megaplier purchase and $3 Just the Jackpot purchase.
Table 8: RWFM Predictions with No Winner Regret




Table 8 shows the maximum number of jackpots that any one parameter set predicts a Standard preference for, under
a RWFM model without a winner regret parameter. No overlap is the cost neutral specication for which additional
Standard entries share no winning states of the world with Megaplier. Full overlap is the cost neutral specication
for which additional Standard entries share all winning states of the world with Megaplier. Single purchase is the
specication of a single $2 Standard purchase, $3 Megaplier purchase and $3 Just the Jackpot purchase.
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Standard Megaplier Just the Jackpot None
$1 Billion Jackpot
Limited Attention, Revisited
Another, perhaps even more puzzling facet of the sales data is the at or even down-
ward trend of Just the Jackpot sales as a percentage of total sales as jackpots grow in
size. This is not consistent with RWFM predictions in any of its specications analyzed
above. As jackpot size increases, not only does the number of parameter combinations
predicting Just the Jackpot selection increase, but also the percentage of the combi-
nations predicting Mega Millions play that are Just the Jackpot. The regressions in
Table 4 conrm the inverse relationship between Just the Jackpot sales percentage and
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jackpot size. Note that as the jackpot size increases, Just the Jackpot must become rel-
atively more appealing under any decision framework taking probabilities into account.
As the jackpot increases in size, lower tier prizes and probabilities remain unchanged.
Therefore, Just the Jackpot sales percentages should increase with jackpot size, but the
data indicates the opposite.
The Kansas Lottery Commission eld experiment demonstrated that limited at-
tention is not responsible for driving low aggregate sales levels of Just the Jackpot
tickets. The jackpot amounts for the draws the promotions were active were $52 mil-
lion and $252 million, both typical jackpot amounts for Mega Millions. There are two
general types of players that play games with rolling jackpots. There are the frequent
players who play at some frequency across all jackpot levels, with intensity of play
perhaps increasing with the jackpot size. Then there are the jackpot frenzy players,
who generally abstain from playing until jackpots become unusually high. What the
Kansas experiment established is that limited attention is not the cause of poor Just
the Jackpot sales among frequent players. The argument proposed here is that extrap-
olating that conclusion to jackpot frenzy players is not appropriate. Frequent lottery
consumers should be expected to have increased awareness of the products available in
that market, much more so than infrequent consumers. There is also evidence that as
jackpots get excessively high, regressivity of the lottery becomes more proportional or
even progressive (Clotfelter and Cook, 1987), meaning that wealthier and higher income
individuals make up a much higher percentage of the consumer base of jackpot games
at higher jackpots amounts. The sales base changes with the jackpot level: exponen-
tial sales increases at unusually high jackpots are not primarily due to regular Mega
Millions consumers scaling up their purchases many times over. The change in income
distribution at low and high jackpot levels indicates that the large jackpots are driving
the participation of the relatively wealthier players. It is reasonable to presume that
these wealthier, higher income players derive much less marginal benet from lower
tier prize winnings than poorer players. Therefore, it seems likely that they would be
willing to give up the chances for lower tier prizes for additional entries into the jackpot
at a given desired expenditure amount. There is also an increase in the pooling of
funds for lottery ticket purchases at higher jackpot levels by groups of individuals, like
co-workers, friends or family. For such pools that have the intent to split winnings of
any tickets purchased, it is not conceivable that any of the lower tier prizes, maybe save
the $1 million, can hold any substantial bearing in the decision to purchase a bunch of
tickets. These reasons collectively point to limited attention reducing Just the Jackpot
selection at higher jackpot levels. Since there has not been a similar experiment to the
Kansas one conducted at an excessively high jackpot level, these reasons highlighting
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the dierence in the player composition at the very least allow for limited attention to
remain a viable hypothesis at higher jackpot levels. The author of this paper holds it
to be the only plausible explanation, given no theoretical or psychological explanation
for the Just the Jackpot sales percentage to decrease with jackpot size.
Counterfactual Analysis
No Feedback Just the Jackpot
The rst counterfactual analyzed is how behavior would look if Just the Jackpot tickets
did not give ex post feedback on the Standard and Megaplier options. There is a
very simple and practical way to accomplish this: require Just the Jackpot entries to
be the selection of a single number between 1 and 302,575,350. Such an entry would
give no feedback on the foregone Standard or Megaplier options, in the same way that
those options don't give feedback on the foregone additional jackpot entries. There is
an assumption of indierence between the current selection process and the proposed
one, and that players are fully aware of the jackpot odds under both processes. It is
possible that the convoluted selection mechanism currently in use allows players to be
unaware of the actual odds, although they are displayed clearly on the Mega Millions
website. They are not advertised in any way though, so the proposed change to the
selection mechanism becomes an advertisement of the jackpot odds, which may inuence
behavior. This issue is set to the side for the counterfactual analysis.
Enacting the mechanism change for Just the Jackpot only makes it no longer re-
vealing of the outcomes of the foregone Megaplier and Standard tickets. In the model,
this means Just the Jackpot evaluation now utilizes δ in all states. Table 9 reports
the RWFM predictions for this restructured Mega Millions game. The predictions give
further credence to the single purchase specication over the cost neutral ones, as they
are no longer able to rationalize a Standard preference over a suciently large range
of jackpots. For the most part, some of the players opting for Standard or Megaplier
in the original game now opt for Just the Jackpot. In fact, comparing the percentages
not playing between Tables 6 and 10 indicate that removing the feedback on Just the
Jackpot does not increase the overall play rate. This begs the question of whether
or not cannibalization by Just the Jackpot of other ticket types is desirable for Mega
Millions.
53
Table 9: RWFM Predictions with No Feedback Just the
Jackpot




Table 9 shows the maximum number of jackpots that any one parameter set predicts a Standard preference for, under a
RWFM model with a restructured Just the Jackpot option that provides no feedback on foregone Megaplier and Standard
selections. No overlap is the cost neutral specication for which additional Standard entries share no winning states of
the world with Megaplier. Full overlap is the cost neutral specication for which additional Standard entries share all
winning states of the world with Megaplier. Single purchase is the specication of a single $2 Standard purchase, $3
Megaplier purchase and $3 Just the Jackpot purchase.
Optimal Sales and Prots
RWFM is not unique in its prediction of Just the Jackpot primarily cannibalizing ex-
isting Mega Millions sales. Table 10 reports the dierences in the overall Mega Millions
play rates using the various models tested earlier, with and without Just the Jackpot as
an option. In spite of the inability of these models to justify the choice behavior in the
sales data, these models consistently predict negligible impacts of introducing Just the
Jackpot on the extensive margin. Such an analysis could have been undertaken leading
up to the creation of Just the Jackpot and would have indicated that the benet of its
introduction would be increased consumer welfare. However, Mega Millions and other
lottery products are not designed with consumer welfare as the primary optimization
objective. Many states have legislation explicitly stating the objective of lotteries to be
revenue maximization for the state. Therefore, inducing players to switch from another
Mega Millions option to Just the Jackpot should result in increases in revenue, in order
to comply with state legislation.
Consider three counterfactual Mega Millions games, each of which only has one of
the three ticketing options available: Standard Mega Millions, Megaplier Mega Millions,
and Just the Jackpot Mega Millions. The current Mega Millions game ends up most
resembling Standard Mega Millions, given the high percentage of Standard sales. The
approach then is to construct hypothetical jackpot and sales progressions in each of the
counterfactual games, using estimated jackpot and sales growth in the existing game,
along with the existing protability rate, which is relatively stable across draws. With
the hypothetical sales and jackpot progressions in each game, the long run average sales
and protability per draw in each game can be estimated, and by that determine the
sales of which ticket type are most in line with state revenue objectives. This procedure
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implicitly assumes that consumption patterns in these counterfactual games mimic that
of the existing game: constant initial sales at the minimum jackpot across games, the
same predicted sales growth as a function of the cash value of the jackpot, and the
same target protability rate in each game. These assumptions are quite strong, but if
accepted allow for clear predictions about Mega Millions revenue maximization.
Table 10: Cost Neutral Play Rates
Mega Millions Play Rate
Model All Options No Just the Jackpot Dierence
Expected Utility 20.3% 18.8% 1.5%
Prospect Theory 91.4% 91.2% 0.2%
Rank Dependent Utility 76.3% 76.1% 0.2%
Disappointment Aversion 14.3% 12.9%% 1.4%
Regret Theory 75.9% 75.6% 0.3%
Salience Theory 88.2% 87.2% 1.0%
Table 10 shows the predicted play rates under a cost neutral framework for each of the common models, both with
and without Just the Jackpot as an available option. Prospect Theory uses the Prelec (1998) weighting function;
Rank Dependent Utility is Cumulative Prospect Theory using the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) weighting function;
Disappointment Aversion with a certainty equivalent less than 4 specication; Regret Theory under pairwise aggregation
and full overlap scenario; Salience Theory under a no overlap scenario with θ = 1, 000, 000.
The sales data over the two year period shows a remarkably consistent net rev-
enue rate of 52% of gross sales. As an aside, net revenue is not the same as prots,
which would be net revenue less retailer commission and costs of running Mega Mil-
lions. Further assume the same retailer commission and additional cost structure across
counterfactual game types, so net revenue optimization translates directly to prot max-
imization. Net revenue for a given draw is dened as gross sales since the last jackpot
reset, less lower tier prize payouts since the last jackpot reset, less the cash value of
the jackpot for that draw. For example, a minimum jackpot of $40 million may have
a cash value of $25 million, depending on interest rates and other factors. If the sales
for that draw were $20 million and lower tier payouts were $2 million, potential net
revenue would be $20, 000, 000− $2, 000, 000− $25, 000, 000 = −$7, 000, 000. Consider
the jackpot rolling over to $50 million with a cash value of $30 million, with sales for
that draw of $20 million and lower tier payouts of $2 million for that draw. Poten-
tial net revenue for that draw would be ($20, 000, 000 + $20, 000, 000)− ($2, 000, 000 +
$2, 000, 000) − $30, 000, 000 = $6, 000, 000. Mega Millions essentially chooses the cash
value of the jackpot for the coming round based on predicted sales and converts that
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into an advertised annuitized amount so that net revenue is at 52%, save for the rst
few draws of a given round of jackpots due to the relatively low sales compared to
the jackpot size. This is true for all the jackpot rounds except the rst one after the
October 2017 changes, in which net revenue is lower and more volatile. There is an
inherent endogeneity of jackpot and sales determination: sales are the sole inuencer
of jackpot size, while jackpot size will inuence sales. Mega Millions announces a ten-
tative jackpot for the next round at the end of the draw, which they determine based
on sales projections. Mega Millions at times scales up the jackpot due to unexpectedly
high sales, but does not reduce the jackpot if sales are abnormally low. Over the time
range in the data, Mega Millions does reasonably well in setting jackpot amounts to
keep expected net revenue stable at about 52%: the interquartile range over the two
years of data for draws outside of the rst few and the rst round of jackpots is 51.8%
to 52.3%. Note that expected net revenue in the data is calculated using expected and
not actual lower tier payouts, and that it can be calculated for every draw, although it
will only realize for a draw with a winning jackpot.
The sales data can be leveraged to establish a relationship between jackpots and
sales to predict sales growth as a function of the natural log of the lagged cash values
of the jackpot. A quadratic t works much better than a linear t at modeling the
sales growth, highlighting convexity in growth as jackpots increase. In each of the
counterfactual games the same minimum jackpot of $40 million and initial gross sales
for the rst draw of $22 million are assumed, which is approximately the average rst
draw sales across the time period. For the rst few draws in the actual data, jackpots
usually increase in increments of $5 million, with sales holding relatively constant with
the increasing jackpots. However, protability increases signicantly with each draw,
settling at the 52% after about 4 draws. This sales and jackpot initiation are copied
to the three counterfactual games. After the rst few draws the lagged cash jackpots
are used to estimate sales growth and therefore predicted sales for the next draw.
Using these predicted sales, a cash value of the jackpot can be determined by setting
the protability rate to 52%. Protability is determined dierently in each version:
Megaplier Mega Millions has high expected lower tier payos, so that jackpot growth is
relatively low draw to draw; Just the Jackpot Mega Millions has no lower tier payos, so
all the payout is packed into the jackpot, which grows fastest in this version; Standard
Mega Millions takes a middle path with moderate lower tier payments and jackpot
growth. Note that Megaplier Mega Millions gives the worst odds at the jackpot, while
Just the Jackpot Mega Millions gives the best. The result is that the expected length of
a jackpot round (23) is longest under Megaplier Mega Millions, and lowest (13) under
Just the Jackpot Mega Millions.
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The construction of hypothetical sales and jackpot progressions also allows for cal-
culating the probability of reaching a specic draw number in each counterfactual game
via the binomial distribution. It would be misleading to simply choose a probability
level and compare the net revenues between games, since this would not be giving an
appropriate notion of comparable revenue, due to variation in the number of draws
to reach that probability level across games. What can be done is to normalize the
revenues in each draw by dividing revenue in a draw by the number of draws up to that
point in the round. Once that is done, the probabilities of reaching a certain draw in
each game can be used to construct CDFs of net revenue in each game. The convexity
of net revenue progressions allows net revenue per draw to be increasing monotonically
in draws. Figure 8 displays the CDFs of net revenue in each game, and Figures 8a and
8b are magnications of Figure 8 for ease of visibility. There is no FOSD of any distri-
bution, but the Megaplier CDF is below and to the right of the CDF of Just the Jackpot
for probabilities larger than about 15%. Standard is also dominated by Megaplier for
most of the distribution, although there is some crossover at the top few percent. Me-
dian net revenue occurs at the draw number for which the probability of reaching that
draw number falls below the 50% threshold, which occurs at dierent draw numbers in
each game. Median Megaplier net revenue is about $14.4 million, larger than median
Standard net revenue of about $13.7 million and median Just the Jackpot net revenue
of $13.4 million. These amounts can be seen visually by checking where the 50% prob-
ability line intersects each of the CDFs in Figure 8b. The same task is also undertaken
for gross sales with similar patterns. Figure 9 displays the CDFs of gross sales for each
counterfactual game, accompanied by Figures 9a and 9b as magnications of Figure 9.
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While the CDFs and median net revenue comparisons give some idea of product
desirability from the point of view of revenue maximization for states, average net
revenue is the most useful comparison, since it is something states could actually work
into budget plans. The convexity of net revenue results in a right-skewed distribution, so
that the median values do not give approximations to the means. Means are estimated
by running through 1,000 concurrent simulations of each of the counterfactual games.
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This results in about 70% more draws in the Megaplier version than the Just the Jackpot
version, and about 35% more than the Standard version. The 1,000 simulations result
in 12,904 draws in the Just the Jackpot game. The mean net revenue and sales for
the Just the Jackpot game can be estimated by dividing the total net revenue and
sales by 12,904. The simulations result in 16,271 draws of the Standard game. One
way to estimate the mean would be to proceed in the same way as Just the Jackpot
mean determination, by dividing aggregates by the number of rounds. An alternative
way is to keep the number of draws xed between games instead of the number of
rounds, so that time is constant across games. This requires nding the simulation
number in the Standard and Megaplier versions for which the number of draws crosses
12,904, the number of draws in the 1,000 Just the Jackpot simulations. Only aggregate
Standard and Megaplier revenues and sales for the simulations before the 12,904th draw
is crossed and normalize. Results are robust to either mean calculation method. The
mean sales and net revenue estimates using the xed draw approach are presented
in Table 11. The Megaplier version not only has the largest median sales and net
revenues, but also has the highest mean ones as well. The Just the Jackpot version
only yields approximately 85% the average sales and net revenues of Megaplier, while
the Standard version yields about 90% of the Megaplier values. These results indicate
that attempting to get players to switch from Megaplier and Standard selections to Just
the Jackpot is not revenue maximizing and therefore not in line with the objectives
explicitly outlined in the legislation of many states that oer lottery products. Just
the Jackpot introduction would only be consistent with state objectives if it brought
in players who were either not playing any lotteries or switching from an even less
protable lottery product outside Mega Millions. However, the mainstream preference-
based decision models do not predict gains on the extensive margin by introducing Just
the Jackpot into the existing Mega Millions game. The analysis places some serious
question marks on the introduction of Just the Jackpot as a Mega Millions option.
Table 11: Mean Sales and Net Revenues
Sales Net Revenues Sales % Megaplier Net Revenues % Megaplier
Megaplier $46,923,590 $24,346,334 100% 100%
Standard $42,224,822 $21,890,201 90.0% 89.9%
Just the Jackpot $39,938,215 $20,705,705 85.1% 85.0%
Table 11 shows the mean sales and net revenues for each of the hypothetical games based on 1,000 simulations of the
prospective jackpot and sales progressions, as well as each of the game's means as a percentage of Megaplier means.
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Conclusion
This paper has used sales data to analyze the underlying choice behavior in the Mega
Millions lottery game since the introduction of the Just the Jackpot ticket option in
October 2017. Just the Jackpot had some initial interest on its opening draw of about
2% of Mega Millions sales, but levels dropped to the 0.2% to 0.3% range within a
few months. A variety of the more popular and accepted decision theoretic models
all predicted higher levels of interest in the Just the Jackpot option then the data
demonstrated, as well as low interest in the Standard option. Alternative explanations
outside of the theoretical decision modeling framework, like limited attention, liquid-
ity constraints and slow sales adjustments, were also ruled out. Further investigation
pinned down the likely culprits to dierences in ex post feedback on foregone outcomes
between the various choices, along with low amounts of winner regret that having a
Standard entry engenders in lower prize tier-eligible states of the world. The Regret
Weighted Feedback Minimax model that captures these two behavioral tendencies is
proposed and demonstrated to unequivocally outperform existing models in rationaliz-
ing the data from all perspectives. The inverse relationship between Just the Jackpot
sales percentage and jackpot size in the data, which no reasonable model can account
for, is argued to be due to limited attention of jackpot frenzy players. These players
only participate when jackpots become abnormally high and may not have much expe-
rience with or be fully aware of the options available to play. If such players were made
fully aware of the Just the Jackpot option, it is presumed that the expected positive
relationship between jackpot size and Just the Jackpot sales percentage would be ob-
served in the data. Counterfactual analysis suggests that introducing Just the Jackpot
into the existing Mega Millions structure will not bring in new players, but rather cause
some existing players to switch to Just the Jackpot from another ticket option. Under
reasonable assumptions, such switching is shown to not be net revenue maximizing and
therefore not in line with state legislative mandates. These results pose serious doubts
relating to the introduction of Just the Jackpot in the rst place, independent of the
actual disinterest in the product demonstrated by players.
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Appendix
Mega Millions Prize-Odds Matrix4
4Taken from https://www.megamillions.com/How-to-Play.aspx on 09/17/20
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Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory
Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory (FCRT) is an extension of Regret Theory pro-
posed by Humphrey (2004) which allows for variation in feedback on outcomes of fore-
gone choices to be included in decision modeling. The model maintains Regret Theory's
native pairwise environment. The decision criteria is a generalization of (9)
Ai  Ak ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
pj[M(xij, xkj)−M(xkj, xij)] ≥ 0
For the purposes of the forthcoming analysis, (13) will be directly related to (9) by
setting
M(xij, xkj) = cij +R(cij − ckj)
where modied utility function M(xij, xkj) can lose its symmetric character if the ex
post regret status in state j diers between Aiand Ak. In the case that in state j,
receiving xij fully reveals the state of the world and foregone outcome xkj,M(xij, xkj) =
m(xij, xkj). In the case that in state j, receiving xij does not fully reveal the state of
the world and foregone outcome xkj, M(xij, xkj) = µ(xij, xkj). However, the decision-
maker has anticipated a state of the world under which they will receive xij and forego
xkj, but actually receiving xij does not reveal xkj (as opposed to some other outcome,
say, xkj∗) as the outcome of the foregone act (Humphrey, 2004). Three conditions are
imposed on M(., .) when xij > xkj:
1. m(xij, xkj) > µ(xij, xkj)
2. m(xkj, xij) < µ(xkj, xij)
3. µ(xkj, xij)−m(xkj, xij) > m(xij, xkj)− µ(xij, xkj)
The rst two conditions highlight that an action fully revealing the state of the world
and foregone outcome in that state has amplied utility when the outcome is larger
than the foregone outcome relative to non-revelation, and diminished utility when the
outcome is smaller than the foregone outcome relative to non-revelation. The third
condition states that the magnitude of the dierence in utilities between revelation and
non-revelation is larger in the case of regret than rejoice. Humphrey (2004) does not
provide a precise structural form or suggested parameterization to his FCRT. This paper
will assume original RT, with a choiceless utility portion that is the same regardless of
feedback, and an R(.) function, where R(.) is scaled up by a δ > 1 if Ai will reveal the
outcome of Ak in state j. With no feedback of the outcome of the foregone action ex
post in state j, R(cij − ckj) is used, and with feedback, δ ∗ R(cij − ckj) is used. This
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functional choice of the relationship between m(., .) and µ(., .) is chosen because of its
simplicity and ease of interpretation, but is clearly not the only formulation consistent
with the Humphrey (2004) stipulations. Notice that in order to fulll the third condition
on M(., .) using (7) to model R(cij − ckj) , β > α is necessary. To start, β = α will be
forced so that the third condition is only weakly satised.
Notice that ex post feedback is not necessarily symmetric: Ai may reveal the out-
come of Ak in state j, but Ak may or may not reveal the outcome of Ai in state j.
For example, the actions of opting into a fair coin ip and not opting in display the
asymmetry: ipping the coin reveals the foregone outcome of not playing in either re-
sultant states of the world, whereas opting out does not reveal the foregone outcome,
since the coin is never ipped. However, the choice could be modied so that the coin
will be ipped and state of the world revealed, independent of choice of action. In that
case, both actions would be fully revealing of the state of the world and outcomes of
the foregone action. The implication is that in this modied game, rejoice would be
larger in magnitude than in the original game for a favorable ip, and regret would also
be larger in magnitude in the event of an unfavorable ip. It is also possible that an
action may only reveal the outcomes of foregone actions in some but not all states of
the world. Then, only in those states would m(., .) be used for utility evaluation, µ(., .)
would be used in all other states.
Mega Millions falls into this partial revelation framework. Not playing Mega Millions
leaves one with the cost of the ticket with certainty, and there is no knowledge ex post
of what the outcome of playing any ticket type would have been. Pairwise comparisons
between not playing and each of the three ticket types results in utilizing µ(., .) in every
state when evaluating not playing, and utilizing m(., .) in every state when evaluating
any ticket type. Pairwise comparisons between ticket types is dierent. At any given
cost, Just the Jackpot gives the greatest number of distinct entries. For example, at
a cost of $6, Just the Jackpot gives four number combination entries, Standard gives
three, and Megaplier gives two. So, consider evaluating the choice between Standard
and Just the Jackpot. A choice of Just the Jackpot would be fully revealing of the
counterfactual Standard in every resultant state: if one or more of those tickets are
partial number matches, those would have been eligible for lower tier prizes had they
been Standard. If none of them are partial matches, well then if they had been Standard
tickets, they would not have been eligible. If one of them won the jackpot, it also would
have won the jackpot had it been Standard. Now consider the perspective of choosing
Standard. If any of those three tickets are lower tier eligible, that would indicate that
they would be ineligible had they been Just the Jackpot. If any of them were jackpot
winners, they also would be under Just the Jackpot designation. Now the asymmetry
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sets in. If none of the tickets are prize eligible, under Just the Jackpot designation a
fourth ticket would have been generated, with two possibilities: that ticket wins the
jackpot, or is a partial match or complete mismatch and wins nothing. Therefore,
Standard is fully revealing of foregone outcomes of Just the Jackpot in some states,
whereas Just the Jackpot is fully revealing of foregone Standard outcomes in every
state. Revelation moves in increasing order respectively with not playing, Megaplier,
Standard and Just the Jackpot. It may be that Just the Jackpot as the most revealing
option is diminishing its appeal.
The framework of FCRT is the same as that of RT, so the same concerns and con-
siderations highlighted in RT carry over to modeling FCRT. Two aggregation methods
were used in RT modeling, pairwise and state-wise mean utilities. For FCRT, only
pairwise mean utilities will be modeled. This is because with the factoring in of feed-
back into RT, calculating cij − mean(c−ij) as the input to R(.) becomes dicult to
interpret. Relative to Ai in state j, some foregone actions may have their outcomes
revealed whereas others may not. It becomes unclear as to whether or not m(., .) or
µ(., .) should be used in evaluation. Therefore this aggregation method is not modeled
under FCRT, only pairwise is, in which averages are taken of pairwise utilities and
the feedback parameter can be applied unequivocally. The two overlap scenarios from
RT also carry over, and in this case there is no confounding that feedback provides in
interpretation. Under FCRT, full overlap does impact the feedback channel relative
to no overlap. With full overlap of lower tier prizes, the state-wise dierentiation in
feedback between Megaplier and Standard is eectively removed. Since Megaplier and
Standard have the same sets of winning numbers under full overlap, Megaplier becomes
fully revealing of foregone Standard outcomes in all states, whereas it does not in states
in which a non-overlapping Standard ticket would be prize eligible.
The total number of tested parameter-jackpot combinations is 32,000 per overlap
scenario: the choiceless utility power function parameter runs from .71 to 1.10 in incre-
ments of hundredths; R(.) also takes the form of a power function, and its parameter
runs from 0.6 to 3.0 in increments of tenths; feedback parameter δ runs from 2 to 5
in increments of one. Both boundary overlap scenarios are tested under pairwise mean
aggregation for the same 8 jackpot levels tested in all other models. Only 8 parameter-
jackpot combinations are consistent with a Standard preference under the no overlap
scenario of a possible 32,000. Table A1 presents the test results of FCRT using the full
overlap scenario, which nds 305 parameter-jackpot combinations indicative of a Stan-
dard preference. Still, no parameter combination predicts a Standard preference for the
ve highest of the eight jackpots under either overlap specication. FCRT does only
marginally better than RT at capturing the choice behavior in the data, and cannot be
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said to be remotely consistent with it.
Table A1: Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory Predictions
Percent of Parameter-Jackpot Combinations
Model Standard Megaplier Just the Jackpot None Max Jackpots Standard
FCRT 1.0% 0.9% 74.7% 23.4% 3
Regret-only FCRT 2.6% 0.7% 71.4% 25.3% 4
Table A1 shows the percentages of tested parameter-jackpot combinations that predict preferences for each of the four
options, along with the maximum number of jackpots that any one parameter set predicts a Standard preference for.
FCRT is Feedback-Conditional Regret Theory under the full overlap specication; Regret-only FCRT is Feedback-
Conditional Regret Theory on regretful outcomes only under the full overlap specication.
As was noted above, the previous analysis set β = α and therefore only weakly
satised condition three on M(., .), whereas Humphrey (2004) lists the condition in
strict form. It is important to mention that this condition is essentially a behavioral
assumption that regret is a more salient feeling than rejoice, although one might incline
to agreement. The other extreme, which does satisfy condition three, is to assume that
ex post feedback does not increase the feeling of rejoice, but only that of regret. This
is consistent with the example given in Zeelenberg (1999), and amounts tom(xij, xkj) = µ(xij, xkj) xij > xkjm(xkj, xij) = δ ∗ µ(xkj, xij) xij > xkj, δ > 1
This other extreme is also tested, with somewhat better results than the forced equiva-
lency of rejoice and regret above. The same 64,000 parameter-jackpot-scenario combi-
nations are run through, with no overlap yielding just 4 parameter-jackpot combinations
at only the two lowest jackpots with a predicted Standard preference. The full overlap
condition is much better, with 830 parameter-jackpot combinations consistent with a
Standard preference, or 2.6% of the full overlap combinations. Results of this speci-
cation are presented in Table A1. These span seven of the eight jackpots, with high
concentration at the lowest jackpots. Furthermore, no one set of parameters can explain
a Standard preference for more than four jackpot levels. While the full overlap scenario
fares somewhat decently relative to most of the models and scenarios tested, full overlap
is again a boundary condition, with partial or no overlap much more realistic assump-
tions. Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that about 80% of Mega Millions tickets
in Texas over the past ten years were randomly generated and not self-selected, and
therefore no or partial overlap is unequivocally the better assumption for those 80%, let
alone the likelihood of players purchasing multiple entries and self-selecting the same
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number combinations. One positive takeaway from full overlap FCRT is that this is the
rst model in which Standard does not hold the fewest parameter-jackpot predictions,
as it just outperforms the Megaplier. However, the conclusion is that FCRT is also
unable to account for the observed Mega Millions choice behavior.
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Table A2: Mega Millions Sales for States Oering Just the
Jackpot
Date Jackpot Total Standard Megaplier Just the Jackpot
10/31/2017 $40,000,000 $7,282,759 91.15% 6.76% 2.08%
11/3/2017 $48,000,000 $8,037,966 91.89% 6.94% 1.17%
11/7/2017 $59,000,000 $7,435,573 91.83% 7.17% 0.99%
11/10/2017 $71,000,000 $7,980,197 92.01% 7.14% 0.85%
11/14/2017 $82,000,000 $7,741,920 92.09% 7.09% 0.82%
11/17/2017 $95,000,000 $8,517,323 92.31% 6.97% 0.71%
11/21/2017 $106,000,000 $8,847,507 91.95% 7.40% 0.65%
11/24/2017 $119,000,000 $8,353,300 91.78% 7.62% 0.60%
11/28/2017 $132,000,000 $9,239,587 92.01% 7.41% 0.58%
12/1/2017 $145,000,000 $10,199,466 92.07% 7.41% 0.52%
12/5/2017 $160,000,000 $9,870,955 92.52% 6.94% 0.54%
12/8/2017 $176,000,000 $10,157,419 92.75% 6.76% 0.49%
12/12/2017 $191,000,000 $10,455,870 92.77% 6.74% 0.49%
12/15/2017 $208,000,000 $11,932,542 92.90% 6.65% 0.45%
12/19/2017 $223,000,000 $12,930,848 93.20% 6.37% 0.43%
12/22/2017 $253,000,000 $16,356,936 93.57% 6.05% 0.38%
12/26/2017 $277,000,000 $14,952,197 93.50% 6.11% 0.39%
12/29/2017 $306,000,000 $27,881,874 93.93% 5.73% 0.33%
1/2/2018 $361,000,000 $32,219,824 94.15% 5.53% 0.32%
1/5/2018 $450,000,000 $50,135,632 94.14% 5.56% 0.30%
1/9/2018 $40,000,000 $8,934,178 92.37% 7.19% 0.44%
1/12/2018 $45,000,000 $8,435,116 92.14% 7.47% 0.40%
1/16/2018 $50,000,000 $7,680,835 92.21% 7.38% 0.40%
1/19/2018 $55,000,000 $8,413,244 92.17% 7.45% 0.38%
1/23/2018 $63,000,000 $8,010,639 92.16% 7.44% 0.40%
1/26/2018 $76,000,000 $8,799,877 92.23% 7.41% 0.35%
1/30/2018 $89,000,000 $8,265,817 92.15% 7.47% 0.39%
2/2/2018 $104,000,000 $9,644,471 92.25% 7.40% 0.35%
2/6/2018 $120,000,000 $9,245,950 92.29% 7.34% 0.37%
2/9/2018 $136,000,000 $9,875,370 92.41% 7.27% 0.33%
2/13/2018 $153,000,000 $9,801,786 92.43% 7.22% 0.35%
2/16/2018 $168,000,000 $10,701,619 92.63% 7.05% 0.32%
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Date Jackpot Total Standard Megaplier Just the Jackpot
2/20/2018 $185,000,000 $9,999,342 92.53% 7.12% 0.34%
2/23/2018 $204,000,000 $11,552,057 92.70% 6.99% 0.31%
2/27/2018 $222,000,000 $12,165,814 92.85% 6.83% 0.32%
3/2/2018 $243,000,000 $12,912,058 92.70% 6.99% 0.31%
3/6/2018 $265,000,000 $13,858,603 93.00% 6.69% 0.31%
3/9/2018 $290,000,000 $14,282,330 92.91% 6.80% 0.30%
3/13/2018 $318,000,000 $16,366,748 93.24% 6.47% 0.29%
3/16/2018 $345,000,000 $18,870,642 93.38% 6.35% 0.26%
3/20/2018 $377,000,000 $19,415,088 93.31% 6.38% 0.31%
3/23/2018 $421,000,000 $21,290,674 93.29% 6.40% 0.31%
3/27/2018 $458,000,000 $24,879,498 93.52% 6.17% 0.31%
3/30/2018 $521,000,000 $51,350,316 94.18% 5.58% 0.25%
4/3/2018 $40,000,000 $8,664,295 91.87% 7.80% 0.33%
4/6/2018 $45,000,000 $8,741,042 91.90% 7.80% 0.30%
4/10/2018 $50,000,000 $8,136,523 91.82% 7.86% 0.32%
4/13/2018 $55,000,000 $9,039,829 92.02% 7.70% 0.28%
4/17/2018 $67,000,000 $8,228,002 91.90% 7.78% 0.32%
4/20/2018 $80,000,000 $9,019,060 92.05% 7.66% 0.29%
4/24/2018 $96,000,000 $8,643,616 92.08% 7.62% 0.31%
4/27/2018 $111,000,000 $9,946,819 92.35% 7.38% 0.27%
5/1/2018 $126,000,000 $9,798,001 92.23% 7.48% 0.29%
5/4/2018 $143,000,000 $10,506,463 92.35% 7.37% 0.28%
5/8/2018 $40,000,000 $7,498,599 91.79% 7.91% 0.30%
5/11/2018 $45,000,000 $7,960,610 91.94% 7.78% 0.28%
5/15/2018 $50,000,000 $7,356,060 91.74% 7.96% 0.30%
5/18/2018 $55,000,000 $8,085,046 91.96% 7.77% 0.28%
5/22/2018 $60,000,000 $7,416,149 91.86% 7.85% 0.29%
5/25/2018 $73,000,000 $8,378,826 92.07% 7.66% 0.27%
5/29/2018 $84,000,000 $7,456,218 91.89% 7.82% 0.30%
6/1/2018 $97,000,000 $9,107,809 92.12% 7.61% 0.27%
6/5/2018 $110,000,000 $9,291,018 92.22% 7.49% 0.28%
6/8/2018 $127,000,000 $9,955,497 92.44% 7.30% 0.26%
6/12/2018 $144,000,000 $9,784,722 92.45% 7.27% 0.28%
6/15/2018 $161,000,000 $10,495,370 92.56% 7.18% 0.26%
6/19/2018 $175,000,000 $10,214,179 92.54% 7.18% 0.28%
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Date Jackpot Total Standard Megaplier Just the Jackpot
6/22/2018 $192,000,000 $11,325,558 92.60% 7.13% 0.27%
6/26/2018 $212,000,000 $12,108,530 92.66% 7.05% 0.29%
6/29/2018 $232,000,000 $13,578,444 92.71% 7.01% 0.28%
7/3/2018 $256,000,000 $14,206,276 92.63% 7.07% 0.30%
7/6/2018 $283,000,000 $14,250,322 92.69% 7.02% 0.29%
7/10/2018 $306,000,000 $16,881,618 93.01% 6.70% 0.30%
7/13/2018 $340,000,000 $20,728,668 93.17% 6.56% 0.27%
7/17/2018 $375,000,000 $21,488,624 93.30% 6.42% 0.28%
7/20/2018 $433,000,000 $34,642,408 93.88% 5.88% 0.24%
7/24/2018 $522,000,000 $60,161,128 94.29% 5.48% 0.23%
7/27/2018 $40,000,000 $8,131,869 91.83% 7.88% 0.29%
7/31/2018 $45,000,000 $7,665,313 91.68% 8.02% 0.30%
8/3/2018 $50,000,000 $8,271,744 91.79% 7.94% 0.27%
8/7/2018 $55,000,000 $7,805,630 91.73% 7.98% 0.29%
8/10/2018 $63,000,000 $8,363,887 91.87% 7.87% 0.26%
8/14/2018 $75,000,000 $8,013,807 91.83% 7.88% 0.29%
8/17/2018 $88,000,000 $8,825,262 92.10% 7.64% 0.26%
8/21/2018 $102,000,000 $9,315,947 92.21% 7.51% 0.27%
8/24/2018 $118,000,000 $10,036,574 92.31% 7.43% 0.26%
8/28/2018 $134,000,000 $9,822,489 92.30% 7.43% 0.27%
8/31/2018 $152,000,000 $10,976,064 92.41% 7.33% 0.26%
9/4/2018 $167,000,000 $10,000,861 92.30% 7.43% 0.28%
9/7/2018 $187,000,000 $11,436,642 92.56% 7.19% 0.25%
9/11/2018 $207,000,000 $11,832,820 92.68% 7.05% 0.27%
9/14/2018 $227,000,000 $12,810,338 92.86% 6.89% 0.25%
9/18/2018 $252,000,000 $12,799,656 92.81% 6.91% 0.28%
9/21/2018 $275,000,000 $13,730,861 92.94% 6.79% 0.26%
9/25/2018 $303,000,000 $15,337,032 92.97% 6.75% 0.28%
9/28/2018 $336,000,000 $17,082,332 93.17% 6.57% 0.26%
10/2/2018 $367,000,000 $18,566,592 93.29% 6.44% 0.27%
10/5/2018 $420,000,000 $24,050,072 93.65% 6.10% 0.25%
10/9/2018 $470,000,000 $28,247,306 93.90% 5.84% 0.26%
10/12/2018 $548,000,000 $43,123,228 94.05% 5.71% 0.24%
10/16/2018 $667,000,000 $78,702,176 94.41% 5.36% 0.23%
10/19/2018 $1,000,000,000 $207,492,976 94.45% 5.32% 0.23%
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10/23/2018 $1,600,000,000 $270,925,600 94.36% 5.38% 0.26%
10/26/2018 $40,000,000 $13,036,618 91.83% 7.87% 0.30%
10/30/2018 $45,000,000 $10,551,508 91.71% 8.02% 0.27%
11/2/2018 $52,000,000 $10,219,383 91.52% 8.08% 0.40%
11/6/2018 $70,000,000 $10,557,753 92.38% 7.38% 0.24%
11/9/2018 $90,000,000 $9,887,921 91.85% 7.92% 0.23%
11/13/2018 $106,000,000 $9,892,155 91.94% 7.81% 0.24%
11/16/2018 $122,000,000 $10,390,820 91.89% 7.89% 0.22%
11/20/2018 $139,000,000 $10,697,782 92.06% 7.71% 0.23%
11/23/2018 $155,000,000 $9,695,451 91.81% 7.97% 0.23%
11/27/2018 $172,000,000 $10,518,311 92.08% 7.70% 0.22%
11/30/2018 $190,000,000 $11,379,043 92.15% 7.64% 0.21%
12/4/2018 $208,000,000 $11,760,428 92.25% 7.52% 0.23%
12/7/2018 $226,000,000 $11,971,119 92.35% 7.43% 0.21%
12/11/2018 $245,000,000 $11,941,937 92.37% 7.41% 0.22%
12/14/2018 $262,000,000 $12,661,328 92.46% 7.32% 0.22%
12/18/2018 $284,000,000 $12,616,857 92.45% 7.32% 0.23%
12/21/2018 $305,000,000 $14,181,272 92.64% 7.14% 0.22%
12/25/2018 $321,000,000 $20,179,728 93.32% 6.48% 0.19%
12/28/2018 $370,000,000 $22,724,544 93.07% 6.74% 0.20%
1/1/2019 $425,000,000 $35,750,088 93.40% 6.40% 0.21%
1/4/2019 $40,000,000 $9,123,219 91.73% 8.05% 0.22%
1/8/2019 $45,000,000 $8,562,782 91.66% 8.11% 0.23%
1/11/2019 $50,000,000 $8,886,587 91.62% 8.17% 0.21%
1/15/2019 $55,000,000 $8,388,774 91.62% 8.16% 0.22%
1/18/2019 $68,000,000 $9,132,415 91.80% 8.00% 0.20%
1/22/2019 $82,000,000 $8,193,440 91.56% 8.22% 0.22%
1/25/2019 $96,000,000 $9,172,900 91.78% 8.02% 0.20%
1/29/2019 $109,000,000 $9,492,464 92.00% 7.79% 0.21%
2/1/2019 $125,000,000 $10,061,010 91.86% 7.93% 0.21%
2/5/2019 $139,000,000 $10,369,302 92.03% 7.76% 0.21%
2/8/2019 $157,000,000 $10,528,767 92.07% 7.73% 0.20%
2/12/2019 $173,000,000 $10,018,091 91.92% 7.86% 0.22%
2/15/2019 $190,000,000 $11,229,604 92.22% 7.58% 0.20%
2/19/2019 $206,000,000 $11,180,536 92.22% 7.56% 0.22%
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2/22/2019 $224,000,000 $12,400,790 92.39% 7.42% 0.20%
2/26/2019 $245,000,000 $12,685,180 92.45% 7.34% 0.21%
3/1/2019 $267,000,000 $14,024,939 92.39% 7.41% 0.21%
3/5/2019 $40,000,000 $8,244,622 91.61% 8.17% 0.22%
3/8/2019 $45,000,000 $8,944,821 91.81% 7.99% 0.20%
3/12/2019 $50,000,000 $8,670,861 91.74% 8.04% 0.21%
3/15/2019 $40,000,000 $9,088,265 91.94% 7.86% 0.20%
3/19/2019 $45,000,000 $9,401,534 92.02% 7.76% 0.22%
3/22/2019 $50,000,000 $10,410,177 92.12% 7.67% 0.21%
3/26/2019 $57,000,000 $10,683,040 92.09% 7.68% 0.23%
3/29/2019 $75,000,000 $10,570,955 92.05% 7.73% 0.22%
4/2/2019 $88,000,000 $9,339,371 91.75% 8.04% 0.21%
4/5/2019 $104,000,000 $10,642,903 91.96% 7.84% 0.20%
4/9/2019 $120,000,000 $10,459,799 92.06% 7.73% 0.21%
4/12/2019 $140,000,000 $11,029,933 92.15% 7.66% 0.19%
4/16/2019 $157,000,000 $10,935,413 92.13% 7.66% 0.21%
4/19/2019 $175,000,000 $11,457,466 92.20% 7.60% 0.19%
4/23/2019 $192,000,000 $11,350,473 92.19% 7.60% 0.21%
4/26/2019 $212,000,000 $12,572,596 92.34% 7.47% 0.20%
4/30/2019 $229,000,000 $12,952,414 92.36% 7.44% 0.21%
5/3/2019 $252,000,000 $14,050,305 92.37% 7.34% 0.29%
5/7/2019 $273,000,000 $13,644,412 92.48% 7.31% 0.21%
5/10/2019 $295,000,000 $14,407,691 92.57% 7.23% 0.20%
5/14/2019 $316,000,000 $15,046,406 92.67% 7.12% 0.20%
5/17/2019 $339,000,000 $15,925,653 92.74% 7.07% 0.19%
5/21/2019 $367,000,000 $16,168,593 92.72% 7.08% 0.21%
5/24/2019 $393,000,000 $17,346,194 92.73% 7.08% 0.19%
5/28/2019 $418,000,000 $18,204,460 92.88% 6.92% 0.20%
5/31/2019 $444,000,000 $23,855,912 93.08% 6.73% 0.19%
6/4/2019 $475,000,000 $25,635,468 93.12% 6.68% 0.20%
6/7/2019 $530,000,000 $32,804,596 93.44% 6.36% 0.20%
6/11/2019 $40,000,000 $8,313,913 91.47% 8.32% 0.21%
6/14/2019 $45,000,000 $8,669,905 91.47% 8.32% 0.20%
6/18/2019 $50,000,000 $8,134,308 91.38% 8.41% 0.21%
6/21/2019 $55,000,000 $8,676,327 91.52% 8.30% 0.18%
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6/25/2019 $60,000,000 $8,174,943 91.44% 8.36% 0.21%
6/28/2019 $71,000,000 $8,766,333 91.47% 8.34% 0.19%
7/2/2019 $83,000,000 $8,580,800 91.43% 8.37% 0.21%
7/5/2019 $95,000,000 $8,544,161 91.41% 8.39% 0.19%
7/9/2019 $107,000,000 $8,979,822 91.67% 8.13% 0.20%
7/12/2019 $121,000,000 $9,703,712 91.79% 8.02% 0.19%
7/16/2019 $137,000,000 $9,908,994 91.82% 7.97% 0.20%
7/19/2019 $154,000,000 $10,679,969 91.95% 7.86% 0.20%
7/23/2019 $168,000,000 $10,430,294 91.97% 7.83% 0.21%
7/26/2019 $40,000,000 $7,675,488 91.48% 8.32% 0.20%
7/30/2019 $45,000,000 $7,227,490 91.35% 8.44% 0.21%
8/2/2019 $50,000,000 $7,928,006 91.40% 8.41% 0.19%
8/6/2019 $55,000,000 $7,479,508 91.42% 8.37% 0.21%
8/9/2019 $60,000,000 $7,850,505 91.51% 8.31% 0.18%
8/13/2019 $65,000,000 $7,472,842 91.43% 8.36% 0.21%
8/16/2019 $70,000,000 $7,926,022 91.54% 8.27% 0.18%
8/20/2019 $79,000,000 $7,714,175 91.56% 8.23% 0.20%
8/23/2019 $90,000,000 $8,595,792 91.75% 8.06% 0.19%
8/27/2019 $103,000,000 $8,902,318 91.91% 7.89% 0.20%
8/30/2019 $113,000,000 $9,777,008 91.89% 7.91% 0.19%
9/3/2019 $127,000,000 $9,092,326 91.72% 8.06% 0.22%
9/6/2019 $139,000,000 $10,153,715 91.87% 7.94% 0.19%
9/10/2019 $154,000,000 $10,299,151 91.90% 7.89% 0.21%
9/13/2019 $172,000,000 $11,530,413 92.07% 7.73% 0.20%
9/17/2019 $192,000,000 $11,325,551 92.09% 7.70% 0.21%
9/20/2019 $211,000,000 $12,694,116 92.33% 7.47% 0.20%





There is existing evidence that decision making over risk is impacted by factors
like whether or not the decision maker can self-select numbers, a type of gaming
utility, a feature common in lottery games. Such preferences would violate the
fundamental properties of reexivity and FOSD, but is nevertheless within the
bounds of what the current literature accounts for. This paper provides experi-
mental evidence that the estimated nancial value of such factors is non-negligible,
as subjects on average are willing to forego 10% to 30% of potential winnings. A
novel result is the signicant variation in self-selection preferences by payo dis-
tribution. Sales data from lottery games played in Texas are adduced to further
conrm the experimental ndings. In order to ascertain the dependency of the
gaming utility on the payo distribution, an additional experiment is run to con-
trol for dierences in non-distributional gaming factors between the Texas lottery
games. The variation persists, leading to the conclusion that a preference for self-
selection of numbers is distribution-dependent for many individuals. Reasons for
these apparent inconsistencies with the existing literature and decision theoretic
model predictions are discussed, and a possible regret-salience motive is proposed.
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Introduction
Researchers have spent the past few decades modifying and rening both the underlying
psychological motivations and representative theoretic modeling of decision behavior
over risk. Many models maintain that if the payo distributions of two lotteries are
equivalent, a decision maker must display indierence. Other models in which lotteries
are evaluated only in comparison to one another, like Regret Theory, may have the
additional requirement of state space equivalence to necessitate indierence, a violation
of the so-called equivalence axiom (Table 6 in Loomes and Sugden 1982). However,
when comparing two lotteries with equivalent payo distributions and only two distinct
payos, distributional equivalence is sucient to ensure indierence (see the appendix
for a proof under Regret Theory). A question then abounds of whether these model
predictions reect real world choice behavior or even choice behavior in an experimental
setting.
A scenario satisfying the distributional equivalence and two outcome suciency
condition is as follows: Lottery A pays the subject $10 if a computer randomly selects
the same integer from 0-9 twice, each integer having an equal probability of being
selected, $0 otherwise. Lottery B requires the subject to choose an integer from 0-9,
and if that matches the integer from 0-9 that a computer randomly selects, the subject
receives $10, $0 otherwise. Both lotteries give $10 with a 10% probability and $0 with
a 90% probability. These two lotteries dier only in a procedural sense: the how of
the lottery resolution diers. Any decision maker that strictly prefers A or B would
be violating reexivity under the standard models. The procedure for risk resolution
under Lottery A is one that does not involve the decision maker in any way once the
decision to play Lottery A is made. Lottery B on the other hand requires further input
from the decision maker even after the decision to play Lottery B is made, although
this input is inconsequential probabilistically. This dierence in participation of the
decision maker in the resolution of the lotteries could drive a strict preference for either
lottery if there is a process preference.
While standard decision theoretic models have little to say about the processes of
risk resolution, there are numerous studies that look into preferences over such pro-
cesses. Of particular relevance to this paper are those studies that assess the rationale
behind the selection of numbers in lottery games (see Simon 1998 for a comprehen-
sive discussion of number selection in lotteries). Some lottery players select lucky or
personally signicant numbers, or numbers that have contemporary or cultural sig-
nicance, and often play such numbers repeatedly over periods of time (Clotfelter and
Cook 1989; Clotfelter and Cook 1991). Some are superstitious, consulting dream books,
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lottery experts and astrologers to aid in number selection (Clotfelter and Cook 1991).
This motive is an example of the well-documented illusion of control phenomenon, an
experimental example of which is subjects who had a choice of a specic lottery ticket
reporting signicantly higher willingness to sell amounts than subjects who were as-
signed a lottery ticket (Langer 1975). Superstition not only impacts which numbers are
chosen, but where lottery tickets are purchased, with increased sales at lottery retail
locations which recently sold a winning ticket (Guryan and Kearney 2008). Represen-
tative biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1972) also impact number selection. Both the
gambler's fallacy (negative autocorrelation) and hot hand (positive autocorrelation)
have been observed in lottery games (Riedwyl 1990; Clotfelter and Cook 1993; Henze
1997) and roulette play (Croson and Sundali 2005). Another selection mechanism re-
lates not so much to the numbers themselves as much as how the numbers are set on the
lottery ticket grid. Many players select numbers to make certain patterns on the grids,
such as: horizontal, vertical or diagonal lines; symmetric images across some reection
line; evenly or very nearly evenly-spaced number selections that result in seemingly pat-
terned grids (Riedwyl 1990; Henze 1997). These evidences suggest that lottery players
that harbor any of these considerations would likely not indicate indierence between
lotteries A and B described above.
Preferences over risk resolution processes like self-selection of winning numbers in
games of chance is part of the literature on process or procedural utility. Amartya Sen
(1995) calls for economics to take more seriously procedural concerns, as consequence-
only approaches would imply implausible conclusions like whether a particular utility
redistribution is caused by charity, or taxation, or torture to be immaterial. However,
procedural utility is often not readily quantiable, which contributes to its typical lack
of inclusion in modeling. Accounting for procedural utility can also lead to violating
certain foundational desiderata of choice theory. For example, assume someone prefers
mangoes to apples. When at a gathering, this individual will take a mango from a basket
of mangoes and apples as long that mango is not the last mango in the basket, as that
behavior may be considered rude. So, c(mango, mango, apple, apple) = mango and
c(mango, apple, apple) = apple (Sen 1997). Such choice behavior is a violation of Sen's α
and consequentially WARP. It is also conceivable that if the individual had been oered
the last mango, instead of having to choose it, the exhibited behavior would have been
consistent with theory. Such a complication highlights the diculty of incorporating
procedural utility into modeling. Sen (1997) gives an example of procedural preference
over risky choices, via the story of a doctor with a single antidote for a deadly disease
that has infected two children. The doctor knows that one of the children has a slightly
higher probability of survival if given the antidote than the other. However, the doctor
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prefers a randomization device to determine which of the two children gets the antidote
over administering the antidote to the child with a slightly higher chance of survival.
This behavior is a violation of the independence axiom and therefore inconsistent with
Expected Utility theory.
In this paper, simple choice experiments like the one described above between lot-
teries A and B are proposed to subjects. The results conrm that most subjects are not
indierent between two outcome distributionally-equivalent lotteries, and furthermore
that subjects are willing to sacrice 10% to 30% of their potential winnings to enact
their preferred process. A truly novel result of the experiment is that the proportion of
subjects with certain process preferences changes as the payo distribution of the equiv-
alent lotteries changes. Sales data from Texas lottery games are adduced to validate
the experimental nding of a correlation between payo distributions and a preference
over risk resolution processes, which in this case is whether or not to self-select winning
numbers. However, the sales data does not allow for a determination of whether the
correlation is due to game characteristics that vary between lottery games, or if the
payo distributions of the games themselves are impacting the process preferences. An
additional experiment is conducted which seeks to control for the game characteristics
in the lottery data, only allowing payo distributions to dier while more closely re-
sembling real world lottery distributions than the rst experiment. The experimental
results suggest that while such controls may mitigate the relationship in the lottery
data, a large and signicant eect persists, implying that for many individuals the pay-
o distributions themselves impact the preference for self-selection. The author is not
aware of any previous study with a similar nding of distribution-dependent process
preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 recounts the relevant literature to the issues
of decision making over risk and process utility. Section 3 describes the experimental
approach and procedures. Section 4 looks at the experimental and empirical results.
Section 5 includes a discussion of the potential driving factors behind the experimental
and empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
There is a thorough literature documenting the purported non-pecuniary benets of
games of chance, like lotteries and gambling. Hirshleifer (1966) proposes a classica-
tion of such activities to account for the common simultaneous lottery and insurance
participation that Expected Utility cannot readily account for. Rather than change the
utility of wealth function, he takes the lottery and gambling behavior in question out
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of the utility of wealth consideration by classifying such activities as pleasure-oriented
gambling, which would make such activities consumption goods and therefore not sub-
ject to evaluation by a utility of wealth function. Wealth-oriented gambling, which he
denes as the deliberate attempt to change wealth status, would be subject to eval-
uation by a utility of wealth function. Wealth-oriented gambling would be the kind
of risky wealth growth options available in nancial markets, pleasure-oriented gam-
bling including those activities that some view with moral disapprobation. He suggests
that a distinction between the two types of gambling can be easily observed in that
pleasure-oriented gambling is repetitive small stakes gambling, whereas wealth-oriented
gambling would be of the large stakes kind. His hypothesis is that at all wealth lev-
els, wealth-oriented gambling will be predominantly risk aversive and pleasure-oriented
gambling will be present, allowing for the simultaneous preference for unfair insurance
and lotteries. This conclusion rests on the exclusion of pleasure-oriented gambling from
evaluation by the utility of wealth function, which would suggest that such activities
provide mostly consumption utility and negligible wealth utility, or that the potential
wealth upside is insignicant in the decision to purchase such lotteries.
While such a distinction saves Expected Utility from a harrowing critique, the as-
sumption that the distinction rests on is questionable. Assigning pleasure-oriented
gambling value as a consumption good instead of a monetary good is appealing, but is
it reasonable to do so? Rationales that are consistent with such an assignment include
the (short-lived) right to dream or fantasize about potential winnings (Clotfelter and
Cook 1990); contributing to socially-desirable causes that are funded by proceeds from
such activities (Clotfelter and Cook 1990); an escape from the routine, mundane and
predictable nature of modern industrial life (Bloch 1951); a mechanism for releasing
tensions and registering non-disruptive protests against an inequitable capitalistic sys-
tem (Devereux 1949; Frey 1984); and a way to establish social cohesion and maintain
friendships (Guillén, Garvía and Santana 2012). While any or all of these reasons may
play a role in the decision to purchase lottery or gambling products for certain indi-
viduals, classifying such products as consumption goods negates the possibility that
any of these reasons may vary in intensity based upon the payo distribution (Forrest,
Simmons and Chesters 2002). Furthermore, the classication of such products as con-
sumption goods is itself suspect; for one, it is quite hard to digest the argument that
individuals purchase such products only for the non-pecuniary benets they provide.
Self-reported consumer evidence also validates this: about half of California lottery
players polled stated that they played the lottery for the money more so than the fun,
the share of which moved inversely to income (Los Angeles Times 1986). More recent
evidence further validates this, as a poll of over 1,000 US adults estimated that `21%
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of Americans, and 38% of those with incomes below $25,000, think that winning the
lottery represents the most practical way for them to accumulate several hundred thou-
sand dollars' (Consumer Federation of America 2006). So, in spite of the non-pecuniary
benets of lottery play, designating it solely as a consumption good does not seem to
be appropriate.
In their seminal work laying the axiomatic foundations of EU, Von Neumann and
Morgenstern assert that concepts like a 'specic utility of gambling' cannot be formu-
lated free of contradiction...anybody who has seriously tried to axiomatize that elusive
concept, will probably concur in it (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). There-
fore, attempts to account for the utility of gambling would have to depart from EU.
A number of models have been proposed that attempt to capture both the monetary
and non-monetary motivations of gambling-type activities (Royden, Suppes and Walsh
1959; Tversky 1967; Fishburn 1980; Dyer and Sarin 1982; Conlisk 1993; Schmidt 1998;
Diecidue, Schmidt and Wakker 2001; Bleichrodt and Schmidt 2002; Luce, Ng, Marley
and Aczél 2008; for a comparison of some of these models see Bleichrodt and Schmidt
2002). The primary features underlying these models are the assumption of a stan-
dard decision making model, such as EU, and the addition of a term that captures
the (dis)utility of gambling, which is of consequence only when comparing risky op-
tions/gambles to riskless amounts/certainties. This latter term can be constructed in
a number of ways: as a constant, if the utility is thought of as being a xed amount
independent of the distribution of the gamble (Fishburn 1980); as a function of the
risky option; as a function of the riskless option (for a comparison of the construc-
tion of gambling utility using the risky or riskless option see Diecidue, Schmidt and
Wakker 2001). In fact, some of these gambling utility models are a special case of
the Expected Cardinality-Specic Utility proposed by Neilson (1992), in which a dif-
ferent utility function is allowed for lotteries depending on the number of outcomes
n the lottery has. In the case of gambling utility, degenerate lotteries (n = 1) are
evaluated with a utility function, and non-degenerate lotteries (n > 1) are evaluated
with another utility function (Bleichrodt and Schmidt 2002). Gambling utility models
with a base of EU can account for additional behaviors that EU cannot, including the
lottery-insurance paradox and the Allais paradox. In that sense it succeeds in much
the same way that models that incorporate probability weighting do. The basic proba-
bility weighting models allow for rst order stochastic dominance violations, but using
weights derived from the cumulative probability distribution ensures dominance com-
pliance (Quiggin 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). However, no such x exists in
the case of utility of gambling models, insofar as dominance compliance is a desirable
consequence of a model. Diecidue, Schmidt and Wakker (2001) show that utility of
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gambling models necessarily violate either dominance or transitivity, two characteris-
tics that many in the eld view as indispensable to sound models of decision making
under risk. Therefore, utility of gambling models have not received anywhere near the
attention that other non-EU models have that can explain EU-inconsistent behavior
while maintaining normatively desirable characteristics.
All the models discussed so far, and the majority of models of decision making
under risk, can be classied as outcome-oriented. In relation to games of chance, a
number of proposed non-pecuniary benets have been listed above, but these stem from
the mere presence of products with certain payo distributions. In addition to payo
distributions and non-pecuniary benets, a third possible source of utility from games of
chance is the method by which risk is resolved. Procedural utility means that there is
something beyond instrumental outputs as they are captured in a traditional economic
utility function. People may have preferences about how instrumental outcomes are
generated. These preferences about processes generate procedural utility (Frey, Benz
and Stutzer 2004). Procedural or process utility has seen limited attention in economic
theory, but there are a number of experimental and observational studies that conclude
that individuals have procedural preferences in certain cases. One good example that
claries the concept of procedural utility is legal arbitration: litigants who found the
arbitration process to be fair were more likely to accept the court-mandated award,
irrespective of the outcomes, although the outcomes themselves played a somewhat
smaller role (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose and Park 1993). Many studies of organizational
structure and protocols, as well as legal systems, provide evidence of procedural utility
(see Frey, Benz and Stutzer 2004 for a review of studies that are suggestive of procedural
utility). In this paper, the procedural preferences and utility will be restricted to self-
selection or random generation of winning numbers in lotteries. Also, it is important
to highlight that the process utility for games of chance is what this paper refers to as
the utility of gaming, in contrast to the utility of gambling models in the literature.
Le Menestrel (2001) takes a procedural approach to the utility of gambling by den-
ing an observable behavior as composed of both a consequence and a process. In the
case of a gamble or lottery, which once again is dened as a lottery that has positive
probability on more than one outcome, a process (dis)utility can be considered inde-
pendent of the (dis)utility of consequences. Behavioral preferences are composed of
consequence preferences and process preferences, where consequence preferences can
abide by EU. The author axiomatizes the three preference types and provides condi-
tions under which observed behavior can lead to a revelation of the underlying process
and consequence preferences. The author notes a situation in which a mountain climber
prefers a route with a 95% chance of survival over one with 100% chance of survival
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over one with 80% chance of survival. The monotonicity violation is unable to be ex-
plained by consequence-only approaches like EU. However, allowing the consequential
monotonic rankings of 100% c 95% c 80% and a process in which risk adds to the
excitement, so that Risk (survival below 100%) p No Risk (100% survival) could lead
to the observed behavior of 95% b 100% b 80% (c is the preference relation over
consequences, p is the preference relation over processes, and b is the preference
relation over observed behavior). However, in the same vein as the utility of gam-
bling models mentioned above, the process Le Menestrel (2001) identies is whether or
not the lottery is degenerate, and would predict indierence between non-degenerate
lotteries that only dier in how risk is resolved.
Experimental Procedure
I implement a simple experimental design in order to determine if number selection
matters to individuals in the resolution of risk within a controlled experimental set-
ting. The experiment was conducted during the winter of 2019 on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), an online workplace that has seen increased usage by experimental-
ists in recent years. A number of classical laboratory experimental economic results
have been replicated on MTurk (Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser 2011). Additional ben-
ets of MTurk include the relative cheapness of subjects, along with access to much
larger samples than are available in most traditional laboratory settings, and ease of
implementation of static, non-interactive designs. The experimental design attempts to
determine if there is some experimental evidence of a process utility of gaming, sepa-
rate from the utility of gambling mentioned in the literature. The experimental designs
are simple, static and non-interactive, only requiring a few minutes of a subject's time.
The approach is within-subject, since even if an eect was found with a between-subject
approach, denitively attributing the eect to a process utility would be dicult, as
the argument that a certain factor was not controlled for could always be levied. The
subject pool was restricted to those located in the United States.
The experiment consists of two questions, each oering subjects a choice between
two lotteries. The rst lottery option in question one is Picking any number you want
from 0-9 and then letting a computer randomly pick a number from 0-9. If the numbers
match, you receive a $10 prize amount; otherwise you receive $0. The second lottery
option in question one is Letting a computer randomly pick a number between 0-9 two
separate times. If the numbers match, you receive a $10 prize amount; otherwise, you
receive $0. Both of these lotteries oer $10 with a 10% chance and $0 with a 90%
chance. As stated in the introduction, consequential models predict indierence between
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these two lotteries. The rst option will be called the Self option, the second option
the Computer option. Subjects are asked to indicate which lottery they prefer, and
are also given the option to indicate indierence. If a subject indicates strict preference,
the subject is then asked to provide the minimum prize amount so that the subject still
prefers the option initially selected, but with the new prize amount for that option only.
The subject then plays out the preferred option with the new minimum prize amount.
If the subject indicates indierence, the subject gets randomly assigned one of the two
options to play out at the initial $10 prize amount. The Appendix demonstrates how
this rst question was presented to subjects with the appropriate instructions.
The second question oers two more options, but with a starkly dierent distribution
than the rst question. The rst lottery option is Picking any number you want from 0-
9 and then letting a computer randomly pick a number from 0-9. If the numbers do not
match, you receive a $10 prize amount; otherwise you receive $0. The second lottery
option is Letting a computer randomly pick a number between 0-9 two separate times.
If the numbers do not match, you receive a $10 prize amount; otherwise, you receive
$0. Both of these lotteries oer $10 with a 90% chance and $0 with a 10% chance.
The second question proceeds in the same manner as the rst question once a player
indicates preference. Subjects received a xed payment of 10 cents for participating,
and after a second randomization done outside of the experiment, subjects were eligible
for up to an additional $10 based on their responses and luck. The average time
to complete the experiment was about ve minutes, the median time was closer to
three minutes. 400 subjects participated in the experiment; however, only 298 of the
responses were fully consistent with rational behavior and the experiment instructions.
For example, if a subject selected a preference for Self but resolved the risk according
to the instructions for a Computer preference, such a response was dropped. Results
do not change substantially for the complete, unltered data.
The decision theoretic model predictions and the evidence for number self-selection
in lotteries allow for the formation of two hypotheses: the former implies indierence in
both questions, whereas the latter implies a strict preference for Self in both questions.
Results consistent with either of these hypotheses would be viewed as in line with the
existing literature. Given that the time dierence in resolution for the Self and Com-
puter options in the experiment is negligible, a third possible hypothesis of a preference
for Computer in both questions is ruled out. Such a hypothesis would be appropriate
if the Computer option took less time to play out and subjects were consequentially
indierent but preferred to nish the experiment quickly and perhaps move on to other
paid tasks on MTurk. Therefore, the two hypotheses are:
1. The Decision Theory (DT) Hypothesis: Subjects will be indierent between
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the Self and Computer options in both questions.
2. The Utility of Gaming (UG) Hypothesis: Subjects will display a strict
preference for the Self option in both questions.
Results
Experiment I
Table 1 shows the distribution of preferences across the two questions. What is imme-
diately apparent is that the results are not consistent with the DT hypothesis: fewer
than one-quarter of subjects indicate indierence in both questions, while nearly two-
thirds never indicate indierence. Over two-thirds of subjects are consistent in their
preferences across questions, but about one-third of subjects demonstrate that the dis-
tribution is somehow impacting preferences over processes. 71 subjects are consistent
with the DT Hypothesis, and 86 are consistent with the UG Hypothesis. Subjects
consistent with either of the hypotheses correspond to the two largest response groups,
amounting to about half of the total responses. However, 46 subjects prefer Computer
for both questions, and 39 prefer Self when the win probability is 10% but switch to
Computer when the win probability is 90%. There seems to be some evidence for re-
linquishing of control at the 90% win probability relative to the 10% win probability.
Using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test, the probability of equivalence of re-
sponse between questions is p = .001. While this is quite a strong signicance level by
typical standards, it is worthy to note that 203 of the 298 subjects indicated process
consistency across questions, while 63 indicated a relinquishing of control at the higher
win probability relative to 32 in the opposite direction. The dierence here is what is
driving the signicance, but it is important to note the dierence corresponds to only
about 10% of subjects. The stronger conclusion is that since nearly half of subjects do
not behave in accordance with either hypothesis, there may be other factors at play in
the decision calculus for many subjects, including payo distribution considerations.
Table 1: Preference Reports of Experiment I
10% win
90% win
Self Indierent Computer Total
Self 86 15 15 116
Indierent 11 71 2 84
Computer 39 13 46 98
Total 136 99 63 298
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While the preference responses from the experiment run strongly against the DT
Hypothesis, it is important to determine the economic signicance of gaming utility, if
any. Charness and Gneezy (2010) run an experiment in which subjects are endowed with
$10 and are asked to make investment decisions. One of the treatments they employ
is an illusion of control (Langer 1975), in which subjects could roll a dice to determine
the outcome of an investment. 25 of the 37 subjects elected to roll the dice themselves;
however, when subjects were required to give up 5% of their endowment to roll the
dice themselves, only 2 of 22 subjects pay the price. They conclude that while there
is evidence of an illusion of control, it is not economically meaningful. So, requiring
subjects with a strict preference to state their minimum prize amount to maintain their
strict preference in my experiment aims to see if a similar inconsequential illusion of
control eect is present here.
The minimum prize amounts reported in both questions are spread out, with a
couple of values receiving large responses. In the question oering a 10% win probability,
of those demonstrating a strict preference one way or the other, 59 subjects stated a
minimum prize amount of $5 to maintain their reported preference. These subjects
were willing to give up half of their potential winnings, or half of the expected value
(50 cents) to implement their preferred process. 30 subjects stated a $9.99 minimum, a
response which is in line with the ndings of Charness and Gneezy (2010). In the 90%
win probability question, 56 subjects state $5 (a $4.50 reduction in expected value) and
36 subjects state $9.99. These are the two most frequent responses in each question.
There are no signicant dierences in mean or median reported minimum prize amounts
between the Self and Computer strict preference groups for each question. In fact, the
means are within a few cents of each other for each question.
What is perhaps suspect is that for each question, 43 of the respondents who in-
dicated a strict preference reported a minimum prize amount less than $5, with 15
subjects reporting a minimum prize amount of $1 in each question. While there is
nothing inherently wrong with such responses, it could be argued that some of these
subjects may have misunderstood the task, or instead reported how much money they
would be willing to have removed from the $10 prize amount (so an input of $1 would
correspond to a minimum of $9). Table 2 reports a few median and mean minimum
prize amounts: unltered, only those reporting $5 or above, and amounts below $5
transformed to $10 minus that amount. For those who indicated indierence, a mini-
mum of $10 is imputed for mean and median calculations.
One method to ascertain the signicance of the reported minimums is to determine
how the data compares to the consequential prediction of a $10 minimum. This can
be done via a Mann-Whitney U Test, pitting the subject data against a constant of
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$10 for the same number of observations. For both win probability questions and all of
the three minimum aggregation methods, the test strongly rejects the hypothesis that
the data is generated from the same distribution as the $10 prediction, p<.00001. In
order to determine an estimate of how signicant the dierence is for each question and
aggregation type, the constant amount of $10 can be incrementally reduced and tested
against the data, up to the point where the test loses signicance, say at the 5% level.
These amounts are reported in Table 2. The unltered and transformed data yield
minimums between $9 and $10, while the truncated data yields $9.99. The truncated
data test results are more in line with those of Charness and Gneezy (2010), while the
other two methods reveal economically signicant reductions in prize minimums. So
there is some evidence of economically signicant valuations of the process utility in
this case. It is also worthy noting that the Charness and Gneezy (2010) experiment
required subjects to give up 5% of their endowment, while this experiment is asking for
a reduction in potential winnings. The reduction of an endowment would be subject to
loss aversion, whereas a reduction in potential winnings would not, if lotteries are all
evaluated independently. Five percent of the Charness and Gneezy (2010) endowment
amounts to 50 cents. In the 90% win question, more than half the subjects report
a willingness to lose more than 50 cents in expected value to pursue their preferred
process. Loss aversion could perhaps be causing the dierence of conclusions between
the two experiments.
Table 2: Minimum Prize Amounts of Experiment I
Unltered $5 or Above Transformed
10% win
Mean $7.37 $8.33 $8.33
Median $9 $9.99 $9
n 296 253 296
Minimum $9 $9.99 $9.90
90% win
Mean $7.39 $8.33 $8.30
Median $9 $9.50 $9
n 298 255 298
Minimum $9.50 $9.99 $9.50
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Lottery Data
The experimental results suggest signicant heterogeneity in number selection prefer-
ences, even between dierent payo distributions. While these results are not fully in
line with the predictions based on the literature, an additional source with similar pat-
terns would make a more compelling case. Many lottery games in the United States are
draw games, requiring players to select a few numbers from a set of numbers, awarding
prizes to players who get full or partial matches. A feature of these games is the option
for players to be given a random set of numbers, an option appropriately called Quick
Pick (QP), as it only requires making a single selection on the lottery ticket. Players
can also choose their own numbers, or Self Pick (SP), which will require lling out the
appropriate number of selections on the lottery ticket, usually between three and six
number selections per entry.
One prediction of consequential models would be an indierence between QP and
SP. The expectation could then be that the percentage of QP would be around 50%
across all draw games. Alternatively, as QP takes less time to complete, there could
be an expectation of around 100% across all draw games, if players prefer to spend
less time lling out entries. Incorporating the evidence that many players prefer to
self-select numbers implies that QP would be 0% across games, if all players are as-
sumed to have such preferences. Convex combinations of these homogeneous extremes
would eectively cover any observed QP percentage, provided that percentage was rel-
atively constant between games. Notice how the processes available essentially mimic
the processes in the experiment: one process allocates the risk resolution totally to a
computer, and another allows the player to pick numbers that are to be matched to
numbers randomly selected via computer or lottery drum.
Table 3 presents the aggregates sales and QP percentages for the draw games oered
in Texas from August 2011 through July 2019. The games are listed in descending
odds for the top prize in each game. The odds for the top prize for Pick 3 is 1:1,000,
whereas the odds for the Mega Millions jackpot are 1:302,575,350. All the games
except Powerball and Mega Millions are games only available for purchase in Texas.
First, the QP percentages are starkly dierent across games, inconsistent with the
range of hypotheses permitted by the literature. Second, there seems to be an inverse
relationship between the QP percentage and the overall odds. Games with better odds
have lower prize amounts, as lottery tickets are similarly priced across games. Third,
QP percentages are correlated with the parimutuel nature of the top prize: higher QP
percentages occur within parimutuel games. There are a few competing explanations
for the wide range of QP percentages across games.
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The rst explanation revolves around dierent utilities of gaming for the various
lottery games. The two games with low QP percentages are the Pick 3 and Daily 4.
Both of these games require selecting (either three or four) numbers from 0-9. All of the
other games require selecting numbers from a larger number pool, such as 35 or 69. It is
certainly easier to construct personally important numbers, like area codes or birthdays,
using a few digits from 0-9 than from a pool of larger, two digit numbers. Another
dierentiating factor between Pick 3 and Daily 4 and the rest of the draw games is that
they are the only two games that allow selecting with replacement. This would allow
selecting a number like 777 in Pick 3 or repeating numbers, which other draw games
would not allow. The single digit selection design and drawing with replacement make
Pick 3 and Daily 4 ripe for playing lucky or important numbers. Selecting numbers
to form patterns or designs on the playing board is also a motive, but this motive
is arguably stronger in games with larger playing boards that require more number
selections, which are the games with worse odds. Another related explanation is that
the games with worse odds of desirable prizes require more numbers to select and a
larger pool to choose from. Many players apparently nd choosing six numbers for a
worse odds game a daunting task (Clotfelter and Cook 1989). This could cause added
mental stress in self-selecting for those games, reducing the impact of the utility of
gaming from self-selecting. The two games with QP percentages near 50% are Cash
5 and All or Nothing. These games have poorer odds than Pick 3 and Daily 4, but
are also not parimutuel. They also have a dierent number selection mechanism of
selection without replacement of single and double digit integers, relative to the single
digit integer selection with replacement of Pick 3 and Daily 4. The mental stress
motive would be stronger for these games as well. These factors all hinder the appeal
of self-selection and would therefore provide a lower utility of gaming for these games.
The four parimutuel games have even larger pools of numbers to choose from without
replacement. The added mental stress would further depress the gaming utility and
result in the observed lower QP percentages.
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Table 3: Texas Lottery Data
Sales QP Percentage Parimutuel Top Prize
Pick 3 $2,083,839,142 12.41% No
Daily 4 $753,942,261 13.01% No
Cash 5 $404,839,457 55.84% No
All or Nothing $270,035,914 55.88% No
Texas Two Step $457,981,345 76.40% Yes
Lotto Texas $1,158,055,791 69.61% Yes
Powerball $2,438,867,623 80.54% Yes
Mega Millions $1,808,619,562 79.39% Yes
Pick 3 requires selecting three numbers from 0-9; Daily 4 requires selecting four numbers from 0-9;
All or Nothing requires selecting twelve numbers from 1-24; Cash 5 requires selecting ve numbers
from 1-35; Texas Two Step requires selecting ve numbers from 1-35; Lotto Texas requires selecting
six numbers from 1-54; Mega Millions requires selecting ve numbers from 1-70 and one number from
1-25; Powerball requires selecting ve numbers from 1-69 and one number from 1-26.
The second explanation for the varying QP percentages between games is the max-
imization of the expected return to playing. For xed odds games, each entry yields
exactly the same expected return, as there is no sharing of prizes in the case of multi-
ple winning entries for any prize level. Games with a parimutuel top prize would only
share this equality of expectation if all entries were determined in an eectively random
manner. Bosch (1994) lists 2,588 popular number combinations of a German lottery,
each being selected at least 50 times more often than by random expectation. These
correspond to 0.038% of tickets sold, whereas the expected percentage by random as-
signment is 0.00018%. Under such circumstances, a player aware of which combinations
are popular would increase the expected return by avoiding such combinations for this
parimutuel game. Since a player cannot be reasonably aware of a comprehensive set of
combinations that are popular for a given game, a player could opt to QP to increase the
likelihood of drawing an unpopular combination. A study of the UK National Lottery
estimates that 18% of the combinations are popular, in that about half of the players
who self-select numbers choose from those 18% (Simon 1998). So, opting to QP would
amount to an 82% chance of drawing an unpopular combination, substantially increas-
ing the expected return of self-selecting, assuming self-selection would more likely yield
a popular combination. This could explain the large gap in QP percentages between
parimutuel and xed odds games, and adding the utility of gaming explanation would
account for the dierences within each game type.
The rst two explanations are wholly contained within the explanatory power of
the existing literature. A third explanation is that the dierences in QP percentages
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between games is somehow due to the payo distributions themselves. Games with
better odds and lower prizes, like Pick 3 and Daily 4, have low QP percentages, whereas
games with poorer odds and higher prizes, like Powerball and Mega Millions, have high
QP percentages. It is worthwhile to determine if payo distributions impact preferences
over self-selection of winning numbers. Unfortunately, in addition to highly variant
payo distributions, the lottery games dier in number selection mechanisms, potential
mental stress of number selection, and parimutuel nature of the top prize. Returning to
the experimental setting and controlling for the rationales consistent with the literature
should yield some insight regarding the driver of the observed choice behavior in the
lottery data.
Experiment II
The second experiment is essentially a modication of the rst, with the intent being
to determine the true culprit behind the QP percentage distribution across Texas lot-
tery games. The rst experiment provided some evidence that the choice behavior of
many individuals cannot be accounted for with the decision theory and number selec-
tion literatures. However, the probability levels of 90% and 10% of winning are not
representative of typical lottery odds. To better recreate the real-life setting, the odds
of winning in the second experiment are reduced signicantly. Once again, subjects
are asked two questions about lottery preference and are told to choose their preferred
option in each or report indierence. The rst lottery option in question one is Picking
any number you want from 0-999 and then letting a computer randomly pick a number
from 0-999. If the numbers match, you receive a $10 prize amount; otherwise you re-
ceive $0. The second lottery option in question one is Letting a computer randomly
pick a number between 0-999 two separate times. If the numbers match, you receive
a $10 prize amount; otherwise, you receive $0. The second question reduces the odds
of winning by a factor of 1,000. The rst lottery option in question two is Picking
any number you want from 0-999,999 and then letting a computer randomly pick a
number from 0-999,999. If the numbers match, you receive a $10 prize amount; other-
wise you receive $0. The second lottery option in question one is Letting a computer
randomly pick a number between 0-999,999 two separate times. If the numbers match,
you receive a $10 prize amount; otherwise, you receive $0. This experiment does not
require disclosure of minimum prize amounts and therefore took less time and had no
possible subject inconsistency issues, all 400 responses are included, although this was
run as a separate session from the rst experiment and these are not the same 400
respondents. Otherwise, it was similarly incentivized and ran in the same fashion as
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the rst experiment.
The results of the second experiment are presented in Table 4. The 1:1,000 odds
bears some similarity to Pick 3, as those are the exact odds for the top prize of $500.
The 1:1,000,000 odds is typical of the odds size for some of the larger prizes in games
like Lotto Texas, Powerball and Mega Millions. Unlike these games though, the num-
ber selection in the experiment more closely resembles Pick 3, which requires players
to choose three digits from 0-9 with replacement. The 0.1% win question essentially
requires the same, as picking three single digits from 0-9 with replacement and order
sensitivity is equivalent to choosing a three digit number from 0-999. The 0.0001% win
question extends the selection from three to six digits, 0-999,999. This design attempts
to remove the number selection dierences noted above between games like Pick 3 and
Mega Millions. In addition to controlling for the number selection mechanism, if there
are multiple winners in the experiment, each gets the promised prize of $10, so the
parimutuel feature is controlled for. The possible mental stress of picking a three digit
vs a six digit number is assumed to be equivalent or negligible. The time dierence
for completion of the experiment between Self and Computer is negligible, assuming
players self-selecting are not mulling over which number to choose. Implementing these
controls leaves the payo distributions themselves as the variable of interest. If a vari-
ation in preferences is found between the two questions, the conclusion would be that
the distributions themselves aect the preference for self-selection.
This indeed is what the experimental results suggest. In the 0.1% win question,
Self is the most preferred option (165 subjects), whereas in the 0.0001% win question,
allowing the computer to select is most preferred (184 subjects). A Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed rank test testing changes in response between questions is highly signicant
(p<.00001). 106 subjects opt for less control as the win probability drops, with only 37
subjects moving in the opposite direction. Less than 40% of subjects behave according
to either hypothesis supported by the literature, namely selecting Self or Indierent for
both questions. In fact, the largest preference group is Computer for both questions.
When moving from the experimental to the empirical setting, Self closely corresponds
to SP and Computer to QP. However, there is no Indierent option in the empirical
setting, so individuals who are indierent ultimately choose either to SP or QP. To
make the experimental data more comparable to the empirical, the Indierent option
needs to be dealt with. One way is to drop the results reporting indierence. If so, 147
subjects prefer Self in the 0.1% win question and 113 prefer Computer, meaning 43%
QP. In the 0.0001% question, 102 prefer Self and 158 prefer Computer, meaning 60%
QP. One extreme case is to assign the indierence to Self. Doing so yields 31% QP in
the 0.1% win question and 46% QP in the 0.0001% question. The other extreme is to
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assign indierence to Computer, which perhaps is more justiable. QP is indeed quicker
than SP in real life, while Self and Computer do not have much of a time dierence in
the experiment. Doing so yields 58% QP in the 0.1% win question and 71% QP in the
0.0001% question. Using the Texas lottery data, games more similar to the 0.1% win
question have 10%-15% QP, while the other games more similar to the 0.0001% question
have 70%-80% QP. While assigning Indierence to Computer gets the 0.0001% win QP
percentage into the appropriate empirical range, even assigning Indierence to Self
doesn't lower the 0.1% win QP percentage into the appropriate empirical range. The
takeaway is that the controlled experiment is generating a signicant gap in purported
QP percentages in the same direction as the lottery data, but a smaller magnitude.
Table 4: Preference Reports of Experiment II
0.0001% win
0.1% win
Self Indierent Computer Total
Self 85 18 62 165
Indierent 11 72 26 109
Computer 17 9 96 122
Total 113 99 184 396
Discussion
The experiment conrms an interaction between the payo distribution and preferences
over risk resolution for a signicant percentage of subjects. A couple of psychological
studies provide the only evidence the author is aware of in which a preference for the
process of risk resolution varies by payo distribution. Experimenters assessed subjects
with a Desirability of Control scale (Burger and Cooper 1979) and nd that high desire
for control subjects bet more money when allowed to throw the dice themselves in a dice
game (Burger and Cooper 1979), and this eect on dice games is more prominent when
the odds of winning are relatively better (Wolfgang, Zenker and Viscusi 1984). These
studies were between-subject studies with fewer than 100 subjects, and critically did
not control for risk preferences in any way, so the results could also be attributable to
more risk tolerance by subjects randomly assigned into treatments instead of an illusion
of control. The experimental design in this paper is within-subject and can face no such
criticism. Summarizing the results from the rst two experiments, about 40% to 50% of
subjects act in accord with the decision theory or utility of gaming literatures. There is
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a stronger preference for Computer in the second experiment in which win probabilities
are extremely low. The preference for Computer regardless of payo distribution could
perhaps be rationalized as slightly less time consuming or mentally taxing than Self.
Another 30% to 40% of subjects change their preferences for risk resolution between
questions. The implication is that there is signicant heterogeneity in preferences for
self-selection of numbers, and for many agents this preference is dependent on the payo
distribution itself. The key contribution of this paper is evidence of the latter. The
question remains as to what is driving such a dependency.
The experiments keep the prize winnings xed at $10 and vary the win probabilities
and therefore the expected values of the lotteries. In the 90% and 10% win probability
experiment, 63 subjects indicated a relinquishing of control when moving from the
low win probability to the high, relative to 32 in the opposite direction. In the 0.1% and
0.0001% win probability experiment, 37 subjects indicated a relinquishing of control
when moving from the lower win probability to the high, relative to 106 in the opposite
direction. Combining these ndings indicates a U-shaped behavior by the average agent
displaying distribution-dependent risk resolution preferences: at very low and high
probabilities of winning Computer is preferred, while at moderately low probabilities
of winning Self is preferred. This non-monotonic behavior requires some creativity to
rationalize. One attempt is to frame the discussion in terms of regret.
Consider dening two types of regret, one resulting from a poor outcome from Self,
the other from a poor outcome from Computer. Once a player is made aware of the
winning numbers post risk resolution, a player selecting Self could retroactively choose
those numbers and win, while a player choosing Computer would be no better o with
that information retroactively, since numbers are assigned randomly. Therefore, playing
Self elicits a tangible regret when a poor outcome obtains, whereas playing Computer
elicits a weaker abstract regret in the event of a poor outcome. If minimizing the pain of
regret was the only concern outside of an evaluation of the payo distribution, opting
for Computer would be optimal for all distributions. Dene a poor outcome as one
that is less than the expected value of the lottery, and the magnitude of regret as the
dierence between the expected value and the poor outcome. Regret therefore has both
probability and magnitude aspects. For a xed magnitude of regret, the pain of regret
would be higher if that regret was tangible instead of abstract. Referring back to the
experiments, the lowest win probability of 0.0001% gives the highest chance of a poor
outcome but simultaneously the smallest magnitude of regret, $10 * 0.000001 - 0 =
$0.00001 cents. The highest win probability of 90% gives the lowest chance of a poor
outcome but simultaneously the largest magnitude of regret, $10 * 0.9 - 0 = $9. A low
probability of winning like 10% gives a magnitude of regret of $10 * 0.1 - 0 = $1.
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One way to explain the U-shape is by the relative salience of either the probability
or magnitude of regret. At the win probability of 0.0001%, the probability of a regretful
outcome is close to one and is a more salient feature of the lottery than the minuscule
magnitude of regret of $0.00001 cents. On the other hand, at the win probability of 90%,
the probability of a regretful outcome is close to zero but the magnitude of regret of $9
is the more salient feature of the lottery. At the 10% win probability, the probability
and magnitude features are not nearly as dierent in salience compared to the other
two distributions. Therefore, when either of the regret aspects is highly salient, the
regret motive becomes more powerful. When the regret motive is strong, namely when
either of the regret features is highly salient, self-selecting and incurring tangible regret
may overpower the benet of self-selecting to the point that the net harm is more
than the pain of abstract regret by assigning risk resolution to a computer. A weaker
regret motive would not hinder the benet of self-selection enough to dissuade from
self-selection. This underlying mechanism is able to account for the observed U-shaped
behavior by subjects that have distribution-dependent preferences over risk resolution.
It must be admitted that the regret and gaming utility story is not conclusive,
but merely rationalizes the observed behavior by a large number of subjects in the
experiment. There may be other explanations which account for the behavior equally
well. Also, given that lottery questions were paired together in the experiment, it is
not clear as to if the observed behavior is due to the absolute payo distributions or
the relative dierences in paired payo distributions. The U-shaped behavior does not
seem to be symmetric: based on the four lotteries proposed in the two experiments, the
distribution dependency of risk resolution preferences is stronger at extremely low win
probabilities relative to high win probabilities. Future studies may be able to tease out
a better understanding of this U-shaped phenomenon through risk resolution preference
elicitation over more win probability values, and could even be expanded to lotteries
with more than two branches if the eect is indeed found to be robust.
Conclusion
This paper provides novel evidence that preferences over how risk is resolved is depen-
dent on the payo distributions of lotteries for a large number of individuals. The risk
resolution method considered is whether winning numbers are self-selected or delegated
to a random number generator. While there is existing evidence that individuals may
prefer to self-select even between lotteries that standard decision models would evaluate
as equivalent, this paper goes further by providing evidence that the payo distributions
themselves impact the self-selection preference. A regret-salience motive is oered to
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explain the choice behavior of subjects displaying distribution-dependent self-selection
preferences. Lottery sales data from Texas is adduced to strengthen the experimental
ndings. Evidence in both the controlled experimental setting and the real world lot-
tery market point to considerations and mechanisms that the extant literature does not
suciently address. More studies are welcomed to to better understand the scope and
motivations of such behavior, and perhaps to even lay down some behavioral principles
or theoretical foundations to account for distribution-dependent process preferences.
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Appendix
Proof of the Suciency of Distributional Equivalence for Two
Outcome Lotteries under Regret Theory
The native environment for Regret Theory is the choice between two actions that result
in certain events occurring in specic states resulting in appropriate outcomes: there is
no single correct way to extend the decision process to three or more outcome, although
a few intuitive ones have been proposed. The actions for the purposes of this paper
and proof correspond to undertaking either of two lotteries, A or B, with equivalent
outcome distributions: receiving (x, y) with probabilities (p, 1-p), x 6= y ∈ R. Notice
that there are up to four possible outcome pairs for {A, B} over all consolidated states,
listed 1 to 4: {x, y}; {x, x}; {y, x}; {y, y}. The rst two states correspond to the
probability of getting x under A, or p. Therefore, let px ≤ p, so probability of State 1
is px and the probability of State 2 is p - px. Similarly, let py ≤ 1 - p, so probability of
State 3 is py and the probability of State 4 is 1- p - py.Under Regret Theory, A  B⇔
pxQ(x - y) + (p - px)Q(x - x) + pyQ(y - x) + (1 - p - py)Q(y - y) ≥ 0 ⇔ pxQ(x - y)
+ pyQ(y - x) ≥ 0 ⇔ (px - py)Q(x - y) ≥ 0, since under Regret Theory Q(0) = 0 and
the symmetry of Q(.) means Q(-ξ) = -Q(ξ). Therefore, indierence will hold i px =
py. Assume px 6= py. The distribution of A remains (x, y) with probabilities (p, 1-p).
The distribution of B is (x, y) with probabilities (p - px + py, px + 1- p - py). A and B
are distributionally equivalent i px = py as premised, so px = py and Regret Theory
predicts indierence. 
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Screenshots of Experiment I
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Chapter 3: Behavioral Modications
to Prize Linked Savings
Abstract
Prize Linked Savings (PLS) is a unique savings product with the ability to ap-
peal to individuals in ways that standard savings products cannot. PLS combines
the principal guarantee of traditional savings products with the return skewness
of lottery products. In this paper, it is shown that the existing implementation
method of uncertainty resolution in PLS products may not be maximizing the up-
take of PLS. An experiment demonstrates that by switching from the extant rae
setup to a more interactive gaming one, PLS appeal is increased. Furthermore,




There are numerous ways that governments, rms and organizations attempt to induce
individuals to save at higher rates than they would without any external inuence or
incentives acting upon them. Banks typically oer savings accounts and other similar
assets whereby depositors deposit savings into an account, often with withdrawal re-
strictions, and are promised a xed rate of interest on their deposit, independent of the
ex-post protability of those assets to the bank (although presumably the rate of inter-
est chosen may certainly be correlated to the bank's ex-ante expected prots). Many
companies provide incentives for their employees to save more of their income for retire-
ment by oering limited matching contributions to a 401k or pension plan (for instance,
matching every dollar an employee invests in a plan up to 5% of an employee's income),
which is equivalent to a signicant increase in the return on investment. In this case, if
an employee without such an incentive would have selected to place 5% of his income
in the plan, and with the incentive his behavior remains unchanged, he would reap an
instantaneous return of 100% on his investment. Governments may directly incentivize
individuals to save more, for instance, by creating various tax incentives, such as those
oered on 401k accounts and IRAs.
Prize Linked Savings (PLS) is an investment vehicle that may also provide additional
incentives to save. The PLS vehicle can take the form of a savings account, a bond,
or another similar asset, where one party is providing some sort of loan to another
party. The key dierence between the PLS design and the standard design is the return
prole: typically returns on bonds, loans, savings accounts and the like are stated as
a xed percentage of the deposit procured or the capital invested. However, the PLS
design adds more risk and variability to the structure with a non-constant ex-post
rate of return. The payment prole is set up as a lottery, typically a highly skewed
lottery, where the probability of winning a signicantly large amount of money is small,
while the probability of winning little to no money is quite large. Notice, however,
that this is a lottery in a purely economic sense: the PLS payo prole ensures the
preservation of the initial principal invested, whereas the more commonly understood
concept of lottery, which I will dierentiate from the economic lottery via the word
'lotto', requires relinquishing the principal as the price to be paid to participate in the
lottery. So, PLS can be viewed as a lottery where the principal is guaranteed.
PLS is employed and has been employed by various banks and institutions across
the world for decades, and in recent years has even seen some limited implementation
in the United States. The late entry of PLS into American markets has been largely
due to extant federal and state bans on private lotteries. However, a major legal hurdle
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was overcome with the passing of the American Savings Promotion Act in 2014, which
removed federal barriers to bank and thrift participation in PLS products, although
the process of revising state laws that prevent PLS introduction continues in various
states (Commonwealth, 2016a). There has been some limited research on PLS, both
empirical and experimental, that overall reaches a few conclusions. PLS is quite a
popular product when introduced, and the source of the demand is partly due to sub-
stitution from other non-saving activities (consumption, lottos, gambling) and partly
from cannibalization of existing savings (moving money from a savings account to a
PLS account, for instance). There is also compelling evidence that PLS demand is
positively related to the skewness of the PLS product and the size of the largest prize.
However, a forthcoming study in the Journal of Financial Economics on PLS utiliza-
tion at American credit unions seems to consolidate the existing evidences within a
single narrative: if the substitution eect works through gambling preferences, PLS
and gambling/lottos should be weaker substitutes the more dierentiated they are on
other dimensions (Cookson, forthcoming). This study ultimately concludes that the
substitution eect does indeed work through gambling preferences, that PLS can serve
as a substitute for gambling and lottos, and that the substitutability decreases the more
dierentiated the products become. For example, the author nds that PLS is a strong
substitute for local gambling but not destination gambling, as destination gambling
includes additional non-gambling factors that are part of the overall utility. He further
nds that PLS is a strong substitute for gambling at casinos without a nightlife, but
not for casinos with a nightlife.
Given the convincing conclusions of this study on PLS at American credit unions
(which are currently where nearly all of the PLS products available in the United
States are oered), I believe there is more that can be done to PLS to make it more
substitutable for gambling and lottos, i.e. by making PLS even less dierentiated
when compared to gambling and lottos. Currently, the primary similarity between
PLS and gambling/lottos is the positive skewness of the payo distribution, something
that traditional loss-protected savings methods do not oer. Other savings tools that
do not guarantee principal maintenance but do have positive skewness features, such
as stock investing, have been shown to serve as substitutes for lottos. There is a
negative relationship between lotto prize size and stock market trading volume in the
United States, and trading in assets that are more like lottos (stocks and options) are
aected by changing lotto prize amounts, whereas those less like lotto are not (bonds
and mutual funds) (Dorn, Dorn and Sengmueller, 2014). Given the evidence, it would
behoove designers of PLS products to attempt to make PLS like gambling and lottos
as much as possible to increase the substitutability eect. One way to do so that has
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not yet been implemented en masse is to supercially make PLS mimic gambling
and lottos: incorporate a gaming aspect, as is common in many gambling activities,
and/or incorporate a pick-your-numbers format, as is common in many lottos. Based
upon the substitutability conjecture, ceteris paribus, these modications should allow
the modied PLS to perform at least weakly better than PLS as it is practiced today.
Even without the substitutability conjecture, if there is positive value placed on the
gaming or selection aspects of gambling and lottos, cetris paribus, this should also lead
to modied PLS weakly outperforming standard PLS. It is these ideas that I seek to
nd evidence for via a simple experiment.
Motivation
There are numerous conceptual reasons why having savings may be desirable from
an individual's utilitarian perspective. Many large purchases may require a substantial
amount of savings in order to be carried out: for instance, in order to purchase a house a
signicant down payment often needs to be secured in order for a lender to provide a loan
for the remaining balance. Curbing some short-term spending to generate such savings
could be utility-maximizing if the value of acquiring a house is large enough. It may be
desirable to have precautionary savings to serve as a buer in case an uninsurable event
happens that causes signicant nancial loss, which without such savings may cause
extreme losses to utility. It may also be desirable to have some savings even after one's
passing, if the utility of one's progeny is incorporated into individual utility. These are
just a few reasons why creating and growing savings may be utility improving behavior.
Despite the various potential utilitarian benets to saving, in addition to certain
policy goals and incentives that may seek to increase savings, savings rates are often
not too high among those who may need savings the most, namely the poor (those
with low wealth levels) and those with relatively lower incomes. Numerous studies
have documented that savings rates increase with income (for a list and classication
of such studies see Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes, 2004). However, those with the lowest
lifetime incomes may be the ones who most desperately need to save, as these savings
would allow an increase in living standards and potentially a permanent move out
of the poverty trap they may nd themselves in. The incentive for the poor to save
may be lacking, as whatever small level of savings they could muster, and whatever
correspondingly small xed returns, would not be viewed as a sucient stock for them
to escape poverty (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). When the Consumer Federation
of America and the Financial Planning Association asked 1,000 Americans about the
most practical way for them to accumulate several hundred thousand dollars, 21%
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replied with "win the lotto", and among the poorest respondents the rate of that answer
was a much higher 38% (CFA, 2006). Perhaps this is why annual spending on lottos
is similar across income strata in the United States, implying that the lowest income
households spend a signicantly larger portion of their incomes on lottos (Kearney,
2005). This same intuition may also be a reason to expect that PLS would be appealing
and eective in encouraging saving among the most nancially vulnerable, and there is
historical precedence that this reasoning is sound.
PLS is by no means a new concept; there is evidence that investment tools that can
be classied as PLS existed as early as the seventeenth century, although well after the
appearance of lottos. Perhaps the rst instance of PLS was the 'Million Adventure'
appeal of 1694, which was established to help supplement the British treasury funds
that were fast diminishing due to the piling expenses of the Nine Years War. The
'Million Adventure' oered 100,000 tickets at a cost of ¿10 each, with a number of
winning prize amounts, ranging from ¿1,000 to ¿10 per year for 16 years, while those
who did not win received ¿1 for per year for 16 years (Murphy, 2005). In this case,
the PLS took the form of an annuity where participants invested ¿10 up front and
were paid a xed amount ranging from ¿1 to ¿1,000 per year depending on whether a
given ticket was a winning one, and if so, to what extent. One interesting feature of
the 'Million Adventure' was that the price to participate of ¿10 was quite low, so that
participation was not limited to the wealthiest of society, and even those who were not
able to aord a ticket individually could pool resources with others to participate in
the lottery (Murphy, 2005). This wide appeal to members of varying economic strata
in society is now a standard feature of modern PLS instruments.
So, at face value PLS seems to have characteristics that may induce an increase
in savings from the baseline savings that would prevail without the presence of PLS,
given its positively skewed payo structure with no risk of loss (assuming away default
probability, deposit insurance concerns, etc.). A few questions require answering though
before PLS is proven eective at increasing savings levels. First, is there a demand
at all for PLS, and if so, how much? Second, an apparent increase in savings after
implementation of PLS is not necessarily a net increase, as it is possible that PLS may
be just siphoning o savings from other savings vehicles. For PLS to be deemed an
eective savings creator, it needs to be demonstrated that new savings is actually being
generated, perhaps by substituting from other non-saving tools that provide a similar
risk structure and payout, such as lottos or gambling activities. I will focus on examining
existing evidence that addresses these questions, and based on the analysis, design an
experiment to determine if further modications to existing PLS product structures will
engender an increased demand for PLS, particularly if part of that increased demand
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is derived from new, non-cannibalized savings.
Literature
The earliest evidence of PLS is the descriptive account of the 'Million Adventure' cited
above. However, PLS instruments have been in use in many countries, including private
utilization by commercial banks in Latin America, as well as public utilization in the
UK via the issuance of Premium Bonds (Kearney, Tufano, Guryan, and Hurst, 2010).
UK Premium Bonds have been oered since 1956, and there is strong evidence that they
are held by individuals across the income distribution. Looking at data from 2005-2006,
while there are a higher percentage of households in the upper income tiers that hold
UK Premium Bonds when compared to households in lower income tiers (as is common
with most nancial assets), the relative share of Premium Bonds in asset composition
seems to be slightly higher in lower income tiers than higher tiers, save the highest
income levels, perhaps due to tax considerations, suggesting it is a popular instrument
among lower income households (Kearney et al., 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence
that sales of these bonds respond positively to the size of the largest prize oered,
although this value contributes to only about 2 percent of the expected return, as there
are other smaller prize amounts available with higher probabilities of winning (Tufano,
2008). Also, increasing skewness and reducing the amount and number of smaller prizes
for the sake of one large prize also seems to increase PLS demand (Pelmann, 2013).
This may provide some insight into optimal PLS design incorporating one very large top
prize instead of multiple smaller prizes when deciding how to divvy up the winnings.
Probably the most well-known and studied privately oered PLS instrument is that
of the First National Bank of South Africa's Million a Month Account (MaMA). They
began oering a PLS account in 2005 but were forced to close the program in 2008. The
program was highly popular and saw massive take-up among all parts of society. The
introduction of this PLS product did not cannibalize other modes of saving: rather,
there is evidence that it may have increased other modes of saving, such as utilization
of standard savings accounts, and that the increase in total savings by participants
represented a 38% increase from mean savings levels (Cole, Iverson, and Tufano, 2014).
There is also evidence that some of these newly created savings were generated as in-
dividuals substituted away from lottos and other similar games, as the authors noted
that there were signicant decreases in MaMA accounts created around the times when
larger lotto jackpots were available. Perhaps further anecdotal evidence of this relation-
ship is conrmed in the closure of the program itself, as the National Lotteries Board
of South Africa sued the Bank. The Bank was found in violation of the Lottery Act
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of 1997, since the South African government has a legal monopoly on lottos, and the
PLS was deemed to be a lotto (Cole et al., 2014). The conclusion from this study is
that PLS undoubtedly can create new savings: its popularity did not merely represent
a shift in savings from other instruments. A weaker conclusion is that PLS can serve
as an imperfect substitute for lottos and perhaps other forms of gambling.
On the experimental side, there is even more evidence of the attractiveness and
eectiveness of PLS products. In an online experiment run primarily through Amazon's
MTurk, the introduction of PLS is found to increase total savings levels, in the range
of 12 percent, as well as induce non-savers to save. The experimental results also
suggest that the funds invested in PLS are taken from existing lottery and consumption
expenditures, and not current savings holdings (Atalay, Bakhtiar, Cheung, and Slonim,
2012). This online study is perhaps the most similar in intent to the one I run, as we
both share the same subject population of MTurk, and both attempt to determine if
PLS uptake is not just extant savings cannibalization, but rather includes substitution
from other activities. However, as my ultimate purpose is to determine if making PLS
mimic gambling and lottos from an entertainment perspective will increase the draw of
PLS, I do have something new to oer that their study does not address. Furthermore,
the expected returns on their savings options are not typical of the returns on these
products in the real world. Specically, their treatments included interest rates on
savings of 5, 10 and 20 percent, all much higher than the sub-one percent interest
rates on standard savings accounts as of their paper's publication year of 2012. Also,
the expected returns per dollar invested in their lotto options range from $.90 to $1.10,
much higher than the overall Unites States average lotto return of $.52 (Kearney, 2005).
Given that the expected returns on their savings options are quite divorced from reality,
it is hard to make strong inferences on real world behavior of introducing PLS based
on their experimental ndings.
In a lab experiment run at the University of Maryland, experimental results sug-
gest that PLS appeal is greatest among males, self-reported lottery players, and those
with low levels of deposits in their bank accounts, which serves as a measure of savings
(Filiz-Ozbay, Guryan, Hyndman, Kearney, and Ozbay, 2015). The authors further con-
clude that individuals seem to exhibit more patience when they are awaiting payment
from a risky investment than when the return is certain, given the expected returns
are the same. The authors also attempt to model the risk preferences, as their exper-
imental results could be explained by convex (risk-loving) utility, as well as non-linear
probability weighting, and determine that non-linear probability weighting is the more
plausible explanation. Specically, men tend to overweight small probabilities more
so than women, and this may provide an explanation as to why in their sample men
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tended to more strongly prefer PLS than women did, and why a higher percentage of
men than women in the sample were gamblers (Filiz-Ozbay et al., 2015). Given that
those at the lower income spectrum tend to spend a higher percentage of their wealth
on lottos (Kearney, 2005), this is further evidence that PLS may have a stronger appeal
among the poor, who often do not have the desire and lack the right incentives to save,
due to their precarious situation.
There is some evidence, however, that simply introducing PLS into an environment
will not automatically create new savers and savings. In order to respond to the low
savings and asset acquisition of low income families in the United States, Congress
introduced the Assets for Independence Act in 1988, which included the establishment of
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), which provide government-funded matching
of savings for families with household income below 200% of the poverty line (Assets
for Independence, 2014). These are exactly the types of people that the aforementioned
studies hypothesize are most in need for savings incentives and will likely benet the
most from the introduction of a PLS instrument. However, the success of the IDA
program to date is mixed, as there is not much evidence of a signicant increase in
savings. In order to modify the IDA incentive structure, a eld experiment consisting
of four dierent treatments was implemented: a reminder and follow-up phone call
before and after deposit deadlines; an increase in deposit frequency from monthly to bi-
weekly; an introduction of a PLS instrument; and increasing the match rate from $2 to
$4 if half of the savings goal was reached (Haisley, Jones, Loibl, and Loewenstein, 2016).
The authors nd that none of these modications signicantly increased savings when
compared to their respective control groups. They suggest that the ineectiveness of
the incentives is likely due to the liquidity constrained nature of the target population,
mainly that they don't have free funds to properly respond to the incentives. In the
case of PLS, the treatment included all the treatments except the increased match rate,
while the control group had none of the four treatments. The treatments were done in
such a compounded way so as to maximize the chance of increasing savings (Haisley,
et al., 2016). There were 42 participants in the treatment group, 45 in the control
group, amounting to a similar number of participants as the lab experiment run at the
University of Maryland. The authors here actually nd that those in the control group
saved more than those in the PLS treatment, although the dierence is not statistically
signicant. These recent ndings, at the very least, cast some doubt on the notion
that PLS inherently is a savings creator. This suggests that there is room for further
analysis of PLS, including the modication and development of PLS instruments in
order for them to become additionally eective, especially on the lower income target
population. For instance, if part of the consumption of the target population is in lotto
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and gambling activities, the liquidity constraint could eectively be loosened if PLS
could serve as a substitute for lotto and gambling activities. The implication of this
study is that PLS was not an eective incentive to increase savings and is not suitable
enough of a substitute for lotto and gambling activities when liquidity constraints are
present. This study used a standard PLS design, where winners are just randomly
selected from a pool of participants. Perhaps modifying the standard PLS design could
make PLS a more suitable substitute for lotto, gambling or other uses of funds, even
when liquidity constraints are present.
When considering optimal PLS design, in addition to issues of payment structure,
such as expected value, skewness and variance of payments, there are two further be-
havioral implications that should be considered; namely, entertainment value and the
illusion of control. When analyzing lottos in the United States, even though the average
expected value of each dollar invested in the lotto is about 52 cents, lotto participants
are not necessarily irrational if they participate in lottos, even if they are risk averse, if
entertainment value is incorporated into the utility. Specically, when gaming and en-
tertainment features are considered, it is found that lotto participants act rationally by
showing an increased demand for lottos when the expected value increases, consistent
with the view that lotto players are not necessarily irrational or risk loving, but rather
derive an entertainment value that is not captured when only considering expected
monetary returns (Kearney, 2005). The illusion of control is a documented psycho-
logical phenomenon where individuals confound luck and skill, and exhibit increased
condence or belief in their ability to control outcomes in situations purely determined
by luck (Langer, 1975). For instance, in an experiment where members of a treatment
group were allowed to select their lottery ticket, while control group members were
assigned a random ticket, individuals who chose their lottery ticket demonstrated a
willingness to sell signicantly higher than those who were randomly assigned a ticket,
an eect due perhaps to the inclusion of the skill-associated task of selection in a situ-
ation of pure randomness and luck (Langer, 1975). These two behavioral aspects have
essentially been unaddressed in the context of PLS to date, and given their purported
existence specically in the realm of lottos, for which there is anecdotal and empirical
evidence that PLS serves as a substitute for, it would behoove researchers to look more
closely at how these eects relate to PLS itself, in order to design PLS to be as eective
as possible at increasing savings.
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Experiment
Currently, standard PLS prize selection involves participants being entered into a draw-
ing and the winner(s) being randomly selected from the pool of participants. There are
numerous variations of this setup. One is that the number of entries (and hence the
probability of winning) increases with every $x deposited in the account. Another could
be that just opening an account with an initial minimum deposit enters the account
holder into the drawing. If there are y winners guaranteed, these structure types make
the probability of winning depend on the total amounts deposited or the number of
accounts created. Alternatively, winners could be determined similarly to how many
lotto winners are determined: PLS participants receive certain sets of numbers, and if
the numbers match the winning numbers drawn, the holder of those matching numbers
wins. In this case, the probability of winning is quite independent of the number of
participants. However, as the number of participants increases, there is an increased
probability of multiple winners, meaning that the prize amount would be split among
the winners.
The agship pilot PLS program in the United States is the Save to Win program,
launched in 2009 in Michigan (this is the same program that is studied in Cookson's
forthcoming JFE article). The Save to Win program claims the majority of the PLS
accounts and savings at depository institutions in the United States. As of early 2018,
112 credit unions in 11 states service over 21,000 PLS accounts with $52 million in
savings, and $2.4 million in prizes awarded to date (Save to Win, 2018a).5 As of the
end of 2017, the overall PLS market spans 165 credit unions in 13 states that service
32,191 accounts with $73 million in savings, and $2.7 million in prizes awarded to
date (Build Commonwealth, 2018). Save to Win PLS accounts are structured so that
an initiation of an account is an entry into the drawing, and every $25 deposit is an
additional entry, up to ten entries per month, prizes awarded monthly and quarterly
(Save to Win, 2018b). I had a correspondence with a customer service sta member
of Save to Win, in which I asked if Members in no way pick numbers or play a game
for each 25 dollars they add, correct? Its just an additional entry into the contest?,
to which she replied That is correct.6 Furthermore, I had a correspondence with
Caezilia Loibl, one of the authors of the IDA empirical study. Regarding their PLS
treatment, she conrmed that We assigned each study participant a randomly drawn,
5Note that the amount of money deposited in accounts to date is likely much more than $52 million,
that is just the current amount of savings in accounts. This point is clear to see given that 2.4/52
yields an implied interest rate of 4.6%, way above any market interest rates on savings.
6Email correspondence with Jessica.Thelen@cusolutionsgroup.com on June 12 and 13, 2017.
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2-digit number.7 So, the conclusion is that standard PLS as it is currently designed
includes neither the ability to choose winning numbers (as is common in lottos) nor a
gaming aspect (as is common in gambling activities).
The main purpose of my experiment is to determine if including behaviorally-
inspired modications to PLS will increase demand for PLS, in terms of cannibalizing
existing savings but also in creating new savings. I attempt to combine both the illu-
sion of control and entertainment value in my modied PLS product. Experimentally,
I propose a PLS product where participants are rst told to choose a number within a
set range, say between 1 and 1,000 (getting at the illusion of control). Once they choose
a number, they are then told to spin a bingo cage in which there are 1,000 balls num-
bered between 1 and 1,000 (getting at entertainment value). If they pull the number
they chose out of the bingo cage, they win the prize amount; otherwise, they keep their
principal. Probabilistically speaking, there is no dierence between this PLS product
and a standard one where the probability of winning is set at 0.1%, and the drawing
is done by some mechanism. However, if this standard PLS product can be viewed as
providing no entertainment value and no illusion of control, while the modied PLS
product has some entertainment value and may allow for the illusion of control, and if
a participant places any positive value on either entertainment value or the illusion of
control, a participant should strictly prefer the modied PLS over the standard PLS,
ceteris paribus. A strict preference would need to translate into a signicant increase
in savings for this to have any practical value. If the modied PLS is shown to be
more successful at creating new savings, this would be a major plus in the column of
modied PLS. However, even if it is shown to generate an increased demand in PLS
that is driven by a switchover from existing savings, this may be of interest to PLS
providers if this is shown to happen even when the implied interest rate on the PLS
instrument is less than the interest rate on the standard xed return savings product.
The experimental design is a relatively short and simple one, in order to gauge if the
modications to PLS signicantly impact savings more so than a standard PLS product.
I run the experiment on Amazon MTurk, an online workplace where workers get paid
xed amounts for successfully performing tasks posted by requesters. Recently, many
experiments and surveys have been run on MTurk, as the pay rates are quite cheap
(often no more than the equivalent of a few dollars per hour's work), and they allow
researchers to reach a somewhat diverse pool of subjects. One potential issue is that
MTurk pays per task completed, so enacting a BDM mechanism or some other potential
incentive compatible payment scheme is not possible. Results rely on the truth-telling
of the subjects. While this at rst glance seems quite sketchy, MTurk has a system
7Email correspondence with loibl.3@osu.edu on December 20, 2016.
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set up so that a requester has the right to reject the work submitted, so workers are
likely primed to do an honest job out of fear of rejection and loss of payment. MTurk
also allows requesters to lter allowed workers based on their rejection rate, so being
rejected not only aects the immediate payout of the task at hand, but can also exclude
workers from many other protable opportunities down the road. Furthermore, an
MTurk replication of a prisoner's dilemma game, a priming game and a framing game
all yielded comparable results to those rmly established within a lab setting (Horton,
Rand and Zeckhauser, 2011). So, online workplaces such as MTurk are great sources of
diverse research subjects at low costs for relatively simple experiments and surveys (for
a detailed discussion on the pros and cons of the online workplace, see Horton, Rand
and Zeckhauser, 2011).
The experiment consists of three questions posed to each subject, with the instruc-
tions that the subject choose the option most preferred in each question. I create three
treatment groups, each treatment consisting of three questions. In each treatment, the
three questions are exactly the same, only the options presented change. The questions
are Given that you have ($20, $100, $1,000) dollars, how would you prefer to spend
those ($20, $100, $1,000) dollars?. Each question therefore represents a dierent ref-
erence wealth level. The rst group, which can be viewed as the control group, sees a
lotto, gambling and savings option in each question. The second group, which is the
standard PLS group, sees a lotto, gambling, savings and standard PLS option in each
question. The third group, which is the behavioral PLS group, sees a lotto, gambling,
savings and behavioral PLS option in each question. The methodology then is to com-
pare the proportions of respondents who select certain options both within and between
groups.
Given the three treatment groups, each treatment was deployed on MTurk at least
four hours apart, so as to reduce the number of participants who ended up in more than
one group. Each group's maximum participation limit was set at 200, and each limit
was reached in about an hour after deployment. MTurk provides the unique worker
IDs with the respondent data, so I was able to remove participants who participated in
more than one treatment (they were still paid for their work, as I made no specication
of treatment groups in the instructions). This reduced the relevant sample size to 189
for the control group, 188 for the standard PLS group, and 184 for the behavioral PLS
group. Each participant was paid ten cents for completing the three questions, the
average response rate in each group was approximately 90 seconds, so the pay rate
was about $4.50/hr. The exact layout of the experiment with the brief instructions
is included in Appendix A. There is no lengthy exposition explaining PLS or a set of
detailed instructions: the experiment was meant to be kept extremely simple. Examples
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of the exact wording of the ve possible options (lotto, gambling, savings, standard PLS,
behavioral PLS) in the treatments are listed below, recalling that the control group had
three of the options and each treatment group had four of the options, and that these
options correspond to the question where $20 is the given wealth level:
1. Choosing a 4-digit number (any number between 1 and 10,000). If the number
exactly matches the randomly drawn lucky number, you receive a $99,980 return
($100,000 in total); otherwise, you receive -$20 return ($0 in total).
2. Playing a game in which you spin a bingo cage, in which there are 100 balls
numbered from 1-100. If you get a number between 1 and 40 you receive a $20
return ($40 in total); otherwise, you receive a -$20 return ($0 in total).
3. Receiving a $1 return ($21 in total) with certainty.
4. Letting a computer randomly pick a number from 1-1,000. If it picks the number
1, you receive a $980 return ($1,000 in total); otherwise, you receive no return
($20 in total).
5. Playing a game in which you choose a number between 1 and 1,000, then spin
a bingo cage, in which there are 1,000 balls numbered from 1-1,000. If you get
the number you chose, you receive a $980 return ($1,000 in total); otherwise, you
receive no return ($20 in total).
As can be seen in Appendix A, as the wealth level changes, some of the payos and
odds change, but within a wealth level across all treatments, options that are available
over multiple treatments are the same. For instance, in the example above, the lotto,
gambling and savings options for the $20 wealth level are exactly as presented above in
each treatment.
Hypotheses
Given the experimental design and results within the literature, there are several hy-
potheses that can be tested via experimentation. Under the assumption that there
exist positive preferences in the population for either or both entertainment value and
illusion of control, ceteris paribus, behavioral PLS will be a more appealing product
than standard PLS. The general format of the hypotheses below is that having PLS as
an option changes the distribution of preferences compared to not having PLS as an
option, with behavioral PLS impacting the distributions more than standard PLS.
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H1: There exists a demand for both standard PLS and behavioral PLS. This
amounts to a positive number of participants who prefer the PLS option in each treat-
ment group.
H1a: Additionally, given the added benets of behavioral PLS, at each wealth level
there will be a dierence in the number of participants who choose PLS in the standard
PLS treatment when compared with the number of participants who choose PLS in the
behavioral PLS treatment.
H2: Both PLS types will serve as partial substitutes for both lottos and gambling,
substitutability increasing with wealth.
H2a: Behavioral PLS will serve as a better substitute than standard PLS at each
wealth level.
H3: Both PLS types will serve as partial substitutes for standard savings, substi-
tutability decreasing with wealth.
H3a: Behavioral PLS will serve as a better substitute than standard PLS at each
wealth level.
These hypotheses represent the combination of three ideas. First, PLS has a highly
dierentiated risk prole when compared with lottos, gambling or savings, but is more
similar to lottos and gambling than savings is. It combines the risky upside of lottos
and gambling with the loss protection of savings. This would suggest that introducing
PLS may result in partial substitution away from each of these other activities. Second,
behavioral PLS yields entertainment value and an illusion of control, so it should lead
to even further substitution and appeal when compared with standard PLS. Third,
the hypotheses also make predictions of how demand and substitutability will change
as the initial wealth level changes. These predictions are primarily drawn from the
reference-dependent loss aversion model of Tversky and Kahneman. The wealth level
proposed in each of the three questions corresponds to a reference point. The relevant
parts of the model include: diminishing sensitivity, or that the closer a xed wealth
change (loss or gain) is to the reference point, the larger the impact on utility; and loss
aversion, or that losses loom larger than gains, for all x > 0, |u(-x)| > u(x) (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991). Furthermore, if for all x > 0 |u'(-x)| > u'(x), then for all y > x, ||u(-
x)| - u(x)| < ||u(-y)| - u(y)|. I also assume that the utility of entertainment value and
the illusion of control are independent of the initial wealth level, as these are functions
of the gaming structure. Therefore, for lotteries involving prospects of both losses and
gains (in our case the lotto and gambling options), ceteris paribus, the preference for
such lotteries decreases with the initial wealth level, which is also the principal that
could be lost. This accounts for why the hypotheses predict substitutability from lottos
and gambling to PLS increases with wealth, as these become less desirable as wealth
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increases. Additionally, when looking at lotteries involving prospects over gains (in our
case savings), a decision maker who compares savings and PLS can take the savings
option as a reference point, as it is an option that yields a xed payment with certainty
Equating the expected return of savings and PLS, a decision maker under reference
dependent loss aversion will prefer PLS less as the amount of the return increases.
Based on how I structured returns, the return amount on savings is increasing in wealth
(although the percentage is decreasing), so I expect that substitution from savings to
PLS will decrease with wealth.
Results
Table 1 provides the frequency table for the responses to the three questions in each of
the three treatment groups. I will use a few naming conventions going forward: L for
lotto, G for gamble, S for savings, SPLS for standard PLS, and BPLS for behavioral
PLS. A few things are worth noting. First, in each of the nine questions, the frequency
is such that L < G < PLS < S. This is reasonable, especially given the expected values
on each of these products. For the $20 question, E(L) = -50%, E(G) = -20%, E(SPLS)
= E(BPLS) = 4.9%, E(S) = 5%. For the $100 question, E(L) = -50%, E(G) = -20%,
E(SPLS) = E(BPLS) = 1.99%, E(S) = 2%. For the $1,000 question, E(L) = -50%,
E(G) = -20%, E(SPLS) = E(BPLS) = 0.999%, E(S) = 1%. The returns of these
products are selected to be typical of the expected returns of these products in the real
world. For instance, expected returns over American lottos tends to be around -50%
(Kearney, 2005), and as there are a large variety of gambling games, there is also a large
variety of expected returns, but they are typically negative but better than those on
lottos.8 Second, as initial wealth increases, the frequency of L, G and BPLS are weakly
decreasing in each treatment, while the frequency of S is increasing (the frequency of
SPLS is non-monotone). Third, there is a higher frequency of BPLS when compared
with SPLS at each wealth level. Also, there is a lower frequency of S at each wealth
level in the SPLS treatment when compared with S in the BPLS treatment.
I will address each hypothesis one at a time. In order to test H1, I use a t-test to
determine if the rates of SPLS and BPLS are signicantly dierent from zero at each
wealth level. The demand for both SPLS and BPLS at each wealth level are signicantly
dierent from zero at any reasonable signicance level (each p-value < .000001).9 This
8See https://wizardofodds.com/gambling/house-edge/ for typical expected returns/losses on a va-
riety of casino games.
9I would typically use Pearson's Chi-Squared Test to determine if two samples are statistically
dierent, but this test does not work well when some of the categories have very low frequencies. In
this case, I am testing the observed PLS frequencies against a theoretical frequency of 0 PLS users, so
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is unsurprising given the real-world demand for PLS and other experimental conclusions
that PLS satises an existing demand. H1a is a more interesting hypothesis and one
that is of clear importance to the premise of this paper. To determine if BPLS is utilized
at a higher rate than SPLS at each wealth level, I use a Pearson's Chi-Squared Test,
where the non-PLS options are all aggregated into one category. Interestingly, at each
wealth level a p-value < .01 is generated, suggesting that behavioral modications to
PLS make it a more appealing tool, leading to an increased demand for BPLS when
compared to SPLS. The issue of the source of the demand for PLS, along with the
increased demand for BPLS, are addressed in the analysis of the remaining hypotheses.
Table 1
Considering substitutability of PLS for the other options, comparing the frequency
distributions between each PLS treatment and the control treatment can identify the
source(s) of the demand for PLS. To rst test if PLS serves as a substitute for lottos,
I aggregate all the non-lotto options into one category then use Pearson's Chi-Squared
Test, comparing each PLS treatment to the control group. Of the six tests run (three
wealth levels, 2 PLS treatments), not a single one yielded a remotely signicant result,
suggesting that neither SPLS nor BPLS serve as a partial substitute for lottos. Now
consider gambling, and doing a similar aggregation and testing, a dierent result ensues.
For SPLS, p-values of (.08, .06, .07) are yielded in increasing wealth order. For BPLS, p-
values of (.01, .05, .19) are yielded in increasing wealth order. These values also suggest
I opt for a t-test here. Either test yields the same strong conclusion in this case.
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that there is no clear relationship between the substitutability of PLS for gambling and
the wealth level. Regarding H2a, the frequency and p-values suggest that BPLS was a
better substitute for gambling than SPLS at the low wealth level, both were about the
same at the intermediate wealth level, and SPLS was a better substitute at the higher
wealth level. However, it is important to note that for SPLS at the high wealth level, the
p-value of .07 would become insignicant at the 10% level had one more person selected
gambling. Therefore, I am inclined to only conclude with condence that BPLS at the
low wealth level was a better substitute than SPLS. Also, since the expected return
of PLS is decreasing with wealth, and while theoretically the gambling option should
become less appealing with wealth, these two forces are working in opposite directions,
making it hard to condently assess the relationship between substitutability of PLS
for gambling and wealth.
A similar approach to that taken above is used to see if PLS cannibalizes existing
savings. Aggregating all non-savings into one category and using Pearson's Chi-Squared
Test, a p-value < .01 is given for all six tests, providing evidence that PLS serves as
a partial substitute for savings, suggesting validation of H3. Also, this evidence is
even stronger given that the interest rates varied over wealth level (5% for $20, 2%
for $100, 1% for $1,000), suggesting this relationship holds over a range of interest
rates. For the SPLS treatment, the dierences in savings frequency between the control
and SPLS groups in increasing wealth order are (9.9%, 15.6%, 11.8%). For the BPLS
treatment, the dierences in savings frequency between the control and BPLS groups in
increasing wealth order are (20.8%, 24%, 24.5%). So, it looks like the conjecture that
PLS substitutability for savings decreasing in wealth does not have strong evidence
in support. It is also a possibility that the substitutability result has not been tested
ideally, as neither the ratio nor the dierence between the expected returns of savings
and that of PLS is constant over the dierent wealth levels. Another similar experiment
with return values chosen appropriately may allow for more careful analysis on how
substitutability changes with wealth.
The most important conclusion of the experiment is reached via analysis of the data
in addressing H3a. Testing H3a gives the reason for the overall increase in demand that
BPLS has over SPLS: existing savings is the primary source for the added demand.
Comparing the savings levels between the SPLS and BPLS treatments, aggregating
all non-savings into a category and using the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test yields highly
signicant p-values in increasing wealth order of (<.01, .02, <.01). It seems that for
a signicant number of individuals, the entertainment and/or illusion of control value
of BPLS is enough to compensate for the lower expected return that PLS has when
compared to savings, providing experimental evidence that many individuals have a
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non-zero entertainment and/or illusion of control value.
Analysis
There are a few primary conclusions that the experimental results suggest. First, there
exists a demand for PLS; however, this is not surprising given the existing success PLS
products have had for literally centuries, making this result not controversial in any way.
The more controversial issue is the source of that demand: is there signicant amounts
of new savings being created, or is the demand simply the result of the cannibalization
of savings. My experiment suggests a combination of these two reasons. I don't nd
proof of PLS serving as a substitute for lottos, but it may serve as one for gambling,
but most of the PLS demand seems to be sourced by existing savings. What does
existing empirical and experimental evidence about PLS indicate about the source of
PLS demand, and how (and even why) do they relate or dier from my experimental
evidence?
A number of studies conclude that PLS does not merely cannibalize savings but
creates new levels of savings. Atalay et al. (2012) and Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2015)
provide experimental evidence of this, Cole et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence in
their study of MoMa accounts in South Africa, and Cookson (forthcoming) provides
empirical evidence in his study of Save to Win accounts in the Unites States. The
source of this new savings is another important question, but one that is much harder
to answer. Atalay et al. (2012) proceed to address this by providing experimental
subjects the ability to split $100 between a set of options: consumption, a lotto, PLS
and standard savings. They conclude that most of the demand for PLS is sourced
by substitution from lottos and then from consumption, with savings cannibalization
contributing the least. I nd quite the opposite, that savings cannibalization seems
to be the primary source of the demand for PLS. Given my cited concerns with the
expected returns on the assets in the Atalay et al. (2012) paper, I turn to Cookson
(forthcoming) as a baseline to sort out the conicting results.
Cookson (forthcoming) empirically analyzes the Save to Win Program PLS accounts
at credit unions in Nebraska. Using cash withdrawal casino data, the author estimates
that PLS introduction at the credit unions accounted for about a $200,000 to $400,000
substitution away from casino gambling, while the total amount of additional savings
at the participating credit unions was about $2 million. The author further analyzes
data on lotto spending and gets a smaller but signicant substitution eect away from
lotto spending. Still, the majority of the increase in savings does not seem due to sub-
stitution away from lottos and gambling. In terms of the options available in my study,
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I basically have a gambling option where Atalay et al. (2012) have consumption, the
other three options are the same, although their returns are starkly dierent. Cook-
son (forthcoming) uses credit card cash withdrawals that incur high cash advance fees
and casino ATM requests of funds in excess of the account balance as a proxy for low
self control. The author nds that the substitution eect is only large and signicant
for high self control individuals. This suggests that PLS introduction does not aect
individuals uniformly; I believe this nding can provide insight into the conicting re-
sults between my experiment and that of Atalay et al. (2012). It may be the case
that many individuals who would be classied as high self control gamblers opted into
the gambling option in my study and not the lotto option, and my results show that
there was some evidence of substitution for gambling. Perhaps if Atalay et al. (2012)
included a gambling option in their study, a similar sorting would have happened and
the substitution witnessed would have happened from the gambling category instead
of the lotto category. In light of the Cookson (forthcoming) study, my results can be
placed appropriately within their overall ndings. Given that I nd no substitution
eect from lottos, I am inclined to think that those who sorted into lottos may be low
self control individuals or have a very strong preference for extreme positive skewness
that PLS can't oer. Regardless, the Cookson (forthcoming) result that PLS serves het-
erogeneously across individuals as a substitute for lottos and gambling is quite strong,
and the rst glance conclusion from my experimental result of PLS not serving as a
substitute for lottos needs to be taken within the context of all the existing evidence.
My major nding of BPLS cannibalizing savings much more than SPLS can be ex-
plained by looking at utility and risk preferences. Individuals who preferred savings
over PLS are consistent with risk neutral and risk averse agents maximizing expected
utility. In the case of BPLS, a much higher percentage of individuals preferred PLS
than in the case of SPLS. Assuming a xed utility value for entertainment and illusion
of control, independent of wealth levels, expected returns, etc., the added utility that
BPLS provides over SPLS seems to be enough to encourage a signicant additional
switchover from savings. A risk neutral or slightly risk averse agent who is a standard
expected utility maximizer but also places some level of utility on entertainment and/or
illusion of control strictly prefers BPLS over SPLS. For such an individual considering
savings vs BPLS, if the added utility from entertainment and/or illusion of control is
enough to compensate for the lower expected return and higher risk of BPLS, this indi-
vidual will prefer BPLS. No such condition applies for this individual when considering
savings vs SPLS, as there is no entertainment and/or illusion of control.
Given the limited scale of the experiment, as each individual only saw three ques-
tions, there is most certainly room for extension, improvement and robustness checks.
115
For instance, lottery and gambling uncertainty realization and payment happens im-
mediately those products are purchased, while for savings there is no uncertainty but
payment happens in the future, and for PLS uncertainty realization and payment both
happen in the future. Framing the experiment within a time context may lead to rel-
atively less demand for both savings and PLS when compared to the timeless version,
given future discounting. There may also be room for estimating the value of entertain-
ment and the illusion of control by asking more questions that vary the expected returns
on PLS relative to the other assets. I also do not disentangle the impact of entertain-
ment value and that of the illusion of control, as BPLS incorporates both. I implicitly
assumes that these two eects do not cancel out each other, which is an assumption
that could be tested in future research. However, given the strong evidence of the initial
experiment, coupled with the corroborating conclusion of Cookson (forthcoming) that
decreased dierentiation between PLS and lottos/gambling increases substitutability of
PLS, there is little reason to doubt that making behaviorally-inspired modications to
PLS will increase demand in PLS relative to PLS without such changes. Filiz-Ozbay et
al. (2015) nd that PLS requires lower returns than standard savings to induce savings.
If so, even if this increase in demand is sourced solely from existing savings, this can
allow providers of savings products to accrue savings at lower costs. For instance, banks
can oer PLS at a slightly lower expected return than their standard savings account.
If this only amounts to some individuals switching from savings to PLS, and the main-
tenance costs of PLS accounts are equal to those of standard savings, this will amount
to cost savings by the banks. Therefore, regardless of the source of PLS demand, banks
and similar institutions should be eager to provide PLS products as a lower cost source
of funds. If they oer BPLS products, my experimental results suggest that it may
result in additional switchover from savings and further cost savings when compared to
oering SPLS products.
Conclusion
PLS is a unique savings product that combines the principal guarantee of standard
savings with the upside risk of gambling and lottos. It would therefore seem to be
a substitute for both the riskless savings and the risky gambling and lottos. The
experimental and empirical evidence validates this supposition. Assuming that substi-
tutability increases the less dierentiated two products are, making PLS more similar to
gambling and lottos would increase the substitution eect from gambling and lottos to
PLS. Furthermore, if gambling and lottos provide an inherent gaming or entertainment
value that in independent of their payo distribution, along with an illusion of control
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value, capturing these eects in PLS will only make PLS more appealing. Currently,
PLS products do not systematically seek to incorporate gaming aspects or illusion of
control facets; rather they focus on the uniqueness of the payo distribution when com-
pared to existing savings products. It would behoove proponents and providers of PLS
to gamify PLS: this could be by allowing participants to choose winning numbers, play
some game to determine if they are a winner or advance into the next round of winner
determination, etc. These could be done on site of the institutions that provide PLS,
or this could be done remotely via online platforms. Many banks and savings institu-
tions have existing online platforms for their customers to do their banking business.
Banks and the like could incur the xed costs of setting up an electronic PLS winner
determination system within their existing platforms and reap the rewards of increased
sources of funds at lower costs to them.
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